Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

289. Memorandum for the Record prepared by unknown drafter, February 7¹

February 7, 1963

SUBJECT

• Views of Dr. Enthoven on Tactical Nuclear Warfare

1. The following views were expressed by Dr. Enthoven in a meeting with the Tactical Nuclear Branch, the Tactical Nuclear Ad Hoc Vice Chairman, and the Deputy Chairman, SSG on 4 February 1963. Meeting with Dr. Enthoven was requested by General Edwards to discuss current Study Group efforts and interpretation of memorandum from Mr. Kaysen of the White House.

a. Dr. Enthoven prefaced his remarks by stating that since our last meeting of 10 December he had gained a clearer view relative to where tactical nuclear weapons do and do not fit into our strategic posture. His conclusions are:

(1) It has been pretty well decided that it is feasible, desirable, and even necessary to have adequate deployed non-nuclear forces capable of holding an enemy conventional assault without the use of nuclear weapons. These deployed conventional forces can be feasibly backed up by necessary CONUS based reserves and with such a posture we have a good capability of achieving reasonable objectives without resorting to nuclears.

(2) When both sides have a comparable balance of tactical nuclears, he has concluded that it is not to our advantage to initiate their use in most situations. Any theater in which tactical nuclear weapons are used becomes an area of mutual disaster—both population and industry are destroyed. It looks now as if the mutual destruction disadvantage out-weighs the military advantage.

(3) Based on the above points, tactical nuclear weapons are NOT required to substitute for a conventional force deficiency. Aside from weapons needed to demonstrate resolve, what then are tactical nuclear weapons for? The answer is that tactical nuclear weapons are required to:

(a) “Deter the other guy” from initiating tactical nuclear warfare, and

(b) If deterrence fails, to allow use to fight nuclear war in the theater. (In answer to a question later discussed, Dr. Enthoven acknowledged that a valid purpose of tactical nuclear weapons can be to deter the enemy from massing a decisive conventional force.)

(4) Tactical nuclear forces have three basic design implications:

(a) They must be able to survive and remain ready and capable during the conventional battle. They must live through the conventional phase without degradation of capability while continuing to provide an umbrella of nuclear deterrence. Safety (peacetime safety?) and stability are parts of the problem.

(b) They must have a second strike capability, i.e., they must be able to survive a nuclear onslaught initiated by the enemy.

(c) Having survived, they must then perform a useful military function, i.e., they must be able to provide effective nuclear fire when needed.

(5) Notwithstanding any views to the contrary, Kaysen, Rowen, and Enthoven believe that in any general war the strategic exchange will dominate the outcome.

b. The thought that an adequate level of conventional forces can be attained which can successfully fight in Europe without nuclear weapons is firmly established in the thinking of the President, the Secretary of Defense and “most of the people who work for them.” We should re-read McNamara’s December presentation to the NATO Council of Ministers in this regard. NATO outnumbers Warsaw Pact in population and soldiers; industrial production is 2½ times as great. Thus the present administration is convinced that proper organization of conventional forces can give us an adequate capability. Admittedly, there is currently a problem of convincing our allies. We must attack the myth of Soviet conventional superiority.

Further studies of our intelligence picture will have to be undertaken to examine this. The military and intelligence community appear to be overstating Soviet Bloc capability. It is not possible (unless McNamara has been “con-ed” by the Army) for the USSR to equip and support 100 divisions or anything approaching that number on the amount of money they are spending. This leads to the “PEMA paradox”: We are currently spending $3.3 billion for PEMA for 22 divisions versus $3.6 billion equivalent by Soviets. How can they equip such a force? Enthoven’s estimate is that it would take the Soviets $15 billion annually to provide a 100 division force when the divisions equated to those of the United States. It would be, indeed, remarkable if they were able to produce modernized conventional forces for what they are spending.

(Dr. Enthoven acknowledged later in the conference that the above argument and the line of reasoning outlined in paragraph 1a are based on the premise that our intelligence picture has not been fully correct in reflecting the Soviet conventional threat, and that a deeper probe of the intelligence picture will affirm this. To what extent the concepts outlined by Enthoven would be altered if current estimates of the threat are upheld was not discussed.)

c. The conclusions expressed in paragraph a above interact with the question of Dual Capability. Tactical fighters, artillery and infantry battalions are now all designed for both conventional and nuclear roles. But in fact, dual capability may not be a good thing. It doesn’t meet the requirement and is not a realistic capability anyway. The time of greatest need for nuclear capability is during conventional conflict when we are faced with great danger of escalation by the Soviets—particularly if we are succeeding conventionally. Under present concepts of having dual capable forces we can’t really do either job well. We need two types of forces, as few weapons are really dual capable.

For example, land based tactical fighters do not meet the requirements of the design objectives for tactical nuclear forces (see above) and therefore are not really a dual capable system. They are vulnerable on the ground in nuclear war and therefore are suitable primarily for conventional operations. MMRBM can perform most of the nuclear missions now assigned to tactical fighters. Possibly carrier based aviation can be considered as dual capable—vulnerability may not be as great and weapons of both types are immediately available.

The problem presented with many nuclear weapons in the hands of the Army is survivability during the initial phase of nuclear war. Troops and weapons are not really protected against nuclear weapon effects. During the conventional phase the nuclear delivery vehicles are vulnerable to conventional weapon attacks and in the way. After escalation the conventional forces will be chewed up.

When we give a commander a dual capability there is a tendency to emphasize nuclear training at the expense of conventional training. Conventional training, doctrine, and equippage suffer.

The F4C is a good airplane for conventional war, however, it is too vulnerable for nuclear war. PERSHING is a partial answer pending development of other MMRMS’s for this mission. PERSHING has a fair range. In peacetime and during conventional conflict, it can be kept back out of range of enemy non-nuclear forces and can perform a military useful function. In this regard Dr. Enthoven referred to the Lee Study on NATO interdiction as a useful employment. A mobile MRBM is probably not vulnerable except under blanket nuclear attack. It is recognized that they could be eliminated in such an attack if the Soviets want to destroy Western Europe. Under these conditions external forces are required to deal with the situation. Dr. Enthoven envisions that specialized nuclear forces would “stay lost” but alert during conventional war. They should not be intermixed with the conventional forces.

A real problem with DAVY CROCKETT is that it does not have adequate survival potential and cannot be adequately controlled under present organizational concepts. Objections to the DAVY CROCKETT and other short-range weapons are that they are up front and vulnerable and they are symbolic of intent to use nuclears from the outset of any conflict situation.

What we really need to do is figure out an approach to designing special purpose tactical nuclear forces.

The Howze concept (as expressed in his article in Army Magazine) may not be too valid for conventional conflict in Europe since it is limited in conventional firepower; however, some such concept might well fit into the development of special nuclear ground units. We should read “Rommel’s Memoirs.” Lines on maps are fine things, but . . . The FEBA referred to in the Initial Project 23 Report is hardly a valid consideration in ground nuclear warfare² nor necessarily in conventional warfare. If we study current and past Soviet doctrine relative to mass and breakthrough, it is obvious that future war will not be fought along lines on a map. Have we not been over simplifying the war too much in this respect? Thus, the problem of ADM’s is that they depend on the use of a nuclear defense line. They might be valuable to protect the border but this presupposes immediate escalation—or they could be useful on the Rhine. However, we can lay down a line of seared earth with PERSHINGS if required.

Insofar as ASW is concerned even the Navy does not see a net advantage to use by our side. We are better off non-nuclear because of the high risk of escalation and the problem of locating and identifying. On the other hand, attack submarines of Soviets have much better chances of locating and identifying our surface forces. Use of nuclears are then much to his advantage. (THIS IS AN IMPORTANT ADVANCE SINCE IT REPRESENTS THE FIRST CRACK IN MILITARY THINKING INDICATING THAT NUCLEAR WARFARE MAY NOT ALWAYS BE TO OUR ADVANTAGE.)

d. Kaysen, Rowen, and Enthoven are all convinced that the strategic exchange will dominate the outcome of a general war and may be decisive regardless of tactical nuclear weapons. As an indirectly related point, Dr. Enthoven indicated the possibility that our current SIOP guidance possibly should be changed to accept a lower level of damage expectancy in SIOP targeting. Perhaps retardation and interdiction targets in Europe should receive more emphasis. It is important to understand the role of tactical nuclears under these conditions and to understand what they will or will not do for us.

Evidence indicates that the Soviets have no nuclear warheads deployed outside the Soviet Union. They have re-usable MRBM launchers. MRMBs can give Soviet theater forces nuclear support. Couldn’t PERSHING do the same for us and keep him from massing his units on the Western front? Twenty Tactical Recee squadrons are planned; can they keep track of enemy units for PERSHING to hit?

We realize today that our conventional forces are inadequate, but we do not assume that tactical nuclear weapons are a substitute. We must persuade our allies that the only acceptable defense against conventional attack is a conventional response. The British are starting to feel we are on the right track, the French have and plan a big army, so we cannot assume that they will not accept this view.

e. In answer to a question, Dr. Enthoven stated that the Studies Group should not concern itself with the question of nuclear weapon requirements during the interval pending achievement of an adequate level of conventional forces.

2. Recapitulation of Dr. Enthoven’s views.

a. If we build up our conventional forces, the Bloc would be hard pressed to “stay ahead.” Economically they are now spending one-fourth of their GNP on defense and are obviously feeling the strain. Add this to our doubts about the number of effective divisions equivalents they now have and it makes the 50 percent increase in conventional forces in Central Europe even more desirable. “We can and will have adequate conventional forces.”

b. Our strategic force structure is credible and deters general war. The day is fast approaching when the side which pre-empts will be expending his delivery capability without any real gain (assuming a highly survivable ICBM force on each side). Thus, the possibility of general war is receding. Our aim is to develop nuclear forces that present a credible deterrence to nuclear war below the general war level. Concurrent therewith we are going to develop conventional forces to respond to conventional assault. Today our conventional forces are inadequate—they need not be in the future.

c. Tactical nuclear weapons can’t solve the problem if we don’t have conventional forces. The military is saying “we can’t do without nuclears” but the much broader question is “can we do with them.” It now appears that we are inviting mutual disaster by planning to escalate to the nuclear level. If the Study Group can prove that it is to our net military advantage to use tactical nuclears, it will be very surprising. Tactical nuclear weapons are NOT a substitute for adequate conventional forces; we can have sufficient conventional forces to do the job. There are, however, two main reasons for the existence of tactical nuclear weapons:

(1) To deter the Bloc from using them.

(2) If this fails, to allow the theater forces to continue fighting the war.

d. Insofar as short-range, small-yield weapons are concerned, we must examine new organizations and concepts that will meet the “design objective.”

e. The military is perpetuating what seems to be a myth relative to the invincibility of Soviet conventional forces. GNP and dollar equivalent comparisons indicate that the advantage can be on our side. We can and must examine this to see if it is a myth.

f. We must proceed to examine an organization comprised of two kinds of distinct and separate theater forces and “get off the dual capability kick”—one force specially tailored for nuclear war—one for conventional.

3. What does this all mean in our study efforts (as seen by Dr. Enthoven)?

a. If our analysis (or any other study) is based upon the premise that a conventional strategy is hopeless, we might as well not bother to do it. “Hearing aids will be turned off throughout the civilian levels and the studies will end up in a drawer unread.”

b. The real issues are not the fiscal year 1965 stockpile, but the longer range questions posed by Kaysen and the Secretary of Defense. The fiscal year 1965 stockpile is merely being used to “smoke out the issues.” The real problem of our study is to develop long-term policy objectives.

c. We should accept the fact that we will respond conventionally and get on with the problem of how we design the nuclear systems to provide:

(1) Survivability during the conventional phase.

(2) Survivability in nuclear warfare and second strike capability.

(3) After surviving, they must then perform a useful military function.

d. The administration is not trying to take tactical nuclear weapons away. The issue is the type of force and what weapons we need for it. The issue is not whether we have theater nuclear forces but rather what do we need to make them effective.

1. “Views of Dr. Enthoven on Tactical Nuclear Warfare.” Top Secret. 6 pp. National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Tac Nuc Wpns Study.
2. This is a misconstruction of Project 23 on this point. References to a “FEBA” were deleted in most cases from Project 23 for this very reason. The notion of a “zone of contact” was substituted.