165. Memorandum of Conversation, February 9, among Rusk, Alphand, and Greenhill1
SUBJECT
- Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
PARTICIPANTS
-
U.S.
- The Secretary
- William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
- John C. Guthrie, Director, SOV
-
France
- Herve Alphand, French Ambassador
- Bruno de Leusse, French Minister
-
U.K.
- Dennis Greenhill, British Chargé
The Secretary said he wished to report on the conversation he had had with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin February 7. Dobrynin had given him Russian language texts of the notes handed the German and French Ambassadors in Moscow on the Franco-German Treaty. There was no discussion of these notes, Dobrynin taking the position that they spoke for themselves.
Dobrynin then turned to the subject of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the Secretary handed Messrs. Alphand and Greenhill copies of notes made on Dobrynin’s oral demarche on this subject. (Copy attached). The Secretary asked that these notes be treated as confidential. The Secretary then said he had made the following informal remarks to Dobrynin. The third paragraph of the attached notes represents the current situation insofar as U.S. weapons are concerned. We do not yet know how the multilateral force will be set up, however, and the U.S. cannot speak for the U.K. and France, both of which possess nuclear weapons. With regard to the third paragraph on page 2 of the attached notes, the Secretary had told Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at Geneva that we drew a distinction between the multilateral force and the proliferation of national nuclear [Facsimile Page 2] capabilities. The President had spoken to the same point at his press conference on [Typeset Page 443] February 7. We reject the idea that there is any deception being practiced in our discussions of a multilateral force. With regard to the Soviet reference to Canada, our arrangements with Canada are similar to those we have with many other countries in NATO and have nothing to do with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the next to the last paragraph, we would not object should the Soviets make arrangements with their allies similar to those we contemplate making with ours.
On this point the Secretary commented that while he had not so stated to Dobrynin, he regarded this Soviet statement as the emptiest threat of all. The Secretary continued that since December he had seen Dobrynin socially as well as once or twice in the office where the subject of non-proliferation had been mentioned, and noted that Dobrynin had spoken to him most recently earlier in January.
The Secretary regarded his comments at that time as having been made without instructions.
He asked Alphand and Greenhill to report the foregoing to their governments to see what conclusions they may have. He said that he had no idea as yet whether the Soviets would reach an agreement with us on the basis of our own clarification concerning non-proliferation but believed it would be helpful for the three of us to concert our views on this subject. The Secretary opined that the result will turn on whether we can make arrangements whereby it would be impossible for a nonpossessor of nuclear weapons in NATO to give a national order to fire such a weapon. He told Ambassador Alphand that he would like to have Paris’ views on the two papers he had handed the French Foreign Minister in Paris in December. If the French Government thinks we should proceed with the Soviets on this subject, then we could discuss the question of methods. The French Ambassador noted that he had asked [Facsimile Page 3] his government for comments on the Secretary’s papers three times already. Mr. Greenhill said that he had nothing recent from London on the subject but that he knew Lord Home accepted the papers handed him by the Secretary in December and would have only minor amendments to offer.
The Secretary concluded by pointing out the President’s concern over the probable acquisition of a nuclear capability, however rudimentary, by the Chinese Communists and said that Chinese adherence to an agreement was a sine qua non. If the Chinese would adhere, he felt that the West Germans could do likewise. Ambassador Alphand remarked that the type of agreement the U.S. was seeking would not prevent the Chinese Communists from acquiring a nuclear capability. The Secretary replied that even if the Chinese Communists refused to adhere to the agreement, this would still mean that the Soviets could not then seek any special arrangements over Germany.
- Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: readout of Rusk–Dobrynin discussions. Secret. 4 pp. Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18–6.↩