259. Memorandum from Helms to McCone, January 251

[Facsimile Page 1]

SUBJECT

  • New Emphasis on Strengthening Soviet Strategic Missile Capabilities

1. Enclosed is another of the special series of CS reports bearing the codeword CHICKADEE. These reports, the product of a sensitive operation to which we wish to afford maximum security, are being distributed on a MUST KNOW basis within the TALENT CONTROL SYSTEM. Arrangements for utilizing any part of this material in any other form must be made with the originating office.

[Typeset Page 928]

2. Information in the enclosed report was obtained by a senior Soviet official who has provided reliable information in the past. Questions regarding this report should be referred to Mr. Maury, Code 143, extension 2421.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms
[Facsimile Page 2] [Facsimile Page 3]

Attachment

COUNTRY

  • USSR

SUBJECT

  • New Emphasis on Strengthening Soviet Strategic Missile Capabilities

DATE OF INFO

  • Mid-January 1962

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT

  • 2

SOURCE

  • A senior Soviet official who has provided reliable information in the past (B), from various senior officers concerned with the Soviet missile program.

1. A certain “evolution” has taken place in the policies of Khrushchev and his government. Unable to resolve the Berlin problem to his taste and wishes by means of shouting threats and similar pressures, Khrushchev continues to fight to win time, which he will use for a further frantic missile and atomic arms race.

2. Khrushchev has decided to complete the production of the required number of strategic missiles with nuclear warheads this year, so that when they are added to the means of mass destruction already available, he will have the capability of covering all NATO countries and bases with these weapons. Such missiles are [Facsimile Page 4] already targeted against West Germany and France in large numbers, and to some extent against England, Italy, and the USA; ballistic weapons have been brought to combat readiness. A large number of launching sites targeted against West Germany are located in the Carpathians.

3. A final decision has been made in favor of Marshal of the Soviet Union Kirill S. Moskalenko’s forces (strategic missiles). His headquarters and directorates will not be combined with the headquarters of [Typeset Page 929] Chief Marshal of Artillery Sergey S. Varentsov (tactical missiles).2 Infantry and tanks will no longer receive as great attention and appropriations as was the case last year. Moskalenko’s forces will be built up rapidly, and an enormous part of the budget is allotted to them. In the immediate future new units (chast) will be deployed (razvertyvatsya) under Moskalenko’s command. It is considered that the tanks and other ground troops’ weapons already available in large numbers are sufficient for the present time, and that it is necessary to effect a major shift of the material and technical potential of the country to production of weapons for Moskalenko’s forces. This does not mean that the production of missiles and other armament for the ground army will be stopped completely, but its scale will be cut down.

4. The decision has already been made, and has begun to be carried out, to release 400,000 soldiers and sergeants. The release of these men was held up several months ago. This demobilization will also result in great savings, which will be applied to strategic weapons.

  1. Transmits report on “New Emphasis on Strengthening Soviet Strategic Missile Capabilities.” Top Secret; NoForn/No Dissem Abroad/Limited/Background Use Only. 4 pp. CIA Files, Job 80B01285A, Mtgs w/President, 12/1/61–6/30/62.
  2. Cf. para 3 of CSDB–3/647, 716 (TCS–9708–61), issued 4 August 1961, for source’s comment about the possibility that the commands of Moskalenko and Varentsov would be combined under Varentsov.