Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

211. Telegram 333 from Moscow, July 25¹

July 25, 1963

From Harriman. At Sov request, meeting today was postponed first to 4 and then to 4:30 pm.

Before meeting actually began, Gromyko handed Harriman a letter in reply to Harriman’s letter delivered this morning. After familiarizing himself with contents of Gromyko’s letter, Harriman asked for private meeting and Gromyko and Hailsham agreed.

Harriman opened private meeting stating he had hoped wording of his letter would be satisfactory to Sovs. Pointed out problem was that of getting votes in Senate; since there was [garble] a China lobby Gromyko’s letter would make situation even worse. Suggested Gromyko take his letter back and we could perhaps modify language of ours so as to provide for right to object by any of depositaries to adherence in specific cases. To have Gromyko’s letter in our possession would make our position in Senate impossible. Suggested change in his letter to Gromyko which would make regime Sovs considered as vacuum bound by the treaty but would not require Sov recognition thereof. Again asked Gromyko to take his letter back and offered modified his own. Pointed out if he took Gromyko’s letter would have to write similar letter re CPR; thus we would be exchanging letters back and forth and might damage favorable spirit which we had developed in these talks with Gromyko’s assistance.

Gromyko said did not quite understand how he could take his letter back since it set forth Sov position as it has always been. As to Harriman’s offer change his own letter, said frankly Sovs not very interested in substance that letter; it stated US position, while Sov letter stated Sov position. Sovs did not deny US right its position. If Harriman were to take his letter back he would take back his own, because his letter was in reply to Harriman’s.

Problem at hand had been discussed orally and US itself had suggest that no formal understanding in writing was being sought but only the common interpretation of issue. However, no such interpretation could be achieved because as far as USSR was concerned it could not recognize legitimacy of ratification for access by Chiang. Sovs believed it would be reasonable if US had similar attitude but they did not know how US would act; in any event, that was US own business. Pointed out he was speaking of Chiang and suggested there be no letters, noting it had not been USSR who had initiated letters. Suggested both sides agree they had different understanding on this matter. There were different kinds of non-recognition, one of them being a diplomatic non-recognition. For example, USSR did not recognize diplomatically Franco or present regime in Portugal but it did recognize them as existing govts. As to Chiang Sovs did not recognize him not only diplomatically but they also did not recognize him even as existing. This was substance Sov position. Evidently US had different attitude toward Chiang but Sovs had their own. Certainly Sovs could not tell US what it should do.

Harriman said if Gromyko gave him his letter he would have to write him that under no circumstances would US accept Red China’s accession. It had been Gromyko’s statement regarding Chiang of yesterday which had caused so much difficulty in Washington. Recognizing Gromyko’s points re difficulties which would arise if all three depositories were required accept accession and ratification, we had developed in our letter procedure which we believed should meet Sov view. However, when Gromyko specifically objected to govt which had great support in US that created great difficulty. Reiterated he anxious not spoil good atmosphere in these talks by receiving this positive letter. Wondered whether Gromyko completely understood his suggested change in his own letter, noting we said non-recognized country or regime would not have to deposit ratification with all depositories but would still be bound by treaty obligations; thus Sovs could continue not to recognize that country just as we would not recognize some country or regimes. Observed that normally he would have discussed draft his letter with Gromyko before transmitting it but since we had believed treaty would be initialed today we had drafted our letter assuming it would be satisfactory. Said prepared to take back his letter and regard it as draft.

At this point both Harriman and Gromyko took back their respective letters.

Hailsham believed Gromyko had a point. Noted if a country’s ratification was accepted such country would become party to treaty and would be voting under treaty provisions for amendments. This was difficult matter and it applied to both sides. Suggested it might be simpler merely to say that non-recognized country could declare itself bound by treaty, but in such case it would not have right to vote as it would not be party to treaty. Reiterated Gromyko had a point as one could not have unilateral ratification without country in question automatically becoming party to treaty.

Harriman pointed out problem involved only special cases noting there were some cases where we could not object. E.g., Outer Mongolia would not be objectionable just as Franco was not objectionable to USSR. Appreciated Gromyko’s frankness in stating his point of view but pointed out US suggested language created a way out for Sovs.

Hailsham said if Chiang were to send his ratification to Sovs they could send it back but if Chiang made a declaration Sovs could merely say they didn’t care.

Gromyko said did not understand why US wished had a text, because Sovs did not wish to write more and could not write less than what was contained in their letter. As to Harriman’s suggestion change wording his letter, specific contents of that letter were of no interest to USSR. In fact he, Gromyko, could turn his head away and take any letter from Harriman. Harriman’s letter was attempt make USSR recognize legitimacy Chiang’s adherence. Reiterated Sovs did not wish say anything more in their letter than already there—although they could—but neither could they say anything less. As to Hailsham’s idea that countries could become bound by treaty without accession, he could only repeat Sovs position. In any event Hailsham’s suggestion not much different from US position. Asserted exchange of letters was to US disadvantage but commented that perhaps there was some misunderstanding in this whole affair.

II

Harriman assured Gromyko reason for our letter was not our desire to promote Chiang in this treaty. Pointed out there would be only limited adherence if only those recognized by Sovs or US could adhere. Washington wanted to make treaty all inclusive. While he did not want mention any names because Sovs might be insulted, there were some countries or regimes we object to. However, if CPR, even though we did not recognize it, were to adhere we would not object just as Sovs apparently would not object to Spain or Portugal. Reiterated Washington wished as broad adherence as possible. Commented we had never expected Sovs would react so violently in this matter although of course we had heard very strong Sov pronouncements at UN. Stressed again treaty would not be all inclusive unless it provided for accession by non-recognized countries or regimes. Observed US was prepared close its eyes to many things we did not like and had hoped Sovs would do the same. We did not believe accession would enhance a country or regime, as they had their standing, whatever it was, even without accession. Requested Gromyko’s help in resolving problem under discussion, reiterating it never occurred to US Sovs would react as violently as they did.

Hailsham observed Harriman’s remarks placed problem in different light. Perhaps US could write letter saying if a country or regime not recognized by US deposited its ratification with USSR, US would accept adherence but would not recognize deposits thus if US concerned about securing accession to treaty by CPR or East Germany they could deposit with USSR and would be bound without recognition of deposit by US.

Harriman interjected we wished universality for treaty and wanted be able say all could adhere if they wished and this was understood between original parties.

Hailsham noted if bilateral recognition of deposits were required that would raise issue of concern to Gromyko. Believed no Soviet reply would be necessary to such letter from US and suggested arrangement would limit number of cases to a handful.

Harriman said perhaps this was true. Since it was our desire universality of treaty non-recognized country or regime could deposit with depository recognizing such country or regime and if copies of instruments were accepted by other depositories, such country or regime would become party. On other hand, if any of three depositories refuse accept ratification respective country or regime would not become party. For example if Outer Mongolia deposited its instruments with USSR and we accepted copies of those instruments it would become party, although of course that would not mean our recognition of that country. On other hand if we sent back those instruments Outer Mongolia would not become a party.

Hailsham noted such an arrangement would give each original party veto power re accession by countries not recognized by it.

Gromyko commented perhaps there was some degree of misunderstanding in this matter, although he was not sure. In any event suggested procedure could not satisfy Sovs. Pointed out any written reply from Sovs could not be different from what he had given Harriman earlier because Sovs regarded US letter as attempt to obtain from USSR indirect recognition of legitimacy of that regime, something USSR could not do. If this was a misunderstanding perhaps what he was about to say would eliminate it. What Sovs could accept was following. They could agree, but not in writing, that if Chiang sent his ratification to USSR, it would not repeat not be accepted; US would probably accept but Sovs would welcome it if it did not. Sovs stated they would not recognize legitimacy of this accession, whereas US would probably take opposite stand and from US standpoint this accession would be legitimate. If this should happen, Sovs would not make any statement re legality or illegality of US act—that, Gromyko said, could be stated already now. Sovs would limit themselves to present explanation and would not make any statement at time of US acceptance Chiang’s ratification. Reiterated Sovs would not make at that time any statement disputing legality or illegality of US action.

Harriman said this was helpful. However, without naming any country there might be countries which would create similar situation with US. Therefore, we had to make a similar reservation.

Gromyko said perhaps there was really some misunderstanding here and hoped his further remarks might clear it up. Said that if for example US said it unwilling recognize adherence by GDR (Harriman interjected we wanted its adherence but without prejudice to recognition problem), US would not recognize legality of Sov action but USSR would accept GDR’s adherence and would regard GDR as party to treaty. Thus situation would be reversed. Gromyko said of course US had right to reserve its position re any such situation but suggested that no statement be made at time of its occurrence.

Harriman said he not in position agree without first communicating with Washington. Said would get in touch with Washington if this was the best Sovs could do.

Gromyko said nothing should be said in writing but he could state officially that USSR could not recognize as lawful act accession by Chiang. Sovs recognized US held different position on this point but would not make any statement re legality or illegality of US acceptance Chiang’s ratification; Sovs would simply refuse accept those instruments.

Hailsham commented this would apparently cause another 24 hour delay in initialing treaty. Said UK Govt had not been consulted by US on this matter and he was angry because he liked to be consulted. Said he did not wish to have anything to do with any letters or drafts.

III

Harriman admitted he had not informed Hailsham of letter until after it was delivered. Unfortunately, there was not time account desire get decision this afternoon.

Gromyko reiterated that from Sovs standpoint any act by Chiang in joining treaty would be unlawful. Sovs recognized US position on this point different but would limit themselves to this clarification. Sovs would not challenge US action in accepting Chiang’s ratification, and no statement at all would be made at time of such acceptance.

Harriman said Gromyko should understand that in such case US reserved privilege and right to take same position with respect to any govt or regime not recognized by it.

Gromyko said he recognized such right, though of course US and Sov positions re certain countries were different.

Harriman asked whether Gromyko could state his reservation in general terms, without mentioning specific names.

Gromyko said he willing have Harriman use qte x unqte in place of specific name, but noted he had privately explained what qte x unqte stood for. Commented however mention of specific name was better because this limited number of cases involved.

Harriman suggested Hailsham might also wish get in touch with Prime Minister on this matter.

Hailsham said would do so.

Harriman then said wished raise another point. Stated we all recognized test ban was only first limited step although a very good step. Khrushchev himself had said that test ban was not disarmament, would not limit production nuclear weapons, and would not eliminate war. Gromyko had also expressed views in course these discussions. However, some people, who were either for or against TB treaty, might say that TB treaty, and specifically its article I, made use of nuclear weapons illegal. If this question were raised by such people we would have to say that test ban treaty placed no limitation on use of nuclear or conventional weapons in self defense, a right inherent in Article 51 of UN Charter. Harriman said had been requested to indicate this to Gromyko. At same time he wished stress we took test ban very seriously as a step of tremendous psychological importance and as a step in cooperation to develop peaceful world.

Gromyko looked baffled and said TB treaty dealt with prohibition of nuclear tests in three environments. Of course it was not a prohibition of nuclear weapons or weapons in general, although USSR was in favor of general and complete disarmament. Said scope of treaty was self explanatory.

Harriman then suggested a brief recess to consult with advisors.

After recess, Harriman said problem was what he could say to Senate on question of accession. Perhaps he could say that if a govt or regime is not recognized by all three original parties such govt may deposit its ratification with depositary or depositaries which recognized it and other one or two depositaries need or need not accept ratification or copy of ratification. However, in any event this would not change obligation depositing regime had undertaken with depository. In other words, whatever obligation such country had it would have them to US and Sovs did not have to recognize it, and the reverse would be true in case of countries US refused to accept.

Gromyko commented he had spoken at length on this subject and had tried set forth Sov understanding of problem and Sov position as concisely as possible. Said he not in position draft or edit Harriman’s statement in Senate. Recalled he had told Harriman that Sovs reserved their position but would not make any statement challenging legality US action in accepting instruments of ratification. Sovs limited this statement to one regime they didn’t recognize; Harriman could say “x” but Sovs had concrete conception of that “x”. As to how Harriman would word his statement in Senate that was up to him.

Harriman noted he had not asked Gromyko to edit his statement in Senate. He was only explaining to Gromyko what he would say so that Gromyko would have opportunity to object if he wished.

Gromyko said in such case he must state following. Sovs had set forth their position re Chiang. From Sov standpoint, and Sovs speaking only for themselves, any attempt or act by Chiang to adhere to treaty would be illegitimate as USSR did not recognize existence any such government. Therefore Sovs would not accept Chiang’s instruments of ratification and would not consider them to be legitimate. However Sovs recognized US held different position, even though they believed US wrong on this score. If specific situation should arise, i.e., if the US should accept Chiang’s instruments, the USSR would make no statement beyond what it had stated now. US would evidently regard such act as lawful but Sovs would not. If US made no statement challenging Sov position, USSR would not make any statement either; Sovs would limit themselves to what had been said today.

Harriman noted Gromyko had said he, Harriman, could insert “x” although he knew who “x” was.

Gromyko said Harriman could of course do so.

Harriman said wanted make clear Sovs should recognize our right as well.

Gromyko said they did.

Harriman said publicly we could say that Sovs had reserved their position re any regimes they did not recognize.

Gromyko observed Harriman had used “regimes” in plural, but Sovs more reasonable, using singular.

Harriman said would communicate with Washington and did not know what reaction would be. Wished however ask why Gromyko thought we were trying pull trick re Chiang. Pointed out our only purpose was make sure we could get Senate support for treaty.

Gromyko said US could reserve its position re certain countries and Sovs reserve theirs. He had set forth Sov position in specific terms in these private discussions. Sovs did not deny US right recognize certain actions as legal, but US should not challenge Sov right to regard certain actions as illegal.

Harriman agreed.

Thereupon larger meeting began, which reported septel.

Kohler

1. Private meeting with Gromyko: non-exchange of Harriman/Gromyko letters, Soviet objections to unrecognized regimes ratifying the treaty, treaty adherence issues, limited nature of test ban treaty, and Harriman’s statement to the Senate. Secret. 8 pp. Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18–4.