Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

231. Memorandum from Col. Chapla to Bundy, March 3¹

March 3, 1961

SUBJECT

• WSEG Report Number 50

REFERENCE

• Memorandum from the Military Assistant, Office of the Secretary of Defense, dated 2 March 1961

1. The summary portion of WSEG Report No. 50, as requested in the referenced memorandum, is forwarded herewith.

2. The attached report is provided on a loan basis for your personal use and return when it has served your need.

Benjamin C. Chapla

Colonel, USA
Executive Secretary

Attachment

WSEG REPORT NO. 50

EVALUATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS

27 December 1960

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. To evaluate the weapons systems and directly related functions which make up the strategic offensive posture of the U.S. in the 1964–1967 period.

BACKGROUND

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff requested, in SM–660–59, an evaluation of strategic offensive weapons systems in the 1964–1967 period, including strategic bombers, air-to-surface missiles, ICBM’s, FBM’s (submarines and surface vessels), and IRBM’s. The study was to be directed particularly towards determining the relative effectiveness of the various systems in terms of their reliability, reaction time, responsiveness to control, penetration capability, accuracy, destructiveness, vulnerability and cost. The evaluation was to take into account the various circumstances under which hostilities might be initiated, ranging from surprise attack on the U.S. to conditions of strategic warning which might permit U.S. initiative. The study was to recognize changes in the threat, in the Free World situation, and in military technology which might occur during the period, as well as significant changes or advances that could reasonably be foreseen beyond 1967.

SCOPE

3. The report reviews the characteristics of individual weapon systems, examines the feasibility of attaining their technical goals, their costs and manpower requirements, and evaluates their effectiveness as elements of the strategic posture. The evaluation is based in part on the systems’ destruction potential against various types of Sino-Soviet targets, and on some qualitative considerations.

4. The report evaluates in detail only those strategic weapon systems which are competitive for funds in 1964–1967 and which are under complete U.S. control. The systems studied are therefore:

Bombers	ASM’S	Ballistic Missiles
B–47	GAM–77	ATLAS
B–52	GAM–87	TITAN
B–58		POLARIS (SSBN)
B–70		POLARIS (CG)
		Fixed MINUTEMAN
		Rail-Mobile MINUTEMAN

5. The report further examines the degree to which different weapons systems mixes, including the service-programmed mix, offer confidence in successfully carrying out national objectives.

6. Three supporting areas are examined in detail because of their importance to the entire strategic offensive posture: early warning requirements and systems; the command and control structure; and post-strike reconnaissance.

7. Finally, the report relates the possible changes in the Free World and in the threat to the problem of developing strategic offensive capabilities.

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

8. The present document contains the report’s summary conclusions. Supporting details are found in the following volumes:

Enclosure “A”—EVALUATION OF PROGRAMMED STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS 1964–1967

Enclosure “B”—TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF TACTICAL EARLY WARNING AGAINST ICBM AND SLBM ATTACK

Enclosure “C”—COMMAND AND CONTROL OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN THE PERIOD 1964–1967

Enclosure “D”—MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS

Enclosure “E”—VULNERABILITY OF SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

Enclosure “F”—ESTIMATED COSTS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPON SYSTEMS

Enclosure “G”—WEAPONS SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTICS

Enclosure “H”—THE ROLE OF RECONNAISSANCE IN POST-STRIKE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Enclosure “I”—CHANGES IN THE FREE WORLD

Enclosure “J”—STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE NATURE OF THE THREAT

INTRODUCTION

9. The first three parts of the present paper summarize and interconnect the more significant findings of the Enclosures to this Report. Part One examines the various factors which contribute to an assessment of the relative value of the programmed weapon systems. Part Two discusses some problems that are common to all strategic weapons systems. Part Three summarizes the capabilities of strategic offensive forces in meeting national objectives and discusses the contribution that other means can make to these objectives.

10. In Part Four, the paper sums up the steps that can be taken to improve support of national objectives by the U.S. military posture, and the role of various types of systems in achieving this posture.

PART ONE: RELATIVE MERITS OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS

11. One of the major aims of this study is to evaluate individual strategic weapons systems as they compare to one another. The elements that are accordingly necessary to this part of the study are system characteristics, costs, responsiveness to control, manpower requirements, penetration capability, and vulnerability. The study also examines some of the potential contributions various systems make to an overall force posture and the possible effects of a mixed force posture on the capabilities of the individual weapon system.

Characteristics of Weapons Systems

12. Enclosure “G” tabulates the physical and operational characteristics of strategic delivery systems programmed for the 1964–1967 period, with emphasis on those characteristics that affect availability, reliability, survivability, and destructive capability, including accuracy² and yield. The Enclosure also estimates the feasibility of attaining the goals established by the Services for these characteristics.

13. In general, it is concluded that the weapons systems under development for deployment in the 1964–1967 period can be operational at the time specified in Service estimates. However, Service estimates for system performance, especially those of accuracy, reliability, and launch schedules, will probably not be fully met initially and will require a period of a few years during which gradual improvements will be made towards meeting specified system operational requirements.

System Costs

14. Enclosure “F” provides cost estimates for each of the weapons systems considered, based on force schedules provided by the Services. From these costs, Enclosure “A” generates for each system an effective annual cost, based on annual operating costs and amortized initial investment costs.

15. It must be emphasized that the reliability of cost estimates varies: considerable confidence can be placed in estimates of the costs of operational systems of long standing, less confidence in estimates for newly operational systems, and considerably less confidence in estimates of future systems. Results of analyses based on estimates for future systems must be used with caution, for experience has shown that early cost estimates for a new weapon system are almost always substantially lower than the actual costs incurred.

Responsiveness to Control

16. Responsiveness to control is discussed in Enclosure “C”, where it is shown that there are no significant differences in this respect among the various weapons systems. As discussed in paragraph 42 and following, the principal problem areas in the command structure are associated with the vulnerability of the higher echelons of command.

Manpower Requirements

17. Manpower requirements and limitations are treated in Enclosure “D”. It is found that none of the weapons systems appears limited merely by the numbers of men required, but all may tend to suffer from a lack of highly skilled technical personnel, a lack which will probably continue through the 1964–1967 period.

Penetration Capability

18. Penetration capabilities of U.S. ballistic missiles are generally assumed in this study to be unity. Penetration capabilities of aerodynamic systems are treated in Appendix “F” to Enclosure “A”. The discussion there indicates that for all types of manned bombers there is relatively high confidence that a substantial fraction of a large force of bombers will be able to penetrate successfully at low altitude. If the USSR is willing to expend the relatively large effort required to develop and deploy a sophisticated and expensive low-altitude defense they would almost certainly also develop and deploy an effective defense against high-altitude supersonic aircraft.

Vulnerability to Attack

19. Vulnerability of systems to attack is treated in a number of places in this Report; the results are integrated in Part I of Enclosure “A”.

Bombers

20. Bombers, being very soft targets on their bases, must achieve survival either through continuous air alert, or through ground alert with early warning and corresponding quick reaction. Enclosure “B” considers the various uses for early warning and examines the capabilities of the programmed ballistic missile warning system. In addition, the technical feasibility, capabilities, costs, and dates of availability of other possible early warning systems are examined. These systems include line-of-sight radars, over-the-horizon radars, and infrared sensors, in ground-based, airborne, and satellite types of deployment.

21. It is shown in Enclosure “B” that by the time period of this study BMEWS should, with high confidence, provide 10–30 minutes warning of attacks with greater than 2–15 ICBM’s launched the short way around on trajectories above 15° from any part of the Soviet Bloc. Appropriately located additional radar stations or other sensors could provide similar warning against missiles with trajectories below 15° or against long-way-around missiles; various systems capable of detecting missiles using these trajectories are presently in the research and development phase, but none is approved for deployment. Although this warning may be adequate for 15-minute ground-alert bombers, the latter will still be vulnerable to attack by SLBM’s. Although an SLBM detection system is feasible, it would provide very little useful warning time, the amount depending on the location of the target and the point of launch. The requirement for air alert in the 1964–1967 time period thus depends critically on the magnitude of the Soviet SLBM threat.

Hardened Missile Sites

22. The vulnerability of a hardened missile site is sensitively dependent on the hardness of the site and on the accuracy, yield and numbers of attacking enemy missiles. Thus, the vulnerability of hardened sites can be evaluated only in terms of the threat; this is done in Part I of Enclosure “A”.

23. MINUTEMAN, being a remotely controlled system, introduces the element of the vulnerability of the control center in distinction to the vulnerability of the missile silo. This problem is examined in Enclosure “C”, where it is shown that under certain conditions the system can be neutralized more easily by attacking the control centers than by attacking the missile silos.

Mobile Missiles

24. The relative merits of hardening and mobility are treated parametrically in Appendix “C” to Enclosure “A”, which shows the effects of the interactions among silo hardness, extent of deployment of the mobile system, costs, effectiveness, and the nature of the enemy threat (including yield, CEP, and numbers).

POLARIS Systems

25. The vulnerability of the POLARIS submarine system is considered in detail in Enclosure “E”. It is shown there that, unless the Soviets make significant advances in ASW technology and deploy very extensive ASW forces, the POLARIS submarines should be relatively invulnerable either to prolonged shadowing with kill at H-hour or to intensive search and destruction prior to the start of war. With respect to peacetime attrition, it is shown that should the Soviet submarines possess a detection range advantage over the FBM submarine, a small number of Soviet submarines could detect FBM submarines only occasionally, but frequently enough to constitute a threat. While it is unknown whether the Soviets will enjoy this advantage, the potential importance of reducing the noise level of the FBM submarine is great.

26. Although the vulnerability of the cruiser version of POLARIS is not studed explicitly in this report, this subject was treated in WSEG Report No. 47, which indicated that the cruiser is significantly more vulnerable to enemy measures than is the POLARIS submarine.

Relative Merits of Systems

Method of Approach

27. Destruction capabilities of U.S. weapons systems are calculated in Enclosure “A” against a variety of potential enemy targets.

28. Comparisons are then made among the various weapons systems, considering all the factors discussed above, on the basis of the number of targets successfully attacked at the 90 percent level of destruction per dollar expended. The relative importance of the factors depends quite significantly on the context of use and the targeting objective of a weapons system. For the objective of destruction of hardened missile targets, the accuracy and delivery time of a weapon are relatively more important than is the case for the objective of industrial or population destruction. In a context of Soviet initiative, the survivability of a weapon system takes on great importance in comparison to a context of U.S. initiative.

29. Uncertainties in future characteristics and costs of strategic weapons and in estimates of future enemy threats make comparisons significantly only when differences are substantial and relatively insensitive to assumptions.

30. For simplicity in presentation the strategic weapon systems are divided into three groups—surface-to-surface missiles, bombers, and air-to-surface missiles—with comparisons principally within each group. In addition there is a discussion of the role of each group, in view of the capabilities and limitations of the group, and a limited number of intergroup comparisons where pertinent.

Principal Findings

Ballistic Missiles

31. Ballistic missiles, because of their rapid delivery time and high confidence of successful penetration, appear to be the primary strategic offensive weapons systems in 1964–1967 against known fixed targets where time of delivery is of military importance.

32. The preferred weapon for the strike-first role, where vulnerability to attack is of no concern, appears to be fixed MINUTEMAN, with TITAN being competitive against hard or area mobile targets, or for the production of large fallout effects.

33. In the strike-second role, fixed and mobile MINUTEMAN and POLARIS all have advantages under certain circumstances. This is illustrated in Figure 1, which indicates qualitatively the way preference for POLARIS or fixed or mobile MINUTEMAN changes with the magnitude of the enemy threat and the size of the desired U.S. retaliatory capability. No numbers are shown on the figure, since the preferences depend on U.S. weapons systems costs, the enemy weapon yield and CEP, vulnerability of mobile MINUTEMAN in terms of hardness and deployment, fixed MINUTEMAN silo hardness, and the type of target against which the U.S. is retaliating. However, the following general relationships are apparent:

34. Since TITAN II and MINUTEMAN enter inventory in parallel the question of whether both are required is pertinent. The general superiority of MINUTEMAN—considering its cost, effectiveness, and vulnerability to attack—indicates military justification for TITAN II only where, for certain targets, large payloads are needed in a single

Fig. 1 PREFERENCE FOR POLARIS OR FIXED OR MOBILE MINUTEMAN

a. For a given number of U.S. ballistic missiles desired to survive, the larger the number of enemy counterforce missiles the greater the tendency to favor the mobile systems (line A—A′).

b. For a given Soviet posture the larger the surviving U.S. ballistic missile force desired, the greater the tendency to favor fixed MINUTEMAN (line B—B′).

missile to carry sufficient decoys or cluster warheads to overcome enemy missile defenses. An additional justification for the development of TITAN II (at a cost of $700 million) can be made on the basis of requirements for space exploration or increased knowledge of how to build large missiles with storable liquid propellants.

35. Based on the analyses of Enclosure “A” and WSEG Report No. 47, the cruiser version of the POLARIS system appears inferior to the submarine version and to fixed and mobile MINUTEMAN. The low ranking arises largely because of the small fraction of time on station. Furthermore, it introduces no new element to our strategic forces not already available in other weapon systems. Hence, the installation of POLARIS missiles on cruisers does not appear to be warranted.

36. One improvement gained by the development of the A–3 missile for the POLARIS system lies in the insurance it provides against an effective ASW system if the USSR develops and deploys one. In addition, the longer range of the A–3 missile will give the FBM system greater operational flexibility and allow it to threaten a larger number of Soviet targets from presently planned deployment areas and, more importantly, according to a DOD program the A–3 missile will carry the cluster warhead primarily for penetrating possible anti-missile defenses.

Manned Bombers

37. Manned bombers, currently the U.S.’s primary strategic weapon, will continue to be of considerable importance in the 1964–67 period, particularly if high levels of enemy fatalities are desired. No further procurement of B–58’s is desirable. The projected B–52 program appears adequate. All procured bombers should remain in the force until operationally obsolescent. Every effort should be made to provide for the survival of a fraction of the bomber force, even going to air alert if reliable tactical warning cannot be assured.

38. The B–70 weapon system appears competitive with the fixed MINUTEMAN system in attacking known fixed targets only if successful delivery of a large number of weapons per bomber to different targets can be achieved. Operational problems associated with this type of mission require considerably more study to establish its feasibility.

Air-to-Surface Missiles

39. Air-to-surface missiles improve the target destruction capabilities of bombers without large penalties in bomber performance and without requiring large expenditures of funds. When they include a flight profile different from that of other strategic systems they also increase the problems of enemy defenses. With respect to specific ASM systems, certain aspects definitely favor the GAM–77, and others definitely favor the GAM–87. On balance no strong arguments exist either for or against developing the GAM–87 as a replacement for the GAM–77 on the B–52.

40. Analyses of the capabilities of mixed force postures, discussed in Part III, indicate that the specific degree of hardening for the fixed MINUTEMAN system is not of great significance in the capabilities of the overall force, provided a reasonable degree of hardness is achieved and appropriate separation of the silos is maintained.

41. The above analyses also indicate that once an effective basic force level consisting of the more promising weapons systems is deployed, it does not make much difference whether increments of one system or another are added in the retaliatory role. (Enclosure “A”, Figure 17).

PART TWO: COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND RECONNAISSANCE

42. This part examines some problems common to all the weapons systems and also U.S. capabilities for post-strike reconnaissance in the event of war.

Command and Control

43. Analyses discussed above show that the U.S. should be able to generate a strategic force which would constitute a retaliatory capability of high confidence, provided that this force could be launched as assumed in the analyses. Enclosure “C” examines the possible vulnerability of the command and control systems which might reduce the effectiveness of the weapons systems. It was found necessary to include in the study the configuration and workings of the national political and joint military command structures and their interrelationships, because the effectiveness of the weapons control systems might be sensitive to them.

44. This examination shows that the maximum warning time that may be available to the President and the higher command structure varies from about 15 minutes for an ICBM attack to zero for an SLBM attack (against which no warning system is presently programmed; see Enclosure “B”). Thus, it appears that the highest levels of authority could not confidently expect any significant warning time to allow for the decision-making and communication processes. Further investigation indicated that the few protected sites available to the top political and military command could be destroyed by a relatively small missile force. In fact, the number of attacking missiles required may be below the threshold of the BMEWS system. Thus, our present vulnerable command structure is not a high confidence system to assure that atomic release or war execution orders will be transmitted to the retaliatory forces.

45. Enclosure “C” examines ways to alleviate the problems without gross modification of the present national political-Joint Military command structure, but none appears promising.

46. To provide a command and control system adequate for both the pre-attack and transattack period requires a composite structure called a “Coupled Command System.” It would consist of:

a. A high command structure composed of several fixed command centers—generally similar in number, size and function to present political and military high command centers—to perform required pre-attack command functions (Enclosure “C”).

b. Coupled to these fixed command centers by communications and nuclear burst sensing systems, one or more continuously manned mobile command center with transattack capabilities for authorization and direction of a retaliatory attack (Enclosure “C”). Manning for this purpose means manning at the level of political and military authority and responsibility commensurate with the decisions and actions that may have to be taken.

47. The two parts of the system would operate under a doctrine delegating command to the mobile system only when conclusive evidence existed that the fixed sites had been attacked and rendered inoperative. This coupled system could raise enemy weapons requirements to interrupt command by factors of several hundreds or more. However, if both fixed and mobile command systems were rendered inoperative, a previously agreed explicit doctrine could assure a politically authorized retaliatory action, even in the face of large-scale enemy attacks designed to prevent it. Military implementation of the coupled command concept and employment of such an explicit retaliatory doctrine would preserve the utility of the coupled command concept should political manning of alternate transattack command centers prove infeasible.

48. This “Coupled Command System” would, among other things, provide the U.S. with a high confidence capability of initiating retaliatory attacks and provide a necessary element for effective decision-making following the initial strikes.

49. Finally, the study concludes that, although all primary modes of communications with the weapon systems are vulnerable to direct enemy attack, alternate modes of communication, either presently available or possible, could give high confidence that the essential signals, once transmitted by higher command, would be received by surviving strategic forces wherever deployed.

Post-Strike Reconnaissance Capabilities

50. Enclosure “H” examines the capabilities of our strategic forces for post-strike reconnaissance and armed reconnaissance; it studies, in addition, other technically feasible means of carrying out the reconnaissance role.

51. It is concluded that the U.S. strategic forces are oriented towards a “one-shot” war, and that there would be almost no capability for collecting and coordinating post-strike information. Such post-strike information as might be available would be limited, sporadic, only locally available, and not likely to give a reasonably comprehensive picture of the results of the initial bomber and missile attacks; thus, further action based on reliable information would be precluded. The lack of this capability is not due to technology, since techniques are presently available—e.g., photographic—which can be employed. In addition, other promising reconnaissance techniques, including indirect means of damage assessment, probably could be made available.

52. If a command system is developed which can survive an attack (see previous section), post-strike reconnaissance can provide information required for making decisions concerning prosecution or termination of the war.

53. Armed reconnaissance for attacking unknown or movable targets, though attractive in principle, may be of questionable value because of the time involved in the search phase and the difficulty of developing appropriate sensors for location and identification of potential targets.

54. The speed of an aircraft for either armed or direct reconnaissance does not appear to be of great significance. For armed reconnaissance, high speed may well make target detection, identification and attack more difficult; and for direct reconnaissance, the total mission time, though lower for high-speed aircraft, is generally dominated by the interpretation time, except where flash interpretation suffices.

PART THREE: CAPABILITIES OF STRATEGIC FORCES

55. This part summarizes the capabilities and limitations of strategic forces and some of their implications (Enclosures “A”, “I”, “J”).

Protection of the United States from Damage from a Nuclear Attack

56. In order to assess the capabilities of the strategic forces in minimizing damage to the U.S. in the event of war, a number of Soviet military postures, all of which appeared reasonable, were assumed. It was further assumed that practically all (90 percent) Soviet fixed missile sites were of known location and could be destroyed by the U.S. in an initiative strike. Analyses indicate that, even in the initiative situation, the U.S., if no protective measures are taken, still would suffer very high levels of population fatalities (greater than 75 percent) except in those cases where the USSR did not deploy weapon systems technologically available to her, i.e., the USSR did not deploy mobile missiles, land or sea, and did not deploy systems capable of being launched on warning. In the context of Soviet initiative attacks, the damage to the U.S. could be, as expected, even greater. It is thus concluded that counterforce alone does not appear to be a high confidence measure for preventing unacceptable levels of damage to the U.S. in the event of war.

57. Other complementary measures, that is, active defenses and shelters, for providing protection to U.S. population and industry, were examined to assess their potential value. It was found that fallout shelters properly used could achieve a significant reduction in casualties but would leave the industrial base vulnerable.³ Active missile defenses which meet design goals of the NIKE–ZEUS system could provide some protection for population and industry in local areas but not from fallout from nuclear bursts in undefended areas. Shelters and active defenses are thus mutually supporting. These measures hold promise because they could be effective whether the missile was launched from a fixed site of known or unknown location, mobile or fast reacting, and in either an initiative or retaliatory attack.

58. The above measures—direct attack, active defense of the NIKE–ZEUS type, and shelters—appear to be the only ones presently available to defend the U.S. against a nuclear attack. The cost of implementing these measures will probably be in the tens of billions of dollars. However, by employing technologically feasible countermeasures, e.g., cluster warheads, and increasing its missile force, the USSR can maintain a strong retaliatory posture capable of doing great damage to the U.S. notwithstanding implementation of defense measures.

U.S. Retaliatory Capabilities

59. Examination of the projected Service programs and other illustrative force postures of lesser cost indicates that the U.S. should be able to maintain a strong retaliatory posture even in the face of threats larger by far than any indicated by intelligence estimates.

60. In 1964 this capability is considerably dependent upon the survival and penetration of a reasonable fraction of the U.S. bomber force; in 1967 the retaliatory capability is much less dependent on bomber survival.

61. It can, thus, be concluded that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union should be able to maintain a retaliatory force capable of inflicting great damage, which cannot be neutralized by the other side without a major technological breakthrough.

Implications

62. This situation, generally referred to as the “nuclear stalemate,” has a number of implications. Among these are the effects on our allies and the development of means to meet enemy aggression no longer deterred by our strategic forces. These issues are explored in Enclosures “I” and “J”.

63. In brief, with respect to our NATO allies, it is becoming increasingly apparent to them that the approaching stalemate situation will make it unlikely that they can continue to count on the U.S. to provide them protection, through the threat of retaliation, from the kinds of Soviet military aggression most likely to occur. This is largely the reason that the idea of national or NATO deterrent forces has been gaining ground.

64. At the same time, there has been an increasing tendency on the part of some of our allies to question the advisability of allowing on their territory U.S. forces which might make them subject to Russian attack in the event of war with the U.S. In addition, since these governments may be unreliable when subject to intense pressures in a crisis situation, it may be prudent for the U.S. to reconsider the value of deploying strategic weapons overseas subject to bilateral control when their primary purpose is the protection of the United States.

65. Finally, because the range of applicability of strategic forces will diminish with the stalemate, the U.S. must develop strong military capabilities for meeting those contingencies requiring military action for their resolution heretofore considered deterred by our strategic superiority. These forces should have a character that clearly reveals our own intent to limit the scale of conflict.

66. The strategic forces can implicitly support these forces by deterring the enemy from actions that would tend to expand the conflict, even if such actions were favorable to the enemy in their effects on the outcome of the limited war.

PART FOUR: MEASURES FOR IMPROVING U.S. MILITARY POSTURE RELATIVE TO GENERAL WAR

Prevention of General War

67. In view of the extremely high levels of population casualties and loss of resources that would result from general nuclear war the most promising means for protecting the country is to prevent the outbreak of the war. Many measures contribute to this end; only those steps clearly required are mentioned:

a. Develop and maintain a retaliatory force that clearly can do high levels of damage regardless of how the war starts. This requires not only a sufficiency of weapons properly deployed but also a high confidence that the force can be launched when desired by receipt of proper authorization. This posture can be achieved by deploying a mix of the types of forces (see Enclosure “A”) programmed to be available in the 1964–1967 period and by reducing the vulnerability of the present higher command structure.⁴ (See Enclosure “C”).

b. Reduce the threat of use of strategic forces to issues that can be resolved in no other way. This implies that the U.S. with its allies develop and deploy forces to meet local aggression locally, and in such a manner as to minimize the expansion of the limited war into general war. (See Enclosure “J”).

In the Event of War

68. It must be recognized that, however successful the U.S. is in reducing the threat of general war, there can be no assurance that it will not occur. Hence, it is necessary to consider the more promising measures which might reduce the damage to the U.S. to manageable proportions and might allow the U.S. to prevail. Because present technology has provided the offensive with a variety of measures at far less cost and earlier than their defensive countermeasures,⁵ there can be little optimism in achieving these results. (See Enclosure “A”). However, the following measures are presently available for improving the U.S. posture.

A. Improve Direct Attack Capability—(Counterforce)

69. a. Determine location and characteristics of Soviet weapons, i.e., hardness, reaction time, and improve pertinent characteristics of U.S. Ballistic missiles, i.e., accuracy, yield, reliability.

b. Develop armed reconnaissance techniques.

c. Improve ASW to counter ballistic missile submarines.

B. Deploy Active Missile Defenses and Fallout Shelters

70. Active missile defenses and fallout shelters are potentially promising measures for reducing damage to the U.S. Present limitation of active defenses is their reduced effectiveness against technically feasible countermeasures.

C. Develop a Post-Strike Survivable Command and Control System

71. A post-strike survivable command structure coupled with information-gathering systems, i.e., a reconnaissance capability, would be desirable to provide the basis for decision for continuing action.

D. Post-Strike Forces

72. Other forces and strategic weapons held in reserve would be desirable to enforce termination of the war and to protect the nation during recuperation.⁶

Post-1967 Measures

73. Enclosure “G” briefly describes weapon systems that may become available as a result of advances in technology. Although great improvements are anticipated in the ballistic missile field in terms of accuracy, payload and reliability, and some improvement in airborne vehicles, the advances presently envisaged are not likely to break the approaching nuclear stalemate.⁷

74. The role of long-range aircraft is subject to considerable uncertainties. In the role of attacking known fixed targets, missiles, especially, considering likely improvements in missile technology, will probably be superior to aircraft, particularly where speed of delivery is of military importance.

75. Aircraft will continue to be able to perform functions that missiles cannot.

a. Reconnaissance—aircraft (and possibly satellites) can perform this important function.

b. Attack of poorly located targets and armed reconnaissance—aircraft have this potential capability, but the effectiveness of this capability may be limited by sensor or equipment performance and by the time involved in locating and identifying targets.

c. Re-strike capabilities—aircraft can provide a capability for re-striking targets provided proper facilities and weapons are available.

d. Maintain a mixed threat—in the event that ballistic missile defenses become effective, the manned aircraft could continue to pose a retaliatory threat.

76. The above appear to be the major military uses for long-range aircraft in the post-1967 period. The B–70 aircraft probably will be able to exploit these capabilities, though other aircraft of lesser performance could probably also do so. The B–70 does, however, provide for an advance in the state of the art with regard to the speed of aircraft which is of technical value and may be exploited for other purposes, e.g., civil aviation.

77. Though a nuclear stalemate seems to be approaching and likely to remain for a considerable period, it must not be conceived as a static stalemate. Technology is progressing too rapidly to believe that the stalemate cannot be broken. All promising avenues of research which might break the stalemate to our advantage should be pursued vigorously. The nation that can indeed develop, for example, an effective active missile defense even in the face of countermeasures will be well on the way to achieving strategic superiority.

1. Transmits report on “Evaluation of Strategic Offensive Weapon Systems.” Top Secret. 28 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, WSEG 50, Smith.
2. Geodetic errors were assumed negligible relative to CEP.
3. The illustrative fallout shelter program studied in Appendix “D” of Enclosure “A” did not fully exploit the potentialities of shelters. Even then, 35–45% of the population could survive against quite heavy Soviet attacks; these same attacks without shelters would result in almost total destruction of the population.
4. In developing this secure retaliatory posture, it is important at the same time to insure that the posture may not lead to accidental war.
5. Defensive measure here means any measure designed to prevent the impact or reduce the effects of nuclear weapons on the U.S., i.e., counterforce, active defenses, and fallout shelters.
6. The meaningfulness of these measures would depend on the level of damage that the U.S. had suffered.
7. This stalemate probably holds for satellite systems capabilities in this same time period.