283. Memorandum from Col. Legere to Col. Ewell, January 161
[Facsimile Page 1]
SUBJECT
1. This morning Carl Kaysen gave
me the attached draft memo from himself to Gilpatric and amplified upon it orally. He has recently
spoken with some high-level people in Defense, and they agree with his
feeling that by 1 March it will be impossible for the Special Studies
Group to turn out a definitive paper which might at least tend to
silence the skeptics on one side or both of the argument. I might add
right here that he is not dead sure he will send the attached draft, but
has asked me for suggestions in modifying it.
2. I believe Kaysen’s thinking, as
known to you, comes through quite clearly in the attached draft. Just to
nail it down, he expressly told me that Alain Enthoven wonders why Pershings cannot do
everything the shorter-range stuff can. In short, the command and
control tail is wagging the nuclear dog. However, the idea of extending
the study deadline may be a good one; Kaysen notes in this connection that General Taylor would probably go along—with
the understanding that the decisions on production for FY 65 would also be delayed and would not
be pre-judged.
3. I would recommend holding my contacts with Kaysen on a sensitive basis.
[Facsimile Page 2]
Attachment
SUBJECT
- Proposed Guidelines for Further Study of the Requirements of
Tactical and Anti-submarine Nuclear Weapons for FY 1965
On January 7, 1963 you transmitted proposed guidelines for the above
study. There are three areas in which it might be useful to ask [Typeset Page 1122]
additional questions. All are of a rather broader scope than those
posed in the guidelines.
First is the question of the relation of the tactical nuclear weapons
singled out for particular study—ADM’s, artillery and DAVY CROCKETT—to weapons of
longer-range, especially SERGEANT and PERSHINGS. Are the military
tasks for which the shorter-range weapons are intended by their
nature so unamenable to targeting by the longer-range weapons that
we must plan on including them in our arsenal despite the obvious
and major problem which they will create in the area of command and
control.
Second is a more fundamental question: the relation of the use of
tactical nuclears to escalation to higher levels of violence in
NATO. Specifically if, in a
particular situation in Europe, it appears that tactical nuclears
need to be called into play, what are [Facsimile Page 3] to examine the extent to
which the use of tactical nuclears gives each side the incentive to
preempt on the strategic level. Further, in the European situation,
does not the civil damage from extensive tactical nuclears make it
more attractive from the point of view of our European allies to
initiate the early use of strategic weapons?
Third is the question of the utility of tactical nuclear weapons
after an exchange of strategic blows. In other words, how, after a
strategic exchange, would the possession versus the non-possession
of a wide variety of tactical nuclear ground weapons affect the
outcome?
Since these three questions are broad and raise many important
problems, it appears doubtful that answers to them can be achieved
with present deadlines. Accordingly, I have requested the AEC to explore the possibility of
extending the decision deadlines for the FY 1965 weapons production program until June 1. If
this is possible without a substantial increase in the cost of
producing the list of weapons under study or without a substantial
delay in achieving the scheduled output then I think the proposed
study should be given a broader scope and a later deadline.
