1. As a result of the President’s request to the Secretary of Defense
that the matter of placing more emphasis on the development of
counter-guerrilla forces be examined, I am attaching a copy of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff long-range program for developing a sound
counter-guerrilla capability.
2. Although the Secretary of Defense has given his approval to my
furnishing you a copy of this study, I would like to emphasize that he
is receiving his copy simultaneously with the delivery of the one
attached and hence has not had time to study in detail, much less to act
upon, the program.
Attachment
Memorandum for the Secretary of
Defense
JCSM–126–61
March 3,
1961
SUBJECT
- Development of Counterguerrilla Forces (U)
1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Secretary of Defense,
dated 10 February 1961, requesting the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (International Security Affairs) in consultation with the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine the means for placing more emphasis
on the development of counterguerrilla forces.
2. Foreseeing the threat of communist-inspired guerrilla movements,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff received approval on 12 October 1960, for
the implementation of JCSM–404–60,
subject: “Counterguerrilla [Typeset Page 722] Training Provided Under the Military
Assistance Program”, dated 15 September 1960. Since the objectives
of this program have largely been met or are in various stages of
implementation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the time is
appropriate to make further recommendations on a long-range program
to counter this communist-inspired guerrilla threat, both with
respect to the US Armed Forces and the indigenous armed forces of
friendly and neutral foreign countries which have a MAAG or Military Mission.
3. As a basis for recommendations, an examination has been made of
the requirements essential to the development of a sound
counterguerrilla capability. This examination has revealed the
existence of the following key military components of an effective
counterguerrilla program:
a. Instructional materials.
b. Schools.
c. Troop basis of US Armed Forces.
d. Training of US Armed Forces.
[Facsimile Page 3]
e. Equipment.
f. MAAGs and Missions advisory personnel.
g. Force structure of indigenous armed forces and other internal
security forces.
h. Training of indigenous armed forces and other internal security
forces.
i. US military contingency plans.
j. Country Team counterinsurgency plans.
k. Interdepartmental responsibilities.
l. Orientation of key civilians.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken, or are taking, actions as
listed below in order to increase the emphasis on counterguerrilla
operations.
a. Acceleration by the Military Services of programs now underway for
preparing, publishing and distributing instructional materials on
counterguerrilla tactics and techniques.
b. Inclusion of instruction in counterguerrilla warfare in
appropriate courses at Military Service Schools.
c. Emphasis on existing counterguerrilla courses to insure that
quotas are filled and that qualified students, both US and foreign,
are being nominated on a basis of need in their present assignments
and over-all value to their armed forces.
d. Establishment by CINCARIB of a course in counterguerrilla tactics
and techniques to commence on or about 1 July 1961, and expansion of
current training activities of USCINCEUR and CINCPAC to [Typeset Page 723] include courses in
counterguerrilla tactics and techniques in order that greater
numbers of US and foreign military students of friendly or neutral
countries may receive this instruction.
e. Examination of the troop basis of US Armed Forces to insure an
adequate capability in all types of units required in
counterguerrilla operations or in rendering training assistance to
other countries.
[Facsimile Page 4]
f. Inclusion of instructions in counterguerrilla operations in the
training programs of combat and combat-support units of the US Armed
Forces, as considered appropriate by each Military Service.
g. Continuation of present programs for development of special
equipment for counterguerrilla training and operations.
h. Increased emphasis and expansion of the current program which
requires that selected US military advisory personnel be qualified
or attend an appropriate course of instruction in counterguerrilla
warfare, psychological operations, civil affairs, intelligence,
counterintelligence or troop information prior to departing CONUS for assignment with a MAAG or Mission in a foreign country
with actual or potential insurgency.
i. Review of the force structure of indigenous armed forces in all
countries with an existing or potential insurgency threat by
MAAGs/Missions and/or unified commands to insure that appropriate
consideration has been given to psychological operations, civil
affairs, intelligence, counterintelligence, troop information and
public affairs, as well as combat and combat-support units. Appendix
A hereto is an estimate based on current information of the friendly
and neutral foreign countries in which a communist-inspired
guerrilla movement is most likely to develop, and the reasons
therefor.
j. Training in counterguerrilla tactics and techniques for indigenous
armed forces of friendly and neutral countries in which an actual or
potential insurgency threat exists.
k. Review of US military contingency plans to insure that
counterguerrilla operations are included, as appropriate.
5. In addition to the military program outlined above, there is a
very significant nonmilitary aspect of this problem. A review of
case histories reveals that communist-inspired guerrilla movements
are the result of long preparation within political, economic and
sociological fields. It is essential that US Governmental agencies
abroad understand the tactics of this development so that adequate
countermeasures can be taken. In this connection there is a need for
clarification, both at the Washington and Country Team levels, of
interdepartmental responsibilities for advising and assisting
indigenous armed forces and other internal security [Facsimile Page 5] forces in
counterguerrilla training and operations. If this is not done, the
most effective counterguerrilla military program [Typeset Page 724] that can be devised
will not suffice to prevent the development of guerrilla movements.
Accordingly, a need exists to educate US personnel in civilian
agencies and the civilian agencies of potentially threatened foreign
governments in the communist method of developing guerrilla
movements. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff specifically
recommend that the following matters be discussed with other US
Governmental agencies and agreement reached to:
a. Develop country counterinsurgency plans for all countries with an
existing or potential insurgency threat.
b. Extend counterguerrilla training to include training for internal
security forces and police in countries having an insurgency
threat.
c. Clarify the responsibilities of the various US Governmental
agencies in advising and assisting foreign governments in
counterguerrilla training and operations, at both the Country Team
and Washington levels, to insure that proper emphasis is placed on
counterguerrilla training for both military and internal security
forces.
d. Educate and orient appropriate US civilian personnel on the nature
of the guerrilla threat and how to combat it.
e. Insure that training of all indigenous military or paramilitary
forces should be a Department of Defense responsibility. ICA responsibility should be limited
to US type city or state police functions.
6. Appendices B and C are forwarded for your information. It is
recommended that all three Appendices be forwarded also as
attachments to your report on this subject when submitted to the
President.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L.L.
Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of
Staff
