Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

228. Memorandum Prepared by Boggs, January 13¹

January 13, 1961

SUBJECT

• Discussion at the 474th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, January 12, 1961

Present at the 474th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present at the Meeting and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Attorney General and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Items 2, 4 and 5); and the Administrator, Housing and Home Finance Agency (Item 5). Also attending the Meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, and for Foreign Economic Policy; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; Mr. Robert Amory, CIA; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Naval Aide to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting and the main points taken.

1. SCOPE OF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF THE POLARIS PROGRAM

(Memo for Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from Secretary of Defense, same subject, dated January 10, 1961)

Mr. Gray introduced this subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum).

Secretary Gates remarked that this was a controversial subject on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had submitted “split papers”. Some time ago a program involving the installation of POLARIS missiles on some six to eight cruisers had been evaluated in the Department of Defense. According to the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) studies, from the standpoint of cost, effectiveness and other criteria, the cruiser was not as effective as the submarine or the mobile MINUTEMAN as a missiles weapons system. Finally, he had accepted the view of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that POLARIS missiles should be installed on one cruiser only; namely, the LONG BEACH. He had informed the Navy that it must absorb the estimated $58 million cost of installing these missiles on this cruiser; moreover, he had reaffirmed a Department of Defense directive which says explicitly that the larger program for installing POLARIS missiles on cruisers was not approved, the LONG BEACH being the exception to his disapproval of the cruiser program. Secretary Gates added that the LONG BEACH was a nuclear-powered cruiser of great endurance which had cost $300 million; hence he felt it was almost criminal not to provide this expensive vessel with offensive capabilities. Both he and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs believed a great deal might be learned from the experiment. He also felt that the experiment was unlikely to expand into a program of equipping six or eight cruisers with POLARIS missiles, even though he admitted that the advocates of the larger program now had a foot in the door. After conferences with the Chief of Naval Operations, he had concluded that the LONG BEACH would not be a “white elephant.” In conclusion, Mr. Gates emphasized that he had not approved the expenditure of additional funds on this program and that the installation of POLARIS missiles on the LONG BEACH was an exception to the general principle that such missiles would not be installed on cruisers.

General Lemnitzer added that the LONG BEACH was originally designed as a missile cruiser; that is, it was intended to carry REGULUS II vehicles, which had since been cancelled. The President said he had approved the installation of POLARIS missiles on the LONG BEACH, even though he was skeptical as to the use which would be found for a surface ship carrying eight missiles when a submarine could carry sixteen. He noted that a great many people had become almost hysterical in their praise of any ship that was nuclear-powered. Secretary Gates said the high cost of the LONG BEACH was due, not to its nuclear power plant, but to the fact that it carried the most modern sonar, radar, and other equipment.

Mr. Stans inquired about the relative cost of placing missiles on the LONG BEACH versus the cost of using other missile launching platforms. Secretary Gates said that compared to the mobile MINUTEMAN and the submarine, the cruiser was a great deal more expensive as a missile platform. The President noted that in discussing MRBM’s for NATO, we had been thinking of small coastal ships as the launching platforms. However, he could see the value of the LONG BEACH if it could be stationed in the middle of the Indian Ocean at the right time. Secretary Gates said the LONG BEACH was a very self-sufficient ship.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed the President’s approval at the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense that, as an exception to the general policy of the Department of Defense of not placing POLARIS missiles on cruisers, the POLARIS program be extended by the installation of 8 missiles on the nuclear-powered USS LONG BEACH, as indicated in the reference memorandum distributed at the meeting.

NOTE: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently incorporated in the revision by the NSC Planning Board of NSC 6021 (circulated as NSC 6108, “Certain Aspects of Missile and Space Programs”).

2. CODIFICATION OF U.S. POLICY ON ARMS CONTROL AND U.S. POLICY ON NUCLEAR TESTING

(NSC 112; NSC 5906/1, paragraph 52; NSC Action No. 2215–c)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on this subject. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum).

Secretary Herter said he had no disagreement with the desirability of codification in this field but he wondered if sufficient time remained to complete the codification before January 20. He added that the Department of State had submitted a paper to the Department of Defense but the latter had not yet had time to study it. The President wondered whether the project should not be referred to the Planning Board. Mr. Gray said that this was his fall-back position but before falling back to that position, he wondered whether the President might request State, Defense, and AEC to make another effort to complete the codification during the next week. The President agreed that such an effort should be made. Secretary Gates said a Defense paper on the subject was on its way to the State Department. It would be difficult to complete this codification during the next week but he was willing to try.

The National Security Council:

Noted the President’s request that the Secretaries of State and Defense, in collaboration as appropriate with the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, expedite the preparation of the subject codifications in an effort to complete them during the next week.

NOTE: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, AEC, for appropriate implementation.

3. DISCLOSURE OF U.S. CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

(NSC Action No. 2125–b)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on this subject. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum).

Secretary Gates said he had experienced a certain amount of difficulty in his own department and with the Atomic Energy Commission in connection with the SD-MICC statement of policy referred to by Mr. Gray. A jurisdictional row was in progress. Mr. Gray wondered whether a directive by the President would help to solve the jurisdictional problem. The President said he believed a little pressure should be applied to this project. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the exchange of intelligence was not affected by the statement of policy referred to by Mr. Gray.

The National Security Council:

Noted the President’s request that the Secretaries of State and Defense expedite the preparation of the statement of policy on the subject pursuant to NSC Action No. 2125–b in an effort to complete it during the next week.

NOTE: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate implementation.

4. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(NSC Action No. 2367; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 9, 1961, SPECIAL LIMITED DISTRIBUTION ONLY)

Mr. Gray introduced this subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum).

After indicating that the 43 recommendations of the report of the Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities and the recommendations by the Department of Defense for revision of the National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) were before the Council, Mr. Gray turned to the recommendations of the Joint Study Group in the order in which they appeared in the January 9 memorandum of the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject.

The first category of recommendations consisted of those, 28 in number, on which all of the Principals of the Joint Study Group were in agreement. The Council concurred in these 28 recommendations.

Mr. Gray then turned to the second category; namely, 7 recommendations on which the Principals were in substantial agreement with the exception of dissents or reservations on each such recommendation by single agency head (See Paragraph 5 of the Briefing Note). Recommendations 21, 22 and 23 called for the establishment of a central requirements facility by the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB). Defense felt that these recommendations should be given further study. Secretary Gates said he had not had time to thrash this matter out with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He felt that he would personally be able to agree to Recommendation 21 at least, but the JCS felt that a problem was involved concerning the general relation of military influence to operational intelligence. General Lemnitzer said the JCS were not so much in disagreement with the objectives of the recommendation as they were inclined to feel the need for further study in the field. He added that problems as to where the central requirements facility might be located, etc. had been raised. Secretary Gates said the purpose of the recommendation was to remedy the present situation in which intelligence requirements can be issued without being checked in a central clearing house to see whether someone else has the same requirements. Mr. Dulles noted that a great volume of requirements were issued. The President wondered why the JCS objected to this recommendation. He felt finding out the exact requirements in intelligence was the road to efficiency. Secretary Gates said the JCS had lumped Recommendations 21, 22 and 23 together. He believed their dissent was a matter of the details rather than the philosophy. Mr. Dulles suggested that the three recommendations be accepted in principle and referred to the USIB for implementation and consultation with Defense and the JCS. Secretary Gates endorsed this proposal and the Council adopted it.

Mr. Gray then turned to Recommendation 24 which would place on U.S. Mission Chiefs overseas the responsibility for coordinating all overt and clandestine intelligence requirements in their area. Mr. Gray said he suggested granting an exception in instances where State and CIA agreed that the Chief of Mission should not exercise this responsibility. Mr. Dulles said Mr. Gray’s exception was acceptable to him. The President agreed.

Mr. Gray then suggested that Recommendation 31 be passed over until Recommendation 29 was taken up. Mr. Gray then turned to Recommendation 34 which would require that military agencies intelligence instructions to components of unified commands be transmitted through the JCS. Mr. Dulles said he concurred in this recommendation, subject to the proviso that it did not include NSA communications to the service cryptographic agencies in the field. General Lemnitzer said this recommendation involved a problem because of the vast volume of requirements in the technical intelligence field. The JCS were not organized for transmission of this vast volume of requirements. He felt there must be some middle ground; perhaps broad operational requirements as distinct from technical requirements could be transmitted through the JCS. The President pointed out that the recommendation referred to “instructions”. Mr. Dulles suggested that the recommendation be amended to indicate that instructions be transmitted through the JCS or as the JCS may direct. General Lemnitzer and Secretary Gates and the President agreed with Mr. Dulles’ suggestion.

Mr. Gray next took up Recommendation 37 which would continue the responsibility of CIA stations abroad to coordinate clandestine activities but would relieve CIA case officers of the authority to veto proposed clandestine operations of another agency. Mr. Dulles said he believed this recommendation unnecessary and distinguished between the final decision to approve and the final decision to veto. He said if a military service wishes to appeal the veto of a CIA case officer, the matter would be decided in Washington by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chief of the Military Intelligence Service. He pointed out also that if a field commander considers an operation essential to the security of his command, he can go ahead with the operation pending Washington’s decision regardless of the objection of the CIA case officer in the field. General Lemnitzer said the JCS agreed with this recommendation. Mr. Dulles said he had no further objection to the recommendation.

Mr. Gray then turned to a category of recommendations, two in number, on which there is disagreement but with respect to which the DCI recommends a decision at this time. The first recommendation in this category was No. 16 which called for the issuance of a new NSCID No. 8 establishing a National Photographic Intelligence Center. Mr. Gray pointed out that the Secretary of Defense and the DCI were in disagreement on this recommendation, each feeling that his agency should have responsibility for administering the proposed Center. General Lemnitzer believed the Center should operate under the general direction of the Defense Department because the vast amount of the in-put would be produced by the Military Services. Moreover, the Military Services would be required to provide training for and would be the principal customers of the Center, which would be especially important in time of war. He recognized the need of other agencies for photographic intelligence and such intelligence would be made available. He gave assurance that the Center would not be removed from Washington if it were placed under the Department of Defense. Vast quantities of photographic intelligence were now being acquired. No photographic center was available at the present time and the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to avoid duplicate centers. The Chiefs feel that the center could most effectively be operated by the Department of Defense with the participation of CIA. Secretary Gates added that Mr. Dulles had agreed that the Center should be operated by Defense in time of war but he (Mr. Gates) felt the need of continuity in the quick transition from peace to war which might occur in the future. This problem was not one of intelligence interpretation but was one of management. Every user agency could interpret the intelligence. Secretary Gates added that the existing Center would have to be expanded in the near future.

Mr. Dulles said some misinterpretation appeared to exist on this subject. The present photographic Center was a joint enterprise consisting of 140 CIA officials, 100 Army officers, and a small but competent Navy contingent of 10 and 7–15 Air Force officers. The Center had been a joint operation for five years and had handled mostly U–2 photography under the management of CIA. The President asked whether the Defense suggestion was that the Center be under J–2. General Lemnitzer replied, no, under the Department of Defense. Secretary Gates added, directly under the Secretary of Defense just as NSA is. The President thought the three Military Services should not be separately involved in this Center. Since the basic danger to be detected by the Center is military, he believed it would be satisfactory for the military to give central direction to the operation.

Mr. Dulles said the information obtained through this Center was chiefly military only in the targeting field. Photographic intelligence had tremendous political significance and was a matter of common concern to the Washington agencies. The matter was one which fell within the field CIA was established to coordinate. In its five years of operation the Center had developed a group of career officials who intended to make photographic intelligence their life work. If the Center were placed in the hands of the military, rotation of personnel would be the principle followed, if past practice is any guide. The President felt rotation would be fatal to an operation of this kind. Secretary Gates said that if the Center were placed under Defense, a career staff would be retained and developed. Mr. Dulles said abandonment of rotation was a new idea for the military. He added that the Center had been operated for five years without a leak. Preliminary analysis of photography is made by the Center and information is then disseminated to user agencies. Some of this information is vital to the Department of State. Mr. Dulles felt it would be very damaging to morale to disrupt this going concern at the present time. The President said he would like to inquire into the time element. While some of the information coming from the Center might be vital to the Department of State, he wondered whether it was not the military rather than the State Department which had an instant need for the information. Mr. Dulles said the information developed by the Center was important to the military but was also important to other agencies such as State because of its effect on policy. The President said the information was important but need not reach State as soon as it reached the military. The information might be needed in a matter of seconds by the military.

Secretary Gates said the Center would be considerably expanded in the future and the operation would be different from the U–2 operation. The President believed that the Center must be operated by an expert career staff. This was a question of management which, perhaps, should be studied before being decided so quickly. If he had to decide at the present time, however, he would say, since the present Center is doing well, let it alone except for its enlargement. He understood that the Department of Defense and the JCS had no complaints about the operation of the Center.

Mr. Stans said one difficulty was that the Air Force was establishing its own Center. Secretary Herter said he understood that the film was processed by the Air Force before it went to the Center. Mr. Dulles said this understanding was erroneous. The film is developed by a private company, which has the greatest competence in this field. This company has been developing this film for five years in the greatest secrecy. The film goes to a special branch of the company and is then flown to Washington. The Air Force gets the film at the same time as the Center.

The President said there should be only one Center and that no Service should establish a separate center. Matters of this kind were placed under CIA by the National Security Act because of their common usefulness. Secretary Gates said Mr. Stans was correct in his statement that the Air Force intended to have its own center. When great masses of photographic data were involved, there was a question of what should be looked at first and how soon. Mr. Gray said he felt the discussion was getting on to very sensitive grounds. The issue was whether there should be a single center or not. The President said there must be a single photographic center. Since CIA was the principal user and collector, he believed the center should be under CIA management as a principle of organization even though the time element still bothered him.

On being called on by the President, Dr. Kistiakowsky said that the existing photographic Center under CIA provided copies of its material without delay to all Services which concentrated on tactical intelligence. The Center does not retain the matter until it makes an exhaustive analysis; it passes it on immediately. Dr. Kistiakowsky felt the existing Center was a revolution in photographic techniques. In a year we would be able to obtain as much information from photographs taken 200 miles above the earth as we were able to get from our best reconnaissance plane in World War II. Operation of the Center required expertise. CIA had taken the lead in managing and developing this Center in the past. Dr. Kistiakowsky felt it would result in delay and loss of progress to disturb the Center at the present time. From the technical point of view, he would much prefer an expansion of the present Center to a transfer of the Center away from CIA management.

Mr. Stans raised the possibility of joint CIA/DOD management. The President said he disliked divided responsibility. He believed Defense had not shown any unhappiness with the existing Center. While he knew how important the time element was, he believed the present Center should be kept under CIA management and expanded. The DOD should state its requirements for photographic intelligence. There should be a single center and no Service should be allowed to set up its own center. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the draft NSCID No. 8 provided that the Director of the Center would be chosen by agreement between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Gray then turned to Recommendation 29 which would provide the DCI with a Coordinating Staff. The sole dissent on this recommendation was that of the Secretary of Defense who feels that the DCI should be separated from the CIA without further delay. Mr. Gray also mentioned the views of the Hull Board on this matter (bottom of Page 3 of the Briefing Note). Secretary Gates said the Defense view mentioned by Mr. Gray was the view of the Defense representative on the Joint Study Group. He (Mr. Gates) did not feel that he should comment on the organization of CIA; accordingly, he would take no strong position on this recommendation. The President believed the Defense Department should be interested in getting the best administration possible in this field and therefore should take a position. Secretary Gates said the Department of Defense had taken a position favoring the separation of the DCI from CIA. The President said he had believed for some time that the structure of our intelligence organization was faulty. He thought the Services should confine themselves to gathering combat intelligence while strategic military intelligence should be collected by an organization under J–2. He was convinced that better intelligence would be obtained by a centralized intelligence organization. Such an organization, however, needed to be streamlined.

Mr. Dulles said a great deal had been accomplished in the intelligence field over the past ten years. He believed coordination and cooperation was now better than it had ever been. He noted that no country had succeeded in achieving complete intelligence coordination, not even the U.K. and certainly not Germany under Hitler. Mr. Dulles was compelled to dissent from the Hull Board proposals because they were illegal until the law is changed. The DCI was responsible under the law for intelligence coordination and he could not delegate that responsibility. A body floating in thin air could not be created for the purpose of intelligence coordination until the statutes were amended. He doubted that such a body could accomplish coordination even if the law were amended to permit it to try. The President said he was convinced that some streamlining of our intelligence organization was needed. The streamlining probably should have been undertaken three years ago rather than at the last minute. Mr. Gray said the recommendation of the Joint Study Group was for a Coordinating Staff under the DCI. If the Secretary of Defense did not wish to press the proposal for a complete separation of the DCI from CIA, then a first step could be taken by adopting the Joint Study Group recommendation. Mr. Dulles said he concurred in the Joint Study Group recommendation. General Lemnitzer said the JCS agreed with the Secretary of Defense; they felt a separation of the DCI from CIA was to be preferred. Mr. Dulles said the objective of the Defense Department would be accomplished to a considerable extent by adopting the Joint Study Group proposal, particularly if Defense would assign a top-level official with real authority to the Coordinating Staff. Mr. Gray said the recommendation was not intended to fix intelligence organization for all time but would be a step forward.

Mr. Gray then proposed that the Council turn back to Recommendation 31 which would establish a management group under USIB. The President wondered whether the Coordinating Staff would not have to manage. Mr. Gray referred to the complicated committee structure under USIB but said no committee was charged with management problems. The Joint Study Group felt the need for a group which would deal with management matters. The DCI had suggested that this function be performed by the Coordinating Staff called for in Recommendation 29, which had just been discussed. The President wondered whether there was a difference between intelligence coordination and management. He felt that two separate bodies might clash. Mr. Dulles pointed out that he proposed a single group, namely, the Coordinating Staff. Secretary Herter suggested that the Coordinating Staff under the DCI be charged with management problems for six months after which the matter could be reviewed.

Secretary Gates referred to a new coordinating board which would be responsible for intelligence planning and estimating. Mr. Dulles felt that Secretary Gates was confusing two things, the membership of USIB and the recommendation of the Joint Study Group for a management group. Secretary Gates said he favored a change in the membership of USIB. He believed Defense, not the Services, should be represented on USIB and that the Defense representative should have a Defense position in the same way he has a Defense position when he comes to an NSC meeting. Mr. Dulles said that as soon as the necessary intelligence reorganization took place in the Pentagon, he would concur in a reorganization of USIB but not before.

Mr. Gray asked whether the Council agreed to give the Coordinating Staff referred to in Recommendation 29 the management function. The Council, including the President, indicated that it did agree with this proposal.

The President said the job of streamlining intelligence had not yet been seriously tackled. He had received a body blow when he learned that USIB consisted of ten people. Mr. Gray asked whether the Secretary of Defense wished to speak further on the membership of the USIB. Secretary Gates said he had recommended a change in USIB membership and he believed this change could be made at the present time. Accordingly, he had submitted proposed amendments to the NSCID’s. The President asked why Defense could not effect the necessary reorganization without the blessing of the Council. Secretary Gates replied that the NSCID’s had been adopted by the Council. The President said that the Council was only advisory to the President and that he (the President) as Commander-in-Chief looked to the Secretary of Defense to effect proper organization of intelligence in the Pentagon. The President added, however, that until intelligence in the Pentagon was reorganized, Defense would have to go along with the idea of changing the membership of USIB in phase with changes in Defense. Secretary Gates said he believed the changes he had proposed would force the Department of Defense to do its homework in intelligence. Mr. Dulles said if the Secretary of Defense wanted to assume the task of coordinating Army, Navy, and Air Force views on such a subject as missiles, he would be delighted. He felt, however, that such coordination would consume a great deal of the time of the Secretary of Defense. He believed he had more time than the Secretary of Defense to attempt this coordination. Secretary Gates said that USIB with Army, Navy, Air Force, DOD, and JCS representatives was a discussion board. No Defense position and no ironing out of Service positions was possible. The whole Defense position was turned over to USIB by default. The President said we were groping toward improvement in our intelligence organization. However, he wondered where the Services obtained the information which Mr. Dulles found so important. He did not believe the Services could find out how many missiles the Soviets have. Mr. Dulles said a distorted estimate would result if it were not for all the Services. For example, the Army had a great deal of experience in the amount of factory floor space required for the building for particular numbers of missiles. An acceptance of an Air Force point of view without regard to this Army experience would result in distortion. The President said he was talking about the views of the Secretary of Defense. He believed technical and tactical intelligence should be in the hands of the Services but broad strategic matters were different. He felt a better definition of the responsibility of each Service as to collection was needed, after which coordination should be less difficult. He believed military strategic intelligence should be centralized in Defense or JCS. General Lemnitzer said intelligence was different from other matters since intelligence estimates were based on a wide variety of information. He pointed out that the proposal by the Secretary of Defense would result in two Defense representatives on USIB, one from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and one from J–2. These two Defense representatives might have a difference of opinion. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense did not have an intelligence staff to help him resolve differences of view. Secretary Gates said he did a great deal of homework on NSC papers before a Council meeting. He believed it should be part of his job to spend time also in resolving intelligence differences. The President said he could not agree more. His inclination would be to put Pentagon intelligence under the JCS and let the latter send one man, not two, to USIB. Secretary Gates said his recommendation involved setting up one intelligence organization in the Pentagon. The President said that, nevertheless, the present system, even it if worked creakingly at present, could not be radically changed until the necessary people were trained. The President, therefore, felt that the language in the Joint Study Group recommendations as to phasing was correct with respect to the membership of USIB. He hoped, however, that the phasing would not require eight years.

Mr. Gray turned next to another category of recommendations, six in number, on which there were differences of view among the Principals and on which the DCI recommends deferral of action. The first recommendations in this category were Nos. 1, 2 and 35 which would require a reorganization of intelligence within Defense and in field commands, with particular reference to the role of the Joint Staff and the unified commands in relation to military intelligence services. The Secretary of Defense approves these recommendations in principle but feels that Recommendation 35 should be deferred until experience is gathered in implementing Recommendations 1 and 2. The DCI objects to Recommendation 1(b)(2), which would require the JCS to coordinate intelligence views within Defense. Secretary Gates said this was a matter of internal directives within the Department of Defense and was related to the discussion just concluded. He felt the matter should be deferred.

The President said he was impressed by Recommendations 1 and 2 but felt that Recommendation 35 should be deferred. Mr. Gray then referred specifically to Recommendation 1 (b)(2). Mr. Stans said that there was no need for three military medical services, three military procurement services, or three military intelligence services. He believed a single military intelligence service should be achieved ultimately and the sooner the better. The President thought this matter would be settled by the reorganization of military intelligence which the Secretary of Defense would undertake. However, he thought intelligence direction by the JCS would have to be phased; such direction could not be accomplished until the intelligence organization in the Pentagon was changed. Secretary Gates said the amendments he had proposed to the NSCID’s would permit a reorganization of intelligence in the Pentagon.

At this point Mr. Gray asked the Council to consider the amendments to the NSCID’s proposed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Mr. Gray explained these proposed amendments.

In connection with NSCID 3, Mr. Stans noted that the Secretary of Defense proposed that Defense undertake the collection of economic information pertinent to the Department of Defense. Mr. Stans thought it would be possible to interpret this provision as including almost any type of information; accordingly, he felt the provision should be eliminated or limited. The President said that Military Attaches would inevitably collect some economic information. If an attempt were made to put intelligence in rigid compartments, some information would be lost. He was ready to admit that the primary responsibility for economic intelligence rested with State and CIA, but he believed the Military Services could not be denied the right to get any information they could obtain. Secretary Gates said his proposal merely updated the language of the existing NSCID, which permitted the three Services to collect economic intelligence. General Lemnitzer pointed out that the Military had to gather certain types of economic intelligence; for example, in order to evaluate Soviet missile capabilities, it was necessary to analyze the floor space of factories. Mr. McCone thought it would be unwise to exclude the Military from economic intelligence activities. Mr. Stans said Budget officials feared that each Military Service would attempt to collect all the economic information it was possible to collect. Mr. Gray pointed out that if the Defense proposals were adopted, Mr. Stans would need to deal only with the Secretary of Defense, rather than the three Services, in attempting to keep intelligence collection within bounds. The President said we should be content with the progress represented by the Defense amendments to NSCID 3. Mr. Stans suggested that the word “directly” be inserted in the provision under discussion so that Defense would collect “economic information directly pertinent to the Department of Defense.” Mr. Gates said he would not argue over an adverb and the President approved Mr. Stans’ suggestion.

In connection with NSCID 5, the President saw no reason to object to designating the Secretary of Defense as the agent with whom the DCI would negotiate coordination of espionage and clandestine counter-intelligence activities in active theaters of war. He felt, however, that while the JCS should not be held responsible, the Secretary of Defense should lean on them for advice in this field.

Secretary Herter said that the Defense proposals for amendment to NSCID 6 were worded in such a way as to exclude the Department of State, the FBI, and AEC from COMINT and ELINT activities. In response to a question from the President, he indicated that State negotiated international agreements for ELINT stations, for example. Secretary Herter suggested that NSCID 6 might be amended simply by indicating that “only the Secretary of Defense shall exercise or delegate this authority within the Department of Defense.” Mr. Dulles concurred in Secretary Herter’s suggestion.

Mr. Gray then reverted to the two remaining Joint Study Group recommendations. He said that Recommendation 5 would have military intelligence agencies develop a capability for war-time clandestine intelligence collection, to be carried out under coordination of the DCI. The President said he could speak with the authority of a former theater commander in time of war in saying that the theater commander could not be responsible to anyone but the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary Herter believed Recommendation 5 required further study. The President said that rather than providing for coordination by the DCI, the recommendation might say that the DCI would be kept completely informed. Mr. Dulles pointed out that Recommendation 5 referred to peace-time, not war-time. The President said he was inclined to agree with Recommendation 5, on the understanding that it applied to peace-time activities only. He did not wish to see developed the theory that a theater commander could be interfered with in time of war.

Mr. Gray then noted that Recommendation 18 would have the DCI focus the attention of the intelligence community on counter-intelligence and the security of overseas personnel and installations with periodic reports to USIB. Secretary Herter said this matter was under intense study at the present time. He believed it would be premature to take action on this recommendation until study and research had been completed. The President said the report referred to in Recommendation 18 could be made through channels. Secretary Herter noted that State Department officials did not wish State Department research activities in this field curtailed as a result of a directive for a joint operation. Mr. Dulles said he hoped some action would be taken on Recommendation 18. He believed coordination was important in this field. The recommendation was not meant to upset the research and study already under way. Mr. Gray suggested that the agencies concerned should make periodic reports to the agency heads.

The President said he hoped this Administration would recommend to the new Administration that the Hull Board be kept in existence. Mr. Dulles concurred. The President added that in his view, the recommendation for continuance of the Hull Board should be made to the new Administration by the DCI and the Secretary of Defense rather than by him (the President) in view of the apparent tendency of the incoming Administration to downgrade the record of the outgoing Administration. Mr. Gray said that in a conversation with his successor, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, he had formed the impression that Mr. Bundy agreed that the Hull Board should be retained. Mr. Bundy’s only question about the Board seemed to be concerned with its relationship to the President. The President said a great many relationships which had been working satisfactorily for a long time were now being questioned by people new to the job.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the views of the Principals of the Joint Study Group regarding the Group’s report, as consolidated by the Director of Central Intelligence (transmitted by the reference memorandum of January 9, 1961); and took the following actions with regard to the recommendations of the Joint Study Group:

(1) Concurred in Recommendations Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 and 43.

(2) Concurred in Recommendations Nos. 1, 2 and 30, provided that:

(a) Implementation of Recommendations Nos. 1 and 2 should take place after study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in a manner to be established by the Secretary of Defense.

(b) The implementation of Recommendations Nos. 1, 2 and 30 with respect to the organization and functions of the USIB should be taken in phase with the carrying out of the related internal adjustments within the intelligence components of the Department of Defense.

(3) Concurred in Recommendation No. 5, with the understanding that this recommendation did not modify the arrangements in this field under wartime conditions.

(4) Concurred in Recommendation No. 16 and approved draft NSCID No. 8 as submitted, with the provision that the National Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC) should be under the Central Intelligence Agency; and noted the President’s statement that there should be no other center duplicating the functions of the NPIC, and that the military services and other departments and agencies should state clearly to the NPIC their particular requirements.

(5) Concurred in Recommendation No. 18, subject to the deletion of the words “and assign responsibility for periodic reports to the United States Intelligence Board” and the addition of the words “and the agencies concerned should make periodic reports to their agency heads.”

(6) Concurred in principle with Recommendations Nos. 21, 22 and 23, and referred them to the USIB for implementation in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(7) Concurred in Recommendation No. 24, subject to the addition of the words “except in situations with respect to which the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence may agree do not warrant such allocation of responsibility.”

(8) Agreed that, in lieu of establishing the management group proposed in Recommendation No. 31, the functions recommended for that group should be performed by the coordination staff proposed in Recommendation No. 29.

(9) Concurred in Recommendation No. 34, subject to the addition of the words “or as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct, subject to the understanding that National Security Agency communications to service cryptologic agencies in the field are excepted from the provisions of this recommendation.”

(10) Deferred action on Recommendation No. 35.

b. Discussed the recommendations of the Deputy Secretary of Defense (transmitted by the reference memorandum of January 9, 1961), and adopted the following amendments to National Security Council Intelligence Directives:

(1) NSCID No. 1, paragraph 4-a, 3rd sentence: Delete the words “with intelligence production responsibilities.”

(2) NSCID No. 2, paragraph 3: Delete this paragraph and substitute the following:

“3. The Department of Defense shall have primary responsibility for, and shall perform as a service of common concern, the collection of military intelligence information. Owing to the importance of scientific and technical intelligence to the Department of Defense and the military services, this collection responsibility shall include scientific and technical, as well as economic, information directly pertinent to Department of Defense missions.”

(3) NSCID No. 3, subparagraph 7-b: Delete this subparagraph and substitute the following:

“b. The Department of Defense shall produce military intelligence. This production shall include scientific, technical and economic intelligence directly pertinent to the missions of the various components of the Department of Defense.”

(4) NSCID No. 5, subparagraphs 8-a, -b and -c: Substitute the words “Secretary of Defense” for the words “Joint Chiefs of Staff”.

(5) NSCID No. 6, paragraph 2: Add the following words: “, except that only the Secretary of Defense shall exercise or delegate this authority within the Department of Defense.”

c. Noted the President’s conviction that further streamlining of the entire foreign intelligence organization still needs to be accomplished.

NOTE: The action in a above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.

The amendments in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently incorporated in revised NSCID’s.

5. MEASURES TO PROVIDE SHELTER FROM RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT

(NSC 5802/1; NSC 5807; NSC 5807/2; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy on Continental Defense”, dated July 14, 1960; NSC Action No. 2300–e; Memos for NSC from Deputy Executive Secretary, subject: “Measures for the Passive Defense of the Population, with Particular Regard to Fallout Shelter”, dated December 7 and 8, 1960; NSC Action No. 2361; NSC 6104; NSC 6104/1)

Mr. Mason, Administrator, Housing and Home Finance Agency, joined the meeting at this point. Mr. Gray presented NSC 6104/1 to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum). In the course of his briefing, Mr. Gray noted that the split in sub-paragraph h on Page 6 of NSC 6104/1 had been settled by agreement between the Budget and OCDM Directors. The Financial Appendix treatment of the same point, however, (fall-out shelter in military buildings) still contained a split between the majority version providing for $30 million a year to be funded by new appropriations and the Budget version which would provide for $10 million in FY 62 to be absorbed within regular military appropriations.

Mr. Gates said this was entirely a question of money. The Department of Defense feels that this small amount should be included in a supplemental appropriation request rather than absorbed by the Department of Defense. Mr. Stans said his proposal relied on the uncontroverted statement he had made in a previous meeting of the Council that Defense could absorb $10 million but not $30 million for this purpose. Mr. Stans felt that $10 million was adequate to get the program underway. In response to a question from the President, Mr. Stans reported that the new budget had already been prepared but that the specifics of money for shelter in military buildings had not been included. The President said that if perhaps some of the marble columns could be eliminated from new buildings, the $10 million could be absorbed. Secretary Gates said that adoption of a policy of putting fallout shelters in old and new military buildings meant that the first step was being taken in a program which would cost a great deal of money. In his view, requests for this money should be incorporated in the national budget, not absorbed in the Defense budget.

Governor Hoegh calling attention to Footnote 1 in the Financial Appendix, pointed out that no funds have to be provided until fallout shelter legislation is passed by the Congress. The President believed that in the light of the billions of dollars being spent for other purposes, it would be inconsistent to eliminate all money for construction of fallout shelters from the budget. The cost of shelters in new buildings would not be great if appropriate changes in design were made. The President, however, was worried about the cost of providing fall-out shelters in existing buildings such as the Pentagon. Mr. McCone said it had cost a great deal to add fall-out shelters to the new AEC building.

In reply to a question by the President, Governor Hoegh said that two feet of earth or sixteen inches of concrete—in fact, eight inches of concrete—provided shielding from fall-out. It would not be expensive to provide this amount of shielding during the initial construction of a building. Governor Hoegh then again called attention to the footnote which indicated that funds need not be provided until Congress passes the necessary legislation.

Mr. Gray called the attention of the Council to the split in sub-paragraph i on Page 7 of NSC 6104/1. This subparagraph dealt with shelters as a condition for federal grant aid and provided for funding from new appropriations. Mr. Stans called attention to the Budget footnote indicating doubt that any specific estimate of cost is feasible and proposing that the cost be absorbed within regular appropriations. As an example, he mentioned the grant-in-aid program for hospitals. Congress regularly raises the budget request for this purpose from $100 million to $180 million. Mr. Stans felt the cost of shelters in hospitals affected by the program could be readily absorbed in this sum. The President agreed that hospitals constructed under this grant-in-aid law should be required to make provision for fall-out shelters within the regular appropriations. Governor Hoegh had no objection.

Mr. Gray then turned to the split in subparagraph j on Page 8 which would require fall-out shelters as a condition for five categories of federal loans and guarantees. Mr. Mason believed that if shelter in housing was to be required, it should be required in all housing, nor merely in low-cost housing covered by this paragraph. He would like to encourage the building of shelters but he did not want to penalize low-cost housing. Secretary Gates felt the provision in subparagraph j might be very difficult to administer equitably. Secretary Anderson agreed, saying that we are singling out people with low income and telling them how they must spend their housing money as a condition for obtaining a loan. Governor Hoegh said that housing was now required to have bathrooms and running water. He felt the requirement that housing have fall-out shelters was based on the same principle. Implementation of a policy in this field would require Congressional approval but submission of the proposal to Congress would show that the Administration means business. Mr. Stans said only the person who had to finance his house with a government loan would have to build a shelter. The President said he was opposed to this provision because he was an individualist. Mr. Mason said he had no objection to require fall-out shelters in cases where a direct government loan was granted; his objection was to requiring fall-out shelters in cases of government-guaranteed loans.

The President observed that people who had fall-out shelters would, in the event of an alert, be under great pressure to share their shelters with people who do not have them.

Mr. Mason thought that fall-out shelters should be public shelters rather than parts of individual houses. Governor Hoegh pointed out that seven NATO countries now require shelters to be incorporated in new houses. Secretary Anderson said he would have no objection to our adopting a policy of this kind. Secretary Herter believed the Federal Government had no authority for laying down a requirement of this kind.

Mr. Stans agreed with Mr. Mason that shelters might be required in cases of direct federal loans, but that a requirement of shelters would be undesirable in the case of guarantees. Mr. Stans also felt that any proposal for a law to require shelters in all new housing should be dealt with apart from NSC 6104/1. Governor Hoegh felt this was a key provision which should be incorporated in legislation. The President said he could agree with Governor Hoegh’s proposal with respect to direct government loans but he did not agree with Governor Hoegh on guaranteed loans. He concluded the discussion by saying that the whole matter of fall-out shelters should be put before Congress once more.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6104/1, prepared by the NSC Planning Board as a revision of the report submitted by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization pursuant to NSC Action No. 2361–d (NSC 6104).

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 6104/1, subject to the following amendments:

(1) Pages 6 and 7, paragraph h: Delete the brackets and the footnote thereto; change the second sentence to read as follows: “In addition, fallout shelters should be incorporated in selected existing military buildings.”; and delete the third sentence.

(2) Page 8, paragraph j: Delete the brackets and the footnote, “and guarantees” from the title, and revise the third sentence to read as follows: “Programs which would be affected include: (1) HHFA/CFA—loans for college housing; (2) HHFA/CFA—public facility loans; and (3) HHFA/CFA projects planned under project planning advances must, where applicable, provide for fallout shelters.”

(3) Page 10, paragraph m: Delete the brackets and the footnote thereto, and substitute the word “continuously” for “fully” in that sentence.

(4) Pages 11 and 12:

(a) Delete the figures “16.0” and “80.0” opposite Item i and substitute dashes.

(b) Delete footnotes 2/ and 4/.

(c) Revise footnote 3/ to read: “To be absorbed within regular appropriations.”

c. Noted the President’s statement that legislation should be sought, as appropriate, to support the principle that all new housing include fallout shelter.

NOTE: NSC 6104/1, as amended by the action in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 6104/2 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, under the coordination of the Director, OCDM. The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director, OCDM and the Director, Bureau of the Budget.

6. RENTAL PAYMENTS FOR MILITARY RIGHTS AND FACILITIES

(NSC 6004/1, paragraph 24; NOTE to NSC Action No. 2192; Footnote to paragraph 18 of NSC 6002/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 11, 1961)

The Council concurred in Mr. Gray’s suggestion that the study prepared by the Department of Defense on “Rental Payments for Overseas Bases” be referred to the Planning Board for further consideration.

The National Security Council:

Referred to the NSC Planning Board for further consideration the study on “Rental Payments for Overseas Bases”, prepared by the Department of Defense as a response to paragraph 24 of NSC 6004/1, the NOTE to NSC Action No. 2192, and the footnote to paragraph 18 of NSC 6002/1 (transmitted by the reference memorandum of January 11, 1961).

7. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY

[Here follows an intelligence briefing on developments in the Soviet Union, the Congo, and counterintelligence activities.]

Mr. Gray said that some of those participating in the meeting were about to become statistics. Mr. Gray said the meeting about to be concluded was the last Council meeting of this Administration. During President Eisenhower’s Administration 366 Council meetings had been held. The President had presided over 329 of these meetings, or 89.897 per cent.

The President said his experience with the National Security Council had been a most gratifying one. The Council is a body in which views were frankly and openly expressed. This was due in part, he believed, to the feeling that what was said in the room was secret. He could remember only one occasion when a remark made in the Council room during his Administration had been quoted publicly outside. This was a really remarkable achievement.

Mr. Gates felt sure the other members of the Council would join with him and the President in thanking Mr. Gordon Gray and his staff in performing conscientiously a difficult and painstaking task.

Marion W. Boggs

1. Discussion at 474th National Security Council Meeting. Top Secret. Polaris program, codification of U.S. arms control/nuclear testing policy, disclosure of classified information to foreign governments, foreign intelligence activities, shelter from radioactive fallout, and rental payments for overseas bases. 25 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.