166. Memorandum from Wiesner to Fisher, February 121
While the principal issue in the present test ban negotiation is the number of on-site inspections in the Soviet Union, we all agree that there are a substantial number of unresolved additional issues which would determine the effectiveness and manner of operation of the treaty. During the course of our recent discussions, however, I have become increasingly concerned that we do not in fact have a clear position on many of these important issues. I believe that it is essential that we develop specific positions on all of the elements of treaty as soon as possible in order to avoid any impression that we are not seriously interested in obtaining a treaty. I hope, therefore, that the paper you are preparing for Thursday will cover all of the elements of the treaty in sufficient detail to permit actual preparation of a treaty. Furthermore, since some of these issues cannot be finally resolved until they are cast in treaty language, I would urge you to prepare a new treaty draft in keeping with the present position as soon as possible.
Among the issues that we must resolve immediately, if we expect to pin the Soviets down as to the form of treaty within which we are negotiating a quota of on-site inspections are the following:
(1) Automatic Unmanned Stations (black boxes). Should automatic unmanned stations in the Soviet Union be included as an element in the treaty? If it is decided that automatic unmanned stations in the Soviet Union will be a part of this treaty, the following points will have to be covered in the treaty:
a. Number of stations;
b. General location of stations;
c. Criteria for precise location of stations;
d. Nature of seismic equipment in stations;
e. Provisions for maintenance of security of the stations;
f. Access rights for installation and maintenance of station and retrieval of data.
[Facsimile Page 2]g. Rights and procedures for telecommunication links, if any, at stations; and
h. The mechanism by which information from the “black boxes” would be employed in the decision process to undertake an inspection.
(2) Selection of Events for Inspection. Will the U.S.–U.K. and Soviet Union select locations for on-site inspection on the basis of any seismic information they claim is adequate to determine a location or must [Typeset Page 445] this determination be subject to certain seismic criteria as has been the case in the past? Will the seismic evidence on which selections are made be subject to any sort of review by the Commission or its scientific staff?
(3) Procedures for On-Site Inspection in Countries Other than U.S.-U.K. and USSR. If the U.S.-U.K. and USSR pick the locations to be inspected in each others territory on the basis of information from their own national systems, what procedures will govern inspections in other countries that may become parties to the treaty (NATO-Warsaw Pact and neutral countries)?
(4) Conduct of On-Site Inspections. The following points on on-site inspections must be covered either in the treaty or its annexes:
a. The specific sequence of events by which an inspection will be carried out including the time limits on each phase of the operation;
b. The specific size of the area to be subject to inspection;
c. The nationality of the inspection team;
d. Size of the inspection team;
e. Mechanism by which inspection team will be provided photographic coverage of the area in question, (i.e., will it be supplied by host country or by the inspection team itself)?
(5) Excluded Areas. What specific provisions, if any, are proposed to permit exclusion of on-site inspection of installations which are claimed to be of a sensitive nature? Among the possible points are:
a. Limitations on size of excluded areas (can an entire on-site inspection be denied);
b. Notification procedure (timing relative to on-site inspection procedures;
c. Effect on quota.
(6) Functions of the Commission. In view of the reliance on national systems rather than on international systems, what are the specific functions intended for the international Commission and international staff?
(7) Atmospheric, Underwater and Space Testing. Will information on possible atmospheric, underwater, and space testing be handled by national systems in a manner analogous to seismic data and what function, if any, will the Commission and international staff have on these problems?
(8) Peaceful Uses. What procedure will govern the certification of nuclear detonation for peaceful purposes?
(9) Definitions. What will be the definition of a nuclear explosion or nuclear test for the purpose of the treaty?
(10) Withdrawal. What provisions for withdrawal will the treaty contain in the event that non-signatory powers test nuclear weapons? (The most recent tabled treaty draft would permit either side to withdraw if either France or China test).
- Resolving problems in the test ban negotiations. Confidential. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing 3, 12/62–8/63.↩