288. Memorandum from Maj. Smith to Gen. Goodpaster, February 61

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SUBJECT

  • US Policy on Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe

1. In one of the first, and last, NSC policy documents approved by this administration, the unsympathetic attitude toward tactical nuclear weapons in Europe was made clear. The document was entitled, “NATO and the Atlantic Nations”, (TAB A) and resulted from an Acheson report on the same subject. It was approved by the President on 22 April 1961.

2. Setting forth a “pragmatic military doctrine” the paper said (p. 5) the US should urge that:

NATO continue . . . to prepare to meet nuclear or massive non-nuclear attack on the theater—but not to a degree that would divert needed resources from non-nuclear theater programs to meet lesser threats or from programs to assure an ample and protected US strategic power.”

3. Later, (p. 7), with reference to nuclear forces the paper stated:

“a. The President should state that an offensive nuclear capability will be maintained in the European area and that nuclear weapons will not be withdrawn without adequate replacement. Nuclear weapons in NATO Europe may be regrouped as further studies may indicate.

“b. Additional resources should be used to strengthen the nuclear capability now in Europe only where (i) going programs are so far underway that they could not be changed without serious adverse political effects, or (ii) the increase will not divert needed resources from non-nuclear tasks and is clearly required to cover needs either for replacement or expansion that cannot be met from outside the theater. [Facsimile Page 2] The 1963 goals, as well as the proposed 1966 goals, should be reviewed by the State and Defense Departments from this standpoint.”

4. In Athens last May, Secretary McNamara clearly implied to our NATO Allies that the US believed the need for tactical nuclear weapons would be less useful in the future. He stated:

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“Battlefield nuclear weapons were introduced in NATO at a time when our Shield forces were weak and the Soviet atomic stockpile was small. In these circumstances it was reasonable to hope that NATO might very quickly halt a Soviet advance into Western Europe by unilateral application of nuclear weapons on or near the battlefield. Using nuclear weapons tactically might still accomplish a desired end in the early 1960’s. . .

“But how much dependence should NATO place on these capabilities? We should succeed in deterring the Soviets from initiating the use of nuclear weapons, and the presence of these weapons in Europe helps to prevent Soviet use locally. But NATO can no longer expect to avoid nuclear retaliation in the event that it initiates their use. Even a local nuclear exchange could have consequences for Europe that are most painful to contemplate. Further, such an exchange would be unlikely to give us any marked military advantage. It could lead to general nuclear war.

“To be sure, a very limited use of nuclear weapons, primarily for purposes of demonstrating our will and intent to employ such weapons, might bring Soviet aggression to a halt without substantial retaliation, and without escalation. This is a next-to-last option we cannot dismiss. But prospects for success are not high, and I hesitate to predict what the political consequences would be of taking such action.”

In the same speech, however, the Secretary stated:

“There exists a deep and natural interest particularly on the part of those Allies who maintain nuclear delivery systems, that US nuclear warheads for such delivery systems [Facsimile Page 3] will be maintained in Europe. President Kennedy previously authorized Ambassador Finletter to state in the Permanent Council that the US will continue to make available to the Alliance the nuclear weapons necessary for NATO defense, and will consult with its Allies about any significant changes which might occur in present US programs for supplying nuclear weapons in support of NATO forces.”

To old NATO hands, whenever the word “Alliance” is used rather than “NATO” by this administration, it usually means weapons outside Europe, i.e., strategic. Thus the Secretary’s statement really does not necessarily mean that the US will maintain nuclear weapons “for the Alliance” in Europe. Rather the last sentence of the exalt in truth foreshadows possible reductions.

5. In Paris last December, Secretary McNamara, undoubtedly because of the known European fears that the US was in the process of a “nuclear withdrawal”, did not speak out quite so strongly against tactical nuclear weapons. In fact, he seemed to retreat a bit. He referred briefly to his remarks at Athens on the escalatory possibilities of the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and commented:

“At this juncture, however, it is premature to suggest specific changes in our tactical nuclear programs. Because of the great strategic and tactical nuclear powers already at our disposal, we have time. I strongly urge that we use the time not only to review our programs [Typeset Page 1140] but also to re-examine the assumption on (sic) that tactical use of nuclear weapons by both sides would generally be to the advantage of the Alliance.”

Then significantly, the Secretary added:

“I want to make it perfectly clear that it is our intention to maintain and to increase tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. However, I doubt that they are the means by which we can compensate for non-nuclear weaknesses.”

In the remainder of the speech Secretary McNamara emphasized the need for NATO non-nuclear forces, asking $8.5 billion more from our Allies for these forces over the next five years.

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6. In summary, in 1961 the President approved a policy of restricting further the tactical nuclear build-up in Europe. Since then, all nuclear weapons productions schedules, dispersal plans, and the original directive for JCS studies on tactical nuclear weapons have been drawn up with emphasis on reducing the availability and restricting the use of tactical nuclear weapons. (This can be documented, if desired.) But then in Paris the US told its Allies we plan to increase tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Nothing since December, however, has shown that the Paris speech in fact constituted a basic change in policy. This leads to a conclusion that while our Allies believe we have plans to increase nuclear weapons in Europe, our action policy still remains one of restricting any build-up and reducing the number of deployed weapons if possible.

W.Y.S.
  1. “US Policy on Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe.” Top Secret. 4 pp. National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Tac Nuc I.