260. Memorandum for the Record Prepared by Maury, January 261
SUBJECT
- ONE Comments on Special Report re “New Emphasis on Strengthening Soviet Strategic Missile Capabilities”, of 25 January 1962
1. This afternoon I discussed the above report with Mr. Stoertz, of ONE, who expressed the following views:
a. The report is of great significance and seems to provide an answer for a number of important questions that have troubled the estimators.
[Typeset Page 930]b. For some time there apparently has been controversy and confusion in Soviet policy circles regarding the allocation of resources as between strategic missiles and other military requirements. In talking to Nixon in late 1959 and in a speech of January 1960, Khrushchev indicated that he was putting most of his eggs in the strategic missiles basket. During this period, there was evidence that Soviet ships were being put in mothballs, Soviet ground forces were being cut back and the production of conventional aircraft was dropping off.
c. In 1961, however, the Soviets seemed to shift in the other direction, giving increased emphasis to conventional forces. This may have been related to the Berlin issue, but in any event, personnel were being retained in service beyond the normal tour and ground force components received considerable emphasis.
d. Now there is evidence that the pendulum is again swinging in the direction of heavy emphasis on strategic missiles. This may be the result of one or more of the following:
(1) The success of recent tests of the Category B ICBM may have convinced the Soviets that this weapon is now sufficiently reliable to justify a mass production program and to receive major emphasis in future Soviet military planning.
[Facsimile Page 2](2) Our recently published articles from Voyennaya Mysl have reflected a sharp controversy within Soviet military circles regarding the role of strategic missiles. The time appears right for a decision on this issue and, in light of the successful Category B tests, this decision may at last have been made—in favor of the concept of keeping strategic missile forces under a separate command.
2. In evaluating the significance of the report, it seems clear that:
a. The Soviets will not be ready for a military show down until the new ICBM program has been substantially completed.
b. The achievement of the proposed missile capability may be designed to serve political and psychological as well as military purposes (for example, Malinovsky’s speech last week reflects the extent to which the Soviets seek to use their missile capabilities to intimidate their adversaries).
c. While source’s use of the term “frantic” to describe the current program may be questioned, there is every reason to believe that the Soviets are now engaged in a vigorous missiles program, and current estimates suggest that by mid 1963 they will have 125 operational ICBM launching sites of more than one missile each. However, current estimates hold that this program cannot be completed in time to meet Khrushchev’s alleged deadline of “the end of 1962.”
3. Mr. Stoertz summarized a number of suggested follow-up requirements to be levied on this source, emphasizing particularly the importance of obtaining actual numbers and rates of production, [Typeset Page 931] number of missiles per launching site, rate of refire, etc. I was able to assure him that all of these requirements had already been carefully spelled out in source’s past briefings.
- Comments on special report on “New Emphasis on Strengthening Soviet Strategic Missile Capabilities.” Secret; Eyes Alone. 2 pp. CIA Files, Job 80B01285A, Mtgs w/President, 12/1/61–6/30/62.↩