Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

229. National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 1–61, January 17¹

January 17, 1961

ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION—The Decade of the 1950’s	Paras. 1–12
A review of the fundamental changes in the structure of world power which occurred in the 1950’s—The drawing of lines between the blocs—The major powers’ reassessment of their military capabilities and strategies—Changes in Soviet leadership and policy—The vast improvement in Soviet military posture—The new opportunities for the USSR in the underdeveloped areas—The imposing position of the USSR at the end of the decade—The relative decline in the US world position.
II. THE COMMUNIST WORLD	Paras. 13–30
A. Soviet Progress and Policy	Paras. 13–19
Soviet economic growth and economic power—Soviet belief that the USSR can challenge the US on disputed issues—The peaceful co-existence policy—The basis of the dispute with China.
B. Chinese Communist Growth and Aspirations	Paras. 20–24
The growing self-confidence of China—Chinese economic growth and economic problems—The Chinese nuclear development program—Chinese revolutionary élan—The Chinese view of Communist world strategy.
C. Sino-Soviet Relations and the Future of Communism	Paras. 25–30
The issues between the USSR and China—Unlikelihood of a clear resolution—Consequences of continuing disagreement—Probability that the USSR will continue seeking to avoid serious risks—Possibility Soviet leaders will misjudge Western will—Probability China will persist in its militancy—Dangers involved.
III. THE EMERGING AREAS	Paras. 31–45
A. The Political and Social Milieu	Paras. 31–38
The objectives of the nationalist revolutions—The motivations of the revolutionary intelligentsia—Their wariness of communism and their attempt to carve out their own destinies—Political and social instability in the underdeveloped countries—The enormity of their problems—Tendency toward authoritarianism and socialism—Effect of population growth—Need for outside aid—Danger to the present revolutionary leaders.
B. International Outlook	Paras. 39–45
Outside world viewed largely in terms of local problems—Choice of neutralism by those who thought they could safely choose it—The tendency to compensate for years of Western influence by accepting closer relations with Sino-Soviet Bloc—Likelihood that trend toward neutralism will become stronger—Political consequences for US, including decline of US influence in the UN—Opportunities for Communist penetration and subversion.
IV. PROBLEMS OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCES	Paras. 46–59
West faces not only stronger Communist enemy but accumulating crises in the underdeveloped nations—Western assets still very great—Political weaknesses in the West—The condition of Western alliances—The problem in Japan—Weakness of CENTO and SEATO—By contrast, the greater strength of NATO—Military problems of NATO—Divergencies and rivalries within Atlantic community—Impact of colonial problems—Lack of a common view of world situation among NATO members.
V. THE MILITARY PROBLEM	Paras. 60–78
A. The Evolving Strategic Situation	Paras. 60–65
Major problem of the 1960’s posed by the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction by the great powers—Each side capable of inflicting enormous destruction upon the other—General nuclear war not impossible, but highly irrational response to international disputes—Problem of assessing risks—Other serious problems posed by strategic situation.
B. Military and Political Implications of the Evolving Strategic Situation	Paras. 66–78

Existing uncertainty about present and future world military situation—Puzzlement over deterrents—Soviet efforts to improve their military position—Soviet view of strategic situation—The advantages the USSR derives from it—Limited war capabilities—Political and military problems of conducting limited war—Consequences of additional countries acquiring nuclear weapons—Possibility of general war coming about through miscalculation or accident—Pressure for disarmament—Conclusion that decade ahead will be an extremely dangerous one.

ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION

THE ESTIMATE

I. INTRODUCTION—THE DECADE OF THE 1950’s

1. The past several years have witnessed fundamental changes in the structure of world power. The coming of the space age, the Soviet bid for world leadership, the growth of Communist China toward world power status, the creation of new nations, and the rapid economic growth of some of the advanced countries have greatly altered the outlook for many of the world’s peoples. We believe it would be useful, as the decade of the 1960’s begins, to survey in a somewhat broader fashion than has been our custom the development of the world situation in the years which have gone by.

2. By the time the decade of the 1950’s began, the major convulsions of the postwar years had come to an end. The Chinese Communists had seized control of the Chinese mainland, the colonial powers had relinquished their hold on most of the Near East and South and Southeast Asia, most of the Eastern European governments were in the hands of Communists responsive to Moscow control, and the Communist drive for political power in Western Europe had been curbed. The US had abandoned isolationism and had accepted the leadership of the Western world. Through NATO, the Marshall plan, aid to Greece and Turkey, and an active participation in world councils, the US had asserted its intention to use its economic and military power in the interests of world stability and the containment of communism. The major tests of that intention came in Berlin and above all in Korea; the firm and rapid US response in Korea made clear to all the world that an attempt by the Communists to acquire territory by open military conquest was unprofitable and dangerous.

3. In retrospect, it can be seen that these US actions of the early postwar period were major factors in creating the conditions which dominated much of the decade. They led to the drawing of lines between Communist and non-Communist territory which could not be crossed by overt military forces without serious risk of retaliation. Thus the Communists were in effect deprived of one tactic for expanding their area of influence; they were obliged to confine themselves to the more devious and time-consuming methods of subversion, guerrilla action, and political and economic warfare. These US actions also gave courage and hope to many nations whose borders were being threatened and whose economic and political weaknesses made them subject to internal and external Communist pressure.

4. The war in Korea, following upon the events in Europe of the late 1940’s and upon the Chinese Communist establishment of control in China, also aroused a lively sense of danger in the non-Communist world. There developed a general awareness of the worldwide aims of the Communist revolution. The US response was to rearm itself and to initiate a military assistance program designed not only to bolster countries on the periphery of the Bloc but also to identify unmistakably those areas which the US was taking under its protection. The two blocs became increasingly well armed and committed to the defense of particular areas.

5. The Korean War, also seen in retrospect, pointed up the need for the major powers to reassess their military capabilities and strategies. In that war, the Soviet leaders had avoided overt participation; a major factor in this decision was their recognition of US nuclear superiority and of the threat which this posed to the Soviet homeland and to the entire Communist position in the Far East. Similarly, the US limited its military operations to the area of Korea; a major factor in the US decision was recognition of Soviet conventional military superiority in Eurasia and of the threat which this posed to US allies in Europe and the Near East. Moreover, the US encountered the very great difficulty of bringing its superior nuclear capabilities to bear on a situation in which the enemy’s immediate goals were limited and the non-Communist world was anxious not to expand the conflict.

6. The strategic reassessment and the reshaping of capabilities which took place on both sides were to some degree efforts to eliminate the shortcomings which the Korean War had made apparent. On the side of the West, this involved the establishment of NATO force goals to provide a larger ground army in Europe, and the development of a capability for tactical employment of nuclear weapons—both designed to offset Soviet ground superiority. In the USSR, the Soviet leaders speeded up the development of their air defense capability, the production of strategic nuclear weapons, and the development of long-range delivery capabilities.

7. While these military developments were going forward, various political changes were taking place in the world. The Soviet dictator died and his great personal power passed to a group of his former subordinates; in the course of a few years Khrushchev emerged as the dominant personality. Under Khrushchev’s leadership, the Soviet rulers apparently engaged in a comprehensive re-examination of the Soviet domestic scene and of the world situation. As a consequence, there were significant internal changes in the USSR, in the Eastern European satellite states, and in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet leaders evidently recognized that Stalinist rigidity had inhibited progress at home, antagonized the satellite peoples, caused a coalescence among the Western Powers, hindered the exploitation of political unrest in underdeveloped and colonial areas, and created dangerous tensions with the US. To correct these “errors,” the Soviet leadership moderated its internal policies by easing police terror and by taking some steps to improve living standards, loosened the reins over the Satellites, began to cultivate a broader range of contacts with the Western Powers, developed a new policy of assistance to underdeveloped countries, and sought to reduce tensions with the US by personal diplomacy.

8. This new Soviet policy was not pursued with thorough consistency, nor did it meet with unqualified success. Loosening the reins over the Satellites and giving encouragement to anti-Stalinist elements in Eastern Europe led to anti-Soviet manifestations in Poland and popular revolution in Hungary. Reassertion of Soviet authority made Hungary a tragic battleground and discouraged other liberal forces within the Communist movement. Similarly, the denunciation of Stalin produced intellectual confusion at home, and the process of liberalization in the USSR was slowed down. Although Khrushchev’s personal diplomacy succeeded in reducing international tensions intermittently between 1955 and 1959, no substantial international accommodation took place, and in this situation of stalemate an atmosphere of tension has revived.

9. Nevertheless, this new Soviet policy has greatly strengthened the Soviet world position. Among other things, its appearance coincided with developments in the emerging areas which gave the USSR new opportunities for expanding its influence. Most of the underdeveloped countries have been in a state of social and economic ferment during the past decade. Most of the peoples in these countries were preoccupied with a desire for modernization and self-government. They are less concerned with ideologies than with results, and more concerned to gain tangible assistance and sympathetic understanding from both world power blocs than to associate themselves with either of them. They have become particularly sensitive to any remnants of colonialism or attempts by the West to influence or to control their domestic and foreign policies. On the other hand, the USSR, through its pose as the defender of Afro-Asian nationalism against “imperialism,” as the exponent of disarmament, as the party offended by alleged US provocations and stubbornness, as the example and proponent of rapid economic development, and as an alternative source of immediate and unconditional aid, has gained much influence and prestige.

10. These Soviet gains in the underdeveloped countries coincided with the Soviet achievement of a vastly improved military posture. The USSR’s achievements in space vehicles and missiles have not only enhanced Soviet prestige but promise to give the USSR capabilities roughly equivalent in their political and strategic impact to those possessed by the US. Thus, even while it possessed a less advanced economy than that of the US and still had only a toehold among the underdeveloped nations, the USSR had created by the end of the decade an imposing platform from which to challenge the Western position throughout the world. While the US still continues to dispose tremendous power and to wield enormous influence, it has appeared to many of its friends and enemies alike to be faltering in its hold upon that power and in its initiative and resourcefulness in wielding that influence. In the nature of things it was impossible that the US should retain for very long the unique position it occupied at the end of World War II. The world perceives that the US no longer enjoys military invulnerability, overwhelming economic strength, or unchallengeable world power.

11. At the same time, the world power position of the US’s European allies had vastly deteriorated from what it was before World War II. These nations had been deprived of control over vast populations, enormous sources of raw material, and far-flung commercial and industrial enterprises. Their ability to move freely and to operate from widely dispersed bases was drastically curtailed. These enormous losses were accompanied by strong nationalist and neutralist tides running against them in their former possessions. In this situation the US-supported economic recovery of most of these states was not matched by a commensurate effort to develop an adequate national defense posture, or to share responsibility in dealing with world problems.

12. These facts signify that the world has entered into a new era. New leaders and new nations are arriving on the scene; there is a new relationship of military power; political and social instability have become epidemic in the southern two-thirds of the world; schisms and heresies have appeared within the Communist camp itself. There is no longer any question that radical change will occur in the world, but only a question of what direction it will take. The future of the West will depend to a large degree upon the manner in which it mobilizes and employs its political, economic, and military resources to shape and guide the process of change. In the paragraphs below we describe the characteristics of the world situation in more detail and attempt to outline the problems for the future which are implied in this situation.

II. THE COMMUNIST WORLD

A. Soviet Progress and Policy

13. There can no longer be any doubt that the USSR is well on the road toward matching the US in many of the indices of national power. In 1950 Soviet gross national product (GNP) was a little over a third that of the US; in 1960 it was nearly half that of the US. During the remaining years of the Seven-Year Plan, the USSR will probably achieve an annual growth rate of slightly less than six percent. By 1965, Soviet GNP will be over half that of the US and about equal to the level which the US reached in 1947. Total investment in the USSR will probably reach about one-third of GNP by 1965, as compared with the present US rate of about one-fifth of GNP. Soviet industrial investment in 1958, measured in dollars, had already exceeded the record US figure, set in 1957.

14. Overtaking the US in total output is a distant prospect. But in more meaningful ways, the economic power of the USSR already compares favorably with that of its chosen competitor. By virtue of complete subordination to regime control, the Soviet economy, despite its smaller size, is presently supporting a military effort of approximately the same size as that of the US. By 1965, production levels in certain basic industrial products will probably approach and in some cases surpass present US records; for example, the USSR has announced and probably will achieve a steel production of 105 million metric tons in 1965, which approximates the US record of 106 million achieved in 1955.

15. There are and will remain certain elements of backwardness. Agricultural production, despite heavy investment, will still employ a very much higher proportion of manpower in the USSR than in the US. The individual Soviet consumer, although he will gain about four percent per year in overall consumption, will still have a standard of living far inferior to that of his US counterpart, especially in housing and in range of consumer choice. Soviet society even by 1970 will not be affluent in the sense of possessing a large service sector in the economy or having available a plethora of gadgetry, consumer choices, and stylistic improvements. Nevertheless, in the decade ahead industry will be expanding so rapidly that by the beginning of the 1970’s the Soviet leaders will be able to confer upon the Soviet citizen benefits considerably beyond those available today. Most important of all, however, the USSR already possesses an economy sufficiently strong and flexible to permit it to assign resources relatively freely and without agonizing self-denials to the major uses of national power—defense, science, and foreign political and economic operations.

16. The Soviet leaders obviously understand that science has become one of the key fronts in the world struggle, not only because of its relation to military and economic strength but also because it is a major element in great power prestige. The scale of the Soviet effort, thanks to a heavy investment in training scientists in past years, is probably now roughly on a par with that of the US in some fields of the basic sciences and in some critical areas related to weapons technology.

17. Soviet progress in the field of rocketry has probably had more effect upon world opinion and upon the world situation than any development of the past two or three years. This progress, together with the earlier Soviet achievements in nuclear weapons development, has created a new strategic situation in the world which will be discussed in greater detail in later paragraphs of this estimate. It is enough here to say that this new military capability is providing the Soviet leaders with a weapons system that is valuable in terms of both political exploitation and military deterrence.

18. The Soviet leaders consider themselves to be in a position of great strength. They probably believe that they now possess, or will soon have, a powerful counterdeterrent to the existing US deterrent force, and that this counterdeterrent will become more and more persuasive in the years ahead. They almost certainly feel that for these reasons they can frequently and vigorously challenge the US on disputed issues. They probably feel that the range of anti-Western actions which they can pursue with little fear of nuclear retaliation is growing, although they almost certainly recognize that they must act with caution lest they provoke the US into precipitate action. The Soviet leaders evidently recognize that a general nuclear exchange could mean the destruction of the fabric of modern society.

19. The “peaceful coexistence” policy of the Soviet leaders is partly the consequence of these cautionary judgments. It is also partly the consequence of the Soviet ideological outlook, which views history not primarily as a contest of military power between states, but as a long-term social revolutionary struggle. The total power position of the Communist world—including but not focusing exclusively around its military ingredient—is viewed as an encouragement and a guarantee of the success of revolutionary forces in the non-Communist states. In the Soviet view the situation especially in the underdeveloped states, is now such that substantial and continuing gains can be won by vigorous pursuit of all forms of struggle short of war. The Soviets probably also feel that in carefully chosen circumstances they could wage limited war with Communist-supported, or even with Bloc forces, without themselves incurring serious risk of general war. The comparative caution implied in this strategy has led to open dispute between the USSR and Communist China. Before we can estimate the course of Communist policy in the years ahead, we should therefore examine the potential and the aspirations of Communist China.

B. Chinese Communist Growth and Aspirations

20. During the past two or three years the Chinese Communist regime has been exhibiting a growing self-confidence. This probably reflected, in part at least, the regime’s increasing satisfaction over its political effectiveness within China and over a substantial consolidation of its economic program. In 1959, the second year of the Second Five-Year Plan, Chinese industrial production increased by about 33 percent. Especially dramatic increases were recorded in basic commodities—steel, coal, and electric power. There was also a better balance of product, a more rational distribution of the labor force, and an improvement in the quality of the output. In short, the Communists began to receive the dividends from 10 years of hard and concentrated effort on the expansion of heavy industry. GNP rose by about 18 percent in 1958; then by about 12 percent in 1959 and 10 percent in 1960. Investment in 1960 reached a peak of about one-third of GNP.

21. Despite such impressive gains, Communist China still has a long way to go before becoming a major industrial power. It is still largely an agricultural country with a small industrial base relative to its huge population. Eighty percent of the population is agricultural, and industrial production is less than 10 percent that of the US. Communist China’s most serious problem for some years to come will be the lag in food production in the face of an annual population increase of 2.5 percent. In time some amelioration may occur, since a large part of the industrial expansion is directed toward the production of items—tractors, fertilizers, irrigation equipment—intended to support the agricultural sector. As a consequence of population increase and bad crop years in 1959 and in 1960, per capita food consumption in China has actually declined. GNP will probably continue to increase at a rapid rate, investment will continue to be heavy, and per capita consumption may increase somewhat. Any such gains, however, will be realized largely by the urban population, while the vast peasantry continues barely to subsist.

22. The Chinese Communist military establishment continues to improve. A substantial growth in the capacity to produce and assemble complex military equipment is likely, and a nuclear development program is underway. In a few years, say somewhere between 1962–1964, the Chinese Communists may be able to test a nuclear device and soon thereafter build an elementary nuclear weapon deliverable by medium bombers. By the end of the decade, they could have a 200–500 mile missile with a fission warhead, and they might be able to produce longer range missiles. These dates could be moved forward or backward by increases or decreases in the amount of Soviet aid.

23. The most striking characteristic of Communist China is not its economic progress but its great revolutionary élan. The Chinese Communist leaders are men of intense ardor who are deadly serious about transforming Chinese society completely and irrevocably. They are determined to create a “new Communist man,” indeed even a “new Chinese Communist man,” and to give to the world the benefits of their “constructive contributions” to Communist dogma and social theory. Confident of their own righteousness and orthodoxy and reinforced in that confidence by what they regard as the great achievements of the past decade, they are pushing, not only toward great power status in the world, but also toward at least co-equal status with the USSR in the world of international communism. Indeed, it became clear during 1960 that Peiping was presenting a major challenge to Moscow’s position as the final authority in the Communist movement.

24. This Chinese Communist drive and sense of mission is reflected not only in such revolutionary social changes as the creation of the commune but also in foreign policy outlook. The Chinese Communists’ view of the world situation is strongly doctrinaire, Sino-centric, and—from the Soviet point of view—overoptimistic. The Chinese leaders evidently believe that “imperialism” is on its last legs, that the Sino-Soviet Bloc has surpassed the West in military power and political influence, and that the emerging peoples in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are ripe for Communist revolution, if only they are actively supported to that end. Whereas in recent years the Soviet leaders have preferred—within the general context of belief in the inevitability of a world Communist victory—a comparatively low-risk policy of peaceful competition, the Chinese Communists have urged a policy of greater militancy, even at considerable risk. They probably also find this policy useful in spurring the Chinese people to the sacrifices they are requiring of them.

C. Sino-Soviet Relations and the Future of Communism

25. The character of Sino-Soviet relations in the years ahead will have a profound effect upon the future of communism and thereby on the world situation. The quarrel with Peiping has put the Soviet leaders in a difficult situation. They cannot condone Chinese contumacy without losing control of the Communist movement. They cannot permit an open break without losing what influence they still possess over the Chinese and without gravely weakening the international Communist movement as a whole. The Soviet leaders would consider an open break calamitous, but we do not believe that they would go so far in trying to avoid it as to surrender to the Chinese position; both the USSR’s determination to preserve its supremacy in the Communist movement and Soviet national interest in avoiding serious risk of general war would preclude such a course. We also do not believe that the Chinese would submit fully to the Soviet position; their pride, self-righteousness, and national aspirations are too heavily committed to permit it.

26. The issues between the partners are basic, and will probably not be resolved in any clear-cut fashion. The meetings in Moscow in November, 1960, clearly did not produce a complete agreement, or one which is likely to be lasting. The estrangement seems likely to continue, with ups and downs as new issues arise and temporary solutions are developed, and possibly moving toward a looser connection. If the Sino-Soviet relationship does in fact develop in this way, there will probably be a tendency for recurrent stresses and strains to weaken the Communist world posture and to diminish the effectiveness of world communism outside the bloc. In particular, factionalism would be stimulated in the Communist movement, with parties or factions in various countries tending to identify either with the USSR or with Communist China. The two countries would compete with each other for influence in a variety of arenas, from revolutionary movements to world organizations. A further widening of the Sino-Soviet split, if it should occur, would dim the image of the bloc as a great and growing power center and thus reduce the pressure upon peripheral countries to accommodate to the Communists.

27. The cohesive forces between the USSR and China are strong, and we believe that the two states will not abandon their alliance against the West. The Soviet leaders would be confronted with a most serious dilemma, however, if the Chinese pursued independently such a militant policy as to become engaged in a major war. Caught between a desire to avoid Soviet involvement, with its attendant dangers, and a desire to preserve a Communist state, with its attendant opportunity to re-establish Soviet influence in China, the Soviet leaders might tend toward the latter course. Thus a wider Sino-Soviet divergency would not necessarily lead to a less dangerous world.

28. It is impossible to predict with confidence the course of Communist policy in the decade ahead, particularly in the light of the uncertain future course in Sino-Soviet relations. We believe that the USSR will stick to its present policy of seeking to win victories without incurring serious risks, and of alternating or combining shows of anger and bellicosity with poses of reasonableness and compromise. We say this largely because we believe that the relationship of power between the US and the USSR will cause the Soviet leaders to desire to avoid general war, and that within the limits which this desire places on their action there will be constantly shifting ideas of the potential risks and gains involved in the various situations which will arise. A danger exists, of course, that in assessing the risks involved in particular situations or proposed courses of action, the Soviet leaders might overestimate their position while underestimating that of the West. In particular, they might misjudge Western will and determination in the face of Soviet threats or encroachments. Such a political miscalculation could lead to the incurring of serious risks without the intention to do so; it could even lead to general war.

29. We believe that China will persist in pressing the USSR for a more militant bloc policy. It will continue its hostility to the US, and as it becomes stronger—especially after it acquires a nuclear capability—it might press its objectives much more aggressively than at present. On the other hand, the Chinese have in recent years assessed risks carefully, and despite their bellicose talk they have refrained from actions which involved serious risk of large-scale military operations. Thus, their militancy has been tempered by some degree of prudence, and this tendency toward prudence might in time become somewhat stronger as they become more familiar with the dangers of nuclear war and as they come to recognize the vulnerability of their developing industrial capacity. On the whole, however, we do not expect a general shift in the Chinese domestic or world outlook for some time to come, and Chinese militancy will continue to create a serious danger of local or general hostilities in the Far East, and even of general war.

30. Over the next decade at least, there appears to be a greater likelihood of flexibility in Soviet than in Chinese policy. The Soviet leadership’s desire to prevent a general war, the wider range of Soviet contacts with the outside world, the continuing pressure at home for liberalization, and the growing capacity of the USSR to provide its citizens with a more comfortable life—these factors taken together may tend toward moderation in foreign policy and toward a recognition of some areas of common interest with the West. It is even possible that the Soviet leaders will come to feel that the USSR has little in common with China except an ideology which the Chinese interpret in their own way, and that by 1970 Communist China, with nuclear weapons and a population of almost 900 million, will be a dangerous neighbor and associate.

III. THE EMERGING AREAS

A. The Political and Social Milieu

31. It is one of the key points in the Soviet estimate of the world situation that conditions are favorable for Communist gains in the colonial and ex-colonial areas of the world; there is much to support this Soviet view. The nationalist revolutions in such areas as Africa and the Arab states have been directed largely toward revamping political and social systems in order to modernize societies and to achieve a place in the sun. The Communist revolutions in Russia and China arose from broadly comparable aspirations. Indeed, the system in these countries is widely admired in the newer nations of the world because it has been demonstrably effective in achieving rapid modernization, while the West is associated in their minds with the colonialism which they blame for most of their problems and miseries, both real and fancied.

32. Many of these countries in emerging areas—especially in Africa and the Middle East—are in the charge of revolutionary-minded leaders; in others of them such leaders are making a bid for power. These leaders are members of an intelligentsia who have frequently had an education along Western lines, some of it in military schools, and who have become aware through travel and education—or through observation of the mode of life of Westerners in their midst—of the backwardness of their countries and the poverty of their people. Out of a sense of obligation, frustration, and impatience, they have adopted a revolutionary attitude or taken revolutionary action against the old order—whether it was colonial or indigenous. Despite the Western nature of their youthful training, they tend to be resentful of Western influence and critical of Western methods. They therefore are tempted by Communism insofar as it is anti-Western and an effective method of bringing about rapid change.

33. Nevertheless, the revolutionary intelligentsia are generally chary of embracing communism. Some of them have accepted Communist advisers, economic aid, and diplomatic support, and some have even sided with the Communists against the West. But, for the most part they do not wish to accept all that now goes with the Communist ideology—the goal of a classless society, wholesale social reorganization, Soviet interference in or dictation of domestic policy, complete identification with the Soviet Bloc in international politics, and exclusion from Western economic aid and technical assistance. Moreover, many of them have become aware of their own nation’s history—in some cases a distinguished history—and they see themselves as national figures capable of resurrecting some features of that past and binding them into the new fabric being created. Thus, they see themselves, not as capitalists, Communists, or exponents of any other borrowed ideology, but as nationalists carving out their own destinies and selecting from the past and from other societies the elements with which to fashion new states and new societies of their own.

34. There are, of course, wide variations within the emerging world, not only as among major areas—Latin America is quite different from Africa—but even within major areas. There are wide diversities of all kinds in social structure, degree of advancement, extent of revolutionary feeling, degree of pressure upon available resources, extent of implantation of Western institutions, and cultural backgrounds. Whereas Latin America is Christian, is predominantly Western in language and culture, and has a long history of independence, Africa is a melange of languages, religions, and cultures, and is only now emerging from foreign domination. Even within a continent such as Latin America, there are societies which have passed through a major social revolution and others which still possess small social elites and a large mass of illiterate and poverty-stricken peasants and tribes.

35. There is, however, a large common denominator in the underdeveloped world. This is the political and social instability which is either manifest or dormant and which arises from the rapidity with which knowledge is growing and from the revolutionary manner in which large numbers of people are reacting to the changes in the world around them. Nearly all the nations of the underdeveloped world—whether in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America—are beset by problems springing from population growth, lack of development capital, rising popular expectations, internal political strife and competing ideological pressures, lack of political prowess and administrative and technical competence, and an inadequate sense of national identity. While some states, especially those barely emerging from tribalism, as in Africa, suffer more intensely than others from these assorted ills, even states such as India and the more advanced Latin American countries confront several of them to a most serious degree. Many states have adopted strongly socialist methods; some have held to constitutional methods of government with only the greatest difficulty; some have thrown out bloody dictators only to acquire equally distasteful successors; some have taken halting and others more dramatic steps toward the establishment of democratic governments.

36. In states confronted by these enormous problems, the tendency toward some blend of authoritarianism and socialism seems likely to continue. Revolutionary leaders attempting to deal with backwardness, tribalism, feudalism, corruption, economic pressures, and ineptitude often have no alternative but to stifle political opposition. Western states which set store by economic individualism and political freedom will probably be increasingly shocked by methods which will be adopted, but in the eyes of local leaders Western standards of political and economic conduct are likely to be irrelevant to the problem. Revolutionary leaders are likely to expect the West to judge them more by what they are trying to do than by the manner in which they are doing it. If the West does not understand and help them, they will tend to rely more and more heavily upon the Communists, until a point is reached when they can no longer extricate themselves from the Communist embrace.

37. Of all the problems confronting these nations that of the relation between population and economic growth may be the most difficult. Indeed, population growth is a grave world problem, with present rates making for a doubling of the world’s population every 35–50 years. In 1930 the world population was two billion; today it is three billion; in twenty years it will probably be four billion; in forty years it may be six or seven billion. Growth is most rapid in the underdeveloped areas, where nearly everywhere it exceeds two percent a year. Ten years ago almost no nation had a population growth rate of three percent; now such rates are not uncommon and there is no reasonable prospect that they can be significantly reduced in the next decade, whatever means might be tried. These increases impede capital formation in the areas where it is needed most, since increases in production simply go to keep alive the larger numbers of unproductive old people and children. In some cases total GNP grows while per capita GNP falls. Standards of living are declining in some countries at precisely the time when the revolutionary leaders now in charge must begin to meet the expectations which have arisen in their own and in their fellow countrymen’s minds.

38. The problem of maintaining standards of living and even that of satisfying to a degree rising economic expectations probably can be met with substantial infusions of outside aid and with the execution of national development programs. However, even if these countries received outside aid in massive quantities, they would still confront the grave political and social problems of backward and uprooted societies. Indeed, these problems will inhibit both the receipt and proper use of needed economic assistance. The present revolutionary leaders must surmount this great complex of problems if they are to sustain the nationalist character of their revolutions; if they fail, they may be replaced by Communist leaders ready to use Draconian methods and determined to impose permanent totalitarian institutions.

B. International Outlook

39. If, as we suggest above, the emerging countries will be preoccupied with their own problems, their attitudes toward the outside world will be determined largely by the way in which they feel the outside world impinges upon these problems. These countries and their leaders will not be concerned so much with ideological, moral, and cultural considerations as they will with manipulating outside influences in order to protect themselves or to advance their particular interests. The two great powers are likely to be viewed largely in terms of the threat or succor which they will afford.

40. Some of the emerging states have clearly aligned themselves with one or another of the two great powers. Many of these are states on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc—Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, South Vietnam, and South Korea—and their leaders have aligned themselves with the US in order to obtain that military and economic assistance which they hoped would enable them to keep any domestic enemies at bay and to stand up against pressures from their powerful neighbors. Cuba alleges similar reasons for aligning itself with the USSR.

41. In general, however, those who thought they could safely do so have chosen neutralism, and indeed some of them have made quite a profitable thing of it. In their desire to achieve and maintain national independence they have sought to avoid commitment to either side, and they have recognized the value to both sides of their not falling under the domination of the other. This has permitted some of them successfully to seek economic assistance from both and some others to seek assistance from one side by suggesting that they might appeal to the other. Nevertheless, many of these countries, in the course of their colonial or semicolonial history, have been subjected to Western influences and institutions and have therefore come to feel that “neutralism” requires a pronounced reaction away from these influences and some closer relationship with the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

42. This trend has been accelerated by increased Soviet willingness to compete with the West in providing economic assistance and diplomatic support. Bloc economic assistance overall is still considerably less than the US equivalent, but the USSR in particular can substantially enlarge its program. Moreover, the USSR has some advantages over the US in carrying out aid programs; it can move more quickly and without regard to a variety of politically-imposed restrictions which characterize US activities. On the other hand, as Soviet aid becomes more commonplace and taken for granted, the USSR is beginning to encounter some of the criticisms and problems which the US has faced in its foreign aid programs.

43. We believe that if the present trend toward neutralism is not reversed, it will become so strong that it will draw away from the West some of those nations now associated with it. This might come about through revolutions in some of these countries—for example Iran or South Vietnam—with seizure of power by nationalist-neutralist forces; it could occur because existing regimes might decide to seek the supposed benefits and safety of neutrality; it could come about because these nations might decide that the US was becoming inferior to the Sino-Soviet Bloc in military power and therefore would no longer be willing or able to support them.

44. The neutralist posture of these countries seems to us likely to produce in the decade ahead some most serious policy problems for the US. Aside from the probability of withdrawal from Western association and attempts to balance Western with Soviet or Chinese influence, there will be continual pressures for economic aid and political support, for denunciations of colonialism, for concessions on disarmament, and for further Western retreat from positions of predominance or influence. The US position in the UN will probably become increasingly difficult, particularly since many of these countries—including such influential members as India and the UAR—now appear to believe that the UN machinery has been used by the major Western powers and especially by the US as an instrument of national, and hence in their view “imperialist,” policy. For this reason, the idea of revising the UN charter and proposals to bring in Communist China have received widespread sympathy among the emerging nations. Their numbers are now so great that when their views become more crystallized—as now seems unavoidable—the hitherto predominant Western influence in the UN will be greatly reduced.

45. It is obvious that neutralism as a principle is fundamentally incompatible with the Soviet objective of a Communist world. Nevertheless, neutralism may often provide Communists with opportunities for penetration and subversion. Particularly in the areas of the new states, the Communists will seize upon rivalries among nations and tribes, upon the need for economic and technical aid, and upon the naivete and weaknesses of inexperienced leaders. Hence the problem for neutralist states is to keep out of Communist clutches. Nevertheless, insofar as the new and underdeveloped nations can overcome their problems, they may take on a strength and stature which will enable them to maintain their neutrality against Communist pressures.

IV. PROBLEMS OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCES

46. Western statesmen are faced with enormously more complicated problems than they had to face ten years ago. Whereas then one could think of military containment in terms of defining vital areas or lines of demarcation between the Communist world and the Free World, or even providing economic aid and diplomatic support in order to achieve political containment, the West must now contend not only with stronger, more flexible, and more dangerous enemies, but also with crises in the southern two-thirds of the world. These crises, as we have seen, arise only partly from Soviet and Chinese Communist machinations; many other factors are at work, such as the natural growth of population, knowledge, communication, and human aspirations, and the social dislocations that accompany rapid change.

47. The West has substantial and growing assets. The Western European economies, especially those in the Common Market area, are booming. Rates of economic growth in France and West Germany are about as high as in the USSR, averaging around six or seven percent per annum since 1950. In the UK and the US growth rates are somewhat lower, averaging around three or four percent; at the moment, the UK economy is in danger of stagnation, while that of the US has markedly slowed down. Nevertheless, the Western economies are for the most part highly advanced and flexible, and they respond to trade and fiscal policies designed to adjust them. The greater emphasis in the Western economies upon private capital, and upon the allocation of resources through the market place, makes it more difficult for them than for those of the Communist countries to concentrate upon the development of national power; however, in times of emergency they can readily be made to serve that objective.

48. Likewise, the major Western Powers, with their systems of alliances, overseas bases, and worldwide deployments of ground, naval, and air forces, possess enormous military power. Grave problems exist with respect to strategic doctrine, weapons systems, and the political application of military power. These we discuss below (Section V), but even with the deficiencies and gaps which are generally recognized this military power of the West is great and widely respected.

49. Moreover, despite the anticolonialism of many of the world’s peoples, the Western powers still wield great influence in many areas of the emerging world. English and French are still the linguae francae of Africa, the Middle East, and Southern Asia; they are still the languages of the revolutionary intelligentsia and of the universities. While Western influence has tended to decline in some areas, as for example among the Arab states, it has tended to rise in other areas, as for example in India. The Western, not the Communist, states are still the principal trading partners of most of the emerging nations, and still their principal bankers, investors, and developers. Despite the interest shown by many leaders of the emerging nations in Communist methods of development and in Soviet economic assistance, these same leaders still have borrowed from the West most of their basic concepts of the good life.

50. Nevertheless, the Western countries have grave and continuing problems. Political instability, while becoming epidemic in the southern two-thirds of the world, is still endemic in parts of the northern third. Basically unhealthy political situations exist in Western Europe itself; Spain and Portugal are restive under personal dictatorships, Italy continues to struggle with finding a parliamentary basis for constitutional government, and France has put its burdens upon one man who holds warring factions in harness through a governmental system created by him and for him alone. On the periphery of Europe, Greece remains poverty-stricken and politically weak, while Turkey is passing through a crisis of regime, the outcome of which can only be surmised.

51. Outside Europe, the condition of the Western alliance system is deteriorating. Japan, by far the most important non-Western nation associated with the system, enjoys a flourishing economy, but is passing through profound political and social changes. Although the rulers of Japan had successfully imposed selected elements of Western society upon a traditionalist society gradually over a period of nearly a century, the impact of nuclear warfare, defeat, and US occupation shook Japanese society to its foundations. In particular, the psychological atmosphere is still overcast with the memories generated by the only two nuclear weapons ever used in war. Today the country, after a decade of US assistance, is seeking, not only to find a way of life common to itself, but to find a satisfactory stance between attractions toward China and the USSR and a desire for protection by the US. In this atmosphere sharply contending political alternatives are being presented to the Japanese people: a radical left which favors neutralism and closer association with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and a conservative right that is generally disposed to association with the US. It is possible that the existing US-Japanese defense agreement may prove more a token than a reality; in any event the US is likely to have increasing difficulties in the years ahead in carrying out actions under the agreement.

52. The minor alliances, CENTO and SEATO, are floundering. Never a very effective organization, CENTO was gravely shaken in 1958 by the revolution in Iraq and that country’s subsequent withdrawal. Iran seems to be almost continuously in a condition of instability, and the British military position and general influence in the Middle East are extremely weak. Moreover, neutralist tendencies have emerged in Iran and Pakistan. SEATO has always been a loose association. It has only one member, Thailand, in mainland Southeast Asia, and the course of events in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam will have a great effect upon Thailand’s policy. The continuing failure of the principal members of the organization—the UK, US, and France—to have a common estimate of the situation in, and a common policy toward, the Indo-Chinese states makes it extremely difficult for SEATO to serve as an effective instrument for stability in the area.

53. These problems and weaknesses in US alliances outside Europe put in sharp relief the much greater vigor and strength of NATO. Despite its many weaknesses, NATO has shown itself to be a useful instrument of Western cooperation, and it has absorbed numerous shocks and crises arising both within and outside the alliance. It bears promise of continuing so to serve and, with some increase of constructive support by its members, even of expanding its utility.

54. But NATO contains centrifugal as well as centripetal forces. Some of these relate to the NATO military program. France’s opposition to an integrated force structure is well known, as is France’s recurrent removal of NATO-committed forces from NATO command. Most NATO members, of course, maintain forces, and in the case of the US very powerful forces, which they have never contemplated putting under NATO authority in peacetime. The most important of these are the US nuclear-capable strategic forces, and the desire to possess similar forces as a symbol of prestige and as a balance to US power within the Atlantic alliance contributed to the British and French decisions to develop independent nuclear capabilities.

55. Exclusive US control of the major deterrent has troubled Europeans in the past because they feared that the US would brandish it in too bellicose a fashion. More recently many have also become troubled by the opposite fear: that the US could no longer be relied upon to risk nuclear devastation in order to counter Soviet pressures in Europe, and that the Soviet leaders, judging this to be the case, would not be restrained from such pressures. Various suggestions have been made for solving the dilemmas presented by the evolving world strategic situation—nuclear sharing, revision of the mission and armament of the shield forces on the continent, arms limitations in the European area or in special European zones, revised procedures for consultation and decision making. Whatever position may ultimately be taken regarding these suggestions, virtually all of NATO’s military concepts seem likely to come under increasing questioning and to be subjected to strong pressures for substantial revision in the decade ahead.

56. In addition to these military problems NATO as an organization confronts various internal divergencies and rivalries which not only sap its capacity to act but shadow the image which it presents to the world. The basic relationship between the US and its European NATO allies is coming under strain, both because of the growing strength and assertiveness of the larger European NATO countries and because of growing European doubts about the future of US policy and US commitments to Europe. Relationships among the European members are also marked by considerable suspicion and jockeying for position—notably as between the UK and its principal continental allies—with the growing economic division of Europe between the Common Market and the Outer Seven countries compounding the mistrust.

57. The harmonization of economic policies among the industrial nations of Western Europe, and of these policies with those of the US, will be a major problem of the forthcoming decade. Should a major recession in the Free World economy occur, there would be danger of resort by the industrial nations to protectionist measures, undermining the pattern of economic cooperation stimulated by the US in the postwar period. In any case, the rapid emergence of Germany as the most powerful nation economically in Western Europe and the relative weakness of the UK complicate the problem of bridging the gap between the Common Market and Outer Seven groups.

58. Another serious problem for the alliance is created by the impact of colonial problems. This issue is at present posed most gravely by the Algerian conflict, which has stirred up anti-Westernism among the emerging peoples and dissension within the alliance. But Belgian and Dutch sensitivities regarding the Congo and West New Guinea problems, the British dilemmas in Nyasaland, Rhodesia, Kenya, and Uganda, and the strong colonialist attitude of Portugal add to the difficulties of individual states and tend to cause tensions among them. Until some of these issues are resolved it will be almost impossible for NATO as a whole to escape reproaches as a protector of colonialism.

59. Apart from these more obvious signs of malaise, there is, we believe, a problem of deeper significance. The world situation is not seen in a common light among the major Western states. This lack of a common understanding is due partly to a failure to communicate, partly to the cultural differences among the Western states, and partly to the inevitable divergencies of interest in many areas. As a consequence, a good many urgent problems are unresolved. When sharp tensions arise over these problems—as in the case of the Offshore Islands and Berlin—a common policy often has to be improvised, while mounting fears impede united action.

V. THE MILITARY PROBLEM

A. The Evolving Strategic Situation

60. Despite a widespread feeling that allout nuclear war is unlikely, the problem posed by the accumulation of offensive weapons of mass destruction by the great powers will remain the major problem of the 1960’s. Although we have been unable to agree upon an estimate of the size of the Soviet ICBM program (estimates range from 200—or perhaps even less—to 700 on launcher for mid-1963), the Soviet capability even at the lowest estimated figure will pose a grave threat to the US. To illustrate, if one assumes the number on launcher to be 200 and applies reasonable rates of reliability to the missile, the USSR could detonate in the US in the target area some 1,000 to 1,250 megatons. The even greater delivery capability provided by shorter range missiles and nuclear weapons deliverable by aircraft or submarines and ships poses an additional threat to the US, to US bases overseas, to US allies, and indeed to most of the northern hemisphere.

61. So far as we can see now, if the USSR undertook to deliver such an attack, the US could do little to prevent enormous damage. A US pre-emptive attack—that is, an attack delivered when a Soviet attack was believed to be imminent—would not prevent such damage unless the various types of Soviet missile launchers had been precisely located, and there is doubt that a high proportion could be so located. Antiballistic missile systems of presently unproven effectiveness will probably be available about the middle of the decade, but such early systems almost certainly will not be sufficiently developed or widely-enough deployed to give assurance of destroying or neutralizing more than a small proportion of the missiles which the USSR will be capable of launching.²

62. The US, however, will also almost certainly be able to do enormous damage to the USSR, even if attacked first by the USSR. It is true that during the next year or so the vulnerability of US retaliatory forces to a surprise missile attack and the uncertainties regarding the size of the Soviet ICBM force introduce some measure of doubt regarding the extent of the US retaliatory capability. It is very unlikely, however, that even during this period the USSR will acquire capabilities sufficient to give it confidence that it can prevent an unacceptable level of US retaliation.³ As the decade advances, the US program of maintaining a portion of the US bomber force on airborne alert and of dispersing missiles in hardened sites, aboard submarines at sea, and on railborne carriers should virtually assure the survival of a substantial retaliatory capability. The Soviets are pursuing a vigorous program for developing antimissile defenses, and we estimate that the USSR will probably begin to deploy an antimissile system of undetermined effectiveness by the period 1963–1966. The Soviet leaders probably believe that they will acquire a military advantage through protection of selected areas and through complicating the task of Western military planners. They almost certainly consider that the first nation to deploy such weapons will gain major psychological, political, and military advantages. Nevertheless, we believe it almost certain that these defenses throughout the period will remain inadequate to shield large areas of the USSR from widespread devastation.

63. Thus it appears likely that during most of the decade ahead the strategic situation will be one in which both the US and the USSR will possess relatively invulnerable nuclear weapons systems capable of inflicting enormous destruction upon the other. The world must face the possibility that a general nuclear war—brought to pass through accident, design, or miscalculation—would kill many millions of people, destroy the capital accumulation of many decades, render large sections of the earth virtually uninhabitable for a time, and destroy the power of most of the modern nations of the world.

64. This strategic situation does not make general nuclear war impossible, but it does make it a highly irrational response to international disputes. As long as this situation continues, each side will be deterred by fear of the consequences (if by nothing else) from deliberately initiating general war. It is almost certain, moreover, that each side will be deterred from action or policies which involve serious risk of general war. The crucial question is: how will the risks of a given action be judged in the context of circumstances which exist when the action is contemplated? To be more specific: how far will the Soviets—or the Chinese Communists—be emboldened by judging that Western reaction to some Communist aggression will be inhibited by Western aversion to incurring serious risk of general war? To what extent will the Western reaction actually be so inhibited? Such questions as these are likely to be decisive in any sharp international crisis.

65. But apart from the calculation of risks in times of crisis, this strategic situation poses other serious problems for policymakers. How long will it persist? Can either side achieve a clear military superiority? If the situation of mutual deterrence does persist, can nuclear war be prevented from occurring by accident? Can nuclear blackmail be countered? Can nuclear armaments be reduced or eliminated without creating unfair advantage or opportunities for evasion? We do not pretend to offer answers, but only to point out in the paragraphs below some of the military and political problems which we believe this strategic situation has created and will create in the decade ahead.

B. Military and Political Implications of the Evolving Strategic Situation ⁴

66. There is much ignorance and uncertainty among military and civilian leaders throughout the world—in both Communist and non-Communist countries—about the present and future world military situation. This is due in part to security restrictions between governments and even within governments, in part to the complex technical and operational factors involved in modern military actions, and in part to the fact that the destructive potential of modern weapons is unprecedented in human history. Even among the politically and militarily sophisticated, there is considerable puzzlement and disagreement about the deterrent effect of present and future nuclear capabilities, about the probable behavior of states in critical situations, and about the most suitable and effective strategic doctrines and weapons systems to develop.

67. These problems must trouble the Soviet leaders as much as they trouble those of the West. We do not believe that the Soviet leaders conceive the ICBM to be the final answer to their military problems, and we doubt that they have formed definite ideas about their force structure ten years hence or about the precise role they will assign to military power in their campaign to establish world communism. They now see themselves as emerging from a period of strategic inferiority, and they surely consider it a prime objective not to let the US draw ahead once more. As long as the weapons race persists, they will not be content with a strategic equilibrium, or with the progress they have hitherto made in weapons development. Beyond that, they will continue to carry on scientific and weapons research and development programs with a high sense of urgency in order to find new weapons systems and defenses against existing ones. They would do this even without dream of vast military conquests, simply in the interest of defense. But if they developed a weapons system which gave promise of decided advantage over the US, they would certainly seek to gain maximum profit from it.

68. In the decade ahead some such weapons—for example, one providing defense against missiles—may achieve operational status and tend to upset the nuclear missile terror balance we have described. From what we know of Soviet ideas, however, we conclude that during the next five years—and perhaps longer—the Soviet leaders will conceive of their long-range striking capability in terms of deterrence and of employment in a heavy blow should they finally conclude that deterrence had failed, rather than in terms of the deliberate initiation of general war. In their view, a condition of mutual deterrence will provide an umbrella under which they can wage a vigorous campaign, using a wide variety of methods, throughout the non-Communist world.⁵

69. In such a circumstance the Soviet leaders will have substantial advantages. They can create crises and issue threats over comparatively minor matters with a reasonable degree of confidence that one or more of the Western powers will give way because of the risks of general war involved in resisting. In circumstances where they judge the risk is not too great they might engage in military action, possibly with Soviet forces but more probably with other bloc forces or with local revolutionary armed groups. In any case where it appeared that the choice for resisters was one between massive nuclear destruction and compromise of principle (including even surrender of territory), large numbers of people around the world would choose the latter.

70. It is now widely held that, in order to prevent such a paralyzing choice from being presented, it is necessary to have limited war capabilities, so that comparatively minor threats can be countered with appropriate means. But in recent years limited war capabilities in the West have been declining rather than rising. There has been a trend toward the reduction of budgetary allocations for the modernization and mobility of limited-war-capable forces. Two of the US allies, for reasons of national prestige, or because they fear that the US will not always support them, have carried on strategic nuclear weapons programs of their own and have reduced their conventional forces.

71. Even if substantial limited war forces should be available, many of the principles of their political and military use in a nuclear age remain to be developed and to be accepted. It is clear, for example, that only limited objectives can be won by limited means, and that pursuit of broad objectives or extension of the conflict beyond a well defined area of combat threatens expansion into a major war and poses for both sides the question of undertaking a large-scale preemptive attack on the enemy’s homeland. Even when both parties accept limitations upon their objectives and upon the area of combat, the rules of combat within that established area still pose problems. One of these is that of using nuclear weapons for tactical advantage. The use of nuclear weapons in almost any form would greatly complicate both the military and political problem. It would almost certainly confuse the enemy and the neutrals as to the user’s real intentions—as distinct from his announced ones—and alienate large and influential sectors of world opinion from the cause of the user, however just it may have been. The Soviets would presumably regard the use of nuclear weapons in the light of the proposition which they repeatedly assert and probably believe—that limited wars would carry particularly great risks of spreading into general war if nuclear weapons were introduced.

72. From a political point of view, there are also questions about the circumstances in which one can intervene with limited forces. As a general rule and as a result of the experience of Korea, the Communist powers will probably try to avoid clear-cut provocations which would permit the West to bring limited war capabilities to bear. They will instead attempt to use situations which are legally or politically anomalous, that is, situations in which they have a defensible color of right for the use of force or in which the political issue has become or can be made to appear so confused as to make Western intervention seem capricious or imperialistic. Much will depend upon the way in which the issue is presented to the world and is handled by both sides. In many circumstances fear of the spread of the conflict into a general nuclear war might be so great that the intervener would find himself severely condemned by large segments of world opinion.

73. A major problem during the next decade is also posed by the probability that additional nations will acquire a nuclear weapons capability. France already has a program underway, and Communist China and Israel almost certainly have started such weapons programs. Other nations might enter the field if only to counter the power and prestige which their rivals or their enemies might gain through the acquisition of a nuclear capability. Even a small increase in the number of nations possessing nuclear weapons will add to the dangers inherent in critical situations as they arise. An increase in the number of states capable of using nuclear weapons—even as a threat—will also increase the chances for irrational and desperate action. At a minimum, the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities will stir up additional political turmoil by encouraging intransigence in their possessors and by encouraging fear and counteraction among those who might consider themselves threatened.

74. Related to these problems of limited war and spread of nuclear capabilities is the problem of preventing miscalculations which might precipitate general war unintentionally. Whenever international disputes arise there is a natural tendency for the parties concerned to place their forces on an alert status and progressively to strengthen the alert by various forms of deployment. In some cases these might be normal precautions and in some cases they might be intended to frighten the adversary, or both. In any case, there is likely to be considerable concern among neutrals and US allies that the US and the USSR will act in too bellicose a fashion, that both the US and the USSR might become so committed that they would be unable to back down and thus would become involved in war, or that the state of alert on one side or both will become so advanced that, fearing a surprise attack, one would take pre-emptive action against the other. As the decade advances and surprise attack against retaliatory weapons systems loses much of its advantage, compelling reasons for launching a pre-emptive attack will no longer exist. Nevertheless, fear of surprise attack will probably persist and might weigh more heavily in the minds of policymakers than would in fact be justified.

75. Another concern is that general war may come about by sheer accident. The worry here is that with an increasing number and variety of space capsules in orbit or being fired into orbit, with an increasing number of missiles nuclear-armed and on the ready, with strategic air forces airborne and armed with nuclear weapons, with a new and untested ballistic missile early warning system in operation, war could come about through communications failures or anomalies, irrational action by local crews or commanders, or errors in judgment, without either side wishing this to happen. As the decade advances and surprise attack loses some of its advantages, there will no longer be compelling reasons to respond immediately to supposed or actual infringements of air space by presumably hostile missiles or aircraft. Nevertheless, fear of attack might in some circumstances be so great that general war could come about in ways we have noted.

76. In this situation of widespread fear of a general nuclear war, it is natural that the peoples of the world should look to arms control as a means of reducing the danger. Whatever its motivation, the USSR has carried on a many-sided campaign for general and complete disarmament. The Soviet leaders probably are interested in achieving some degree of disarmament, to an extent which would at least slow down or stop developments which might harm their strategic position or increase the danger of accidental war. During the decade, it is possible that both sides will become sufficiently concerned with stabilizing the balance of terror that some limited agreements may be reached. In any case, it is possible that—in order both to achieve stabilization and to meet world pressures for reducing the danger of war—the two sides will undertake tacit agreements resulting in some degree of arms limitation.

77. Also, the UN is likely to continue to be regarded by its members as an instrument for the prevention of war. If two nations are involved in dispute that threatens to result in a general war which they wish to avoid, the UN might provide a useful forum for airing the dispute and UN action a useful excuse for emerging from the dispute with less than full satisfaction. Moreover, the underdeveloped nations, who are likely to become an increasingly powerful voice in the UN, will almost certainly feel it in their interest to prevent a general war and will therefore exert their influence for the preservation of peace.

78. While there is some reason to expect, therefore, that the UN may play a role in preserving peace, that the present balance of forces will persist or become stabilized, that the limited war concept may be sufficiently capable of development to provide an escape from nuclear blackmail and general nuclear war, and that chances of general war coming about by accident or fear of surprise attack may be reduced, the decade ahead will still be an extremely dangerous one. The Soviets see increasing opportunities for political gains in their new strategic position, in their economic growth, and in the changing situation in the underdeveloped areas. They are almost certain to test these opportunities, and such tests could give rise to serious crises. Berlin and the Offshore Islands exemplify situations in which retreat may become impossible, and civil wars in such areas on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc as Laos could pose grave questions concerning the objectives and rules for the conduct of limited operations. The world contest in the decade ahead will necessarily be conducted in the shadow of this strategic situation, and it will affect the decisions of statesmen everywhere.

1. “Estimate of the World Situation”; introduction and report on Soviet progress and policy. Secret. 22 pp. CIA Files, Job 79R01012A, ODDI Registry.
2. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, concurs in the net judgment contained in this paragraph and the succeeding paragraphs that, so far as can now be seen, a general nuclear war would cause enormous damage to all major protagonists and that resort to general nuclear war, under these circumstances, is not a rational course of action. He believes, however, that the intelligence community is unable to adjudge the capability of the US to develop an effective defense against ballistic missiles.
3. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur. As previously stated in his footnote to NIE 11–4–60, “Main Trends In Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1960–1965,” dated 1 December 1960, he feels that we are entering a very critical twenty-four month period in which the USSR may well sense that it has the advantage. The Soviet leaders may press that advantage and offer the US the choice of war or of backing down on an issue heretofore considered vital to our national interests.

4. The Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, believe that the tone of Section V, especially part B of this Section, compares a dynamic Communist Bloc to a static Free World. While emphasizing the capabilities of the Bloc, it gives little or no credit to the capability or determination of the West to shape the course of events.

   For example:

   a. Paragraph 69 charges “large numbers of people around the world” with acceptance of the Bertrand Russell thesis of preferring Communist chains to nuclear war. The Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, doubt the validity of this assertion.

   b. Paragraph 72 forecasts Communist political manipulation in crisis situations so as to try to make Western intervention seem “capricious or imperialistic.” Adroitness in the political arena by the West—believed by the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, to be equally possible—appears to be discounted as a factor for consideration.

5. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur in this paragraph. It is his belief that the evidence of offensive missile and bomber production and deployment shows a definite intent by the Soviet rulers to achieve a clear military superiority at the earliest practicable date.