284. Notes on Remarks of President Kennedy, January 221

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Following is the substance of a forty-minute talk by the President at 11:00 a.m., January 22, 1963, to the National Security Council and a large group of officers of the Government departments.

The subject was forthcoming National Security problems.

The President began by saying that he wanted particularly to review the problems and areas that are going to be before us in the coming months. U.S. responsibility is worldwide, he said, and the U.S. is the only power that can fully exercise that responsibility. He cited the commitments to NATO, SEATO and, in the case of CENTO, the U.S.’s role as the key country though it is not a member.

CUBA

The reason the Cuban crisis illustrates the importance of providing time during moments of confrontation between the big powers so that both sides can consider alternatives before moving to points of no return. He pointed out that it was a “very close thing” between a U.S. decision to mount an air strike against the Soviet installations and the final decision, the quarantine. The results, he said, emphasized the importance of the strategy we embarked on. It put the Russians in the position of having to act within a twelve hour period. During the four to five days leading up to the U.S. decision, he said, all the principals involved somewhat changed their original views. There is general agreement, he believes, that the final decision was the right one.

We should hope, he said, to approach future crises with a similar objective, namely to give the antagonist sufficient time to consider alternatives.

It is entirely likely, he said, that we will have another serious confrontation with the Russians somewhere in the next two years, according to the history of the past two years.

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This likelihood is one of the important reasons for extreme emphasis on our present strategy of conventional force buildup in Europe. Also he said, we should not dismiss from our minds the possibility that we might have to consider again hitting Cuba in some way, either directly, or from sort of reprisal action or with some other major move [Typeset Page 1124] made necessary by either further Soviet activities there or by the conduct of the Cubans themselves.

Also he said, we should be prepared to have to move not only in Cuba but perhaps in Berlin simultaneously. We now have a hostage in this hemisphere just as the Russians have had one in Berlin for several years.

EUROPE

Since 1958, the President said, we have been faced with General de Gaulle’s proposal for a French, American, British directorate. The Eisenhower Administration rightly rejected this as a step that would give the French a veto over U.S. policy and strategy all over the world, and as one that would lead to the destruction of NATO.

The President is convinced that our refusal to accept the de Gaulle triumverate idea has not produced our present troubles with de Gaulle. In spite of what de Gaulle says, his present course is not based on a real distrust of us (in fact he is basing all his policy on reliance on U.S. power) but it is based on a strong historical conviction of the dominance of France in Europe having been rebuffed by the United States and the UK. He has now turned to the Germans in an effort to bring about this French hegemony. This is not much of a threat to us. We have attempted since the war to prevent Germany from turning East so this can be lasting value in developing Franco-German amity.

The French blockage of the UK entry into EEC is a definite setback for us and even worse one for the British. It is not as bad as some of our other problems in the world. We will have problems because the British don’t get in but we are going to have some very serious economic ones if they did get in. The President said we are “going to have trouble” with Europe in the time ahead. [Facsimile Page 3] This is all the more reasons, he said, why we must push hard and fast on the multilateral nuclear plan and on general strengthening of NATO. Perhaps the multilateral plan can’t be worked out, but it is the best course, and one which would maintain our ability to influence Europe on behalf of our own interests and would keep them somewhat dependent on U.S. power.

The President recited the list of de Gaulle’s non-cooperation in NATO, UN, Congo, Laos and Viet Nam, but concluded “he is there and we have to live with him”.

The President spoke at some length on our trade and balance of payments problems and said that all those involved in trade negotiations are going to have to be very careful about protecting the interest of this country. He said, with great emphasis, that we have got to settle our balance of payments hemorrhage by 1964. If not, great pressure [Typeset Page 1125] will develop in the Congress for us to withdraw from the world to narrower policy. We have got to find ways to make Europe carry its full share. If the balance of payments continues to worsen it could be the beginning of fast deterioration of U.S. power. We have already lost most of our economic power, with the rise to prosperity in Europe, so we must use our military and nuclear power in negotiations for our interest. The point, he drove home, was that we have to look out for ourselves in months ahead and not expect that our allies are going to be particularly generous about helping us settle our own problems.

NEUTRALS

The President recognized that there is considerable criticism here and among some allies that we do not distinguish between neutrals and allies. He said that Pakistan is a critic of this sort. We have got to be pretty cold about this the President said. India may be neutral, but it represents one-sixth of the world’s population and 40% of the underdeveloped world. It is in our own interest to have a sub-continent that can protect itself externally and internally. Since the split with China, India represents a historical opportunity and we must coldly assess our interests as we consider each neutral government. He pointed out that we cannot tolerate the notion of any of our aid recipients that [Facsimile Page 4] our aid should be used to settle some of their historical differences with their neighbors. Also he said, we can’t have neutrals falling into the Communist camp. It may be personally obnoxious to have us to have to deal with Sukarno and Nassar but it is necessary.

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AID

Strong effort must be made in the next few months to tie our AID very closely to the security of the United States. The test of every Aid proposal is whether it serves the U.S. It was a mistake, the President believes, to call the program AID, a mistake made by this Administration. Mutual Security may have become a tired term but it is still a better one.

He said he particularly hopes that Defense officials will be more alert to the necessity of economic as well as military aid. They have better luck in getting military aid approved by the Congress but military aid is simply not enough. South Korea can’t be kept alive by military aid alone.

The President expressed great concern that the Congress will badly mutilate the AID weapon this year unless the Administration really makes a case and drives it home to the American people. The way to do this, he said, is to make very clear to the American people how and why AID is in their interest.

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The President said he was sure that nobody in this Administration wanted to be in power in a period where four or five or more countries fall to Communism.

DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

The President spoke at some length on the budget situation pointing out that we are going to have a deficit of 12 to 12½ billion dollars. He pointed out that except for Defense, Space and interest on debt (about which we can do nothing), the budget under the three years that has been presented by this Administration has been increased less than under the three years previously of the Eisenhower Administration.

He expressed deep concern about the slow growth rate of the U.S. in the past ten years—only 1 percent a year per capita. This was one illustration of why the Tax Reform Bill is very important. If we have another recession in this country it will seriously hurt our gold [Facsimile Page 6] reserves and have an extremely bad psychological effect in the U.S. The very force of Khrushchev’s progress in Russia while we drift could prove to be a tremendous victory for him if we do not end the drift and move forward.

The President said with great emphasis, “We have to prevent another recession.” If we had one, he said, the presently contemplated deficit of 12 billion could go as high as 20 billion dollars and with disastrous effects.

MILITARY

The President said he was confident that some of the military were disturbed over the cut-backs in some programs such as B–70, Nike-Zeus and Skybolt but he reminded that the highest proportion of the budget by far is going to Defense.

In connection with Defense commitments he said that one of our biggest jobs is to persuade some of our Allies in Europe, under very adverse conditions, that they must do more themselves. The coming months are going to be rather decisive, particularly as they effect the multilateral question and our conventional strategy.

As he did in other places, the President stressed that we must consider very hard the narrow interest of the U.S. as well as the general interest of the world. Otherwise the voice of the U.S. will become less and less and if this happens free world power will also become less and less.

He remarked that DeGaulle’s strategy is in fact based entirely on the power of the U.S.

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DISARMAMENT

He placed heavy emphasis on the importance of a nuclear test ban. If the USSR really wants one and knows we must ultimately include Red China, then the [Facsimile Page 7] conclusion of test ban negotiations can have helpful consequences that we are not yet able to define.

He expressed great concern about the possibility of the Chinese Communist nuclear capability. He thought a test ban agreement might produce pressure against development of such a capability. Any negotiations that can hold back the Chinese Communists are most important, he said, because they loom as our major antagonists of the late 60’s and beyond.

The President spoke for approximately more than 40 minutes with considerable force and clarity. He used no notes but was obviously well organized in his train of thought and concepts. He expressed thanks to everyone at the meeting for the work they and their colleagues had done in the last year. He was pleased by the way various branches of the Government had been cooperating and hoped that this inter-relationship would grow even stronger in the next year.

  1. A review of national security problems: Cuba; Europe; the Neutrals; domestic affairs; foreign aid, and military issues. Top Secret. 7 pp. Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/1–2363.