147. Memorandum from Conger to Brubeck, September 271

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On September 26 a letter was sent from Mr. Foster to the Secretary of Defense, summarizing developments to date regarding a possible international agreement on the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons, and giving this agency’s recommendations on such an agreement.

A copy of this letter is attached for the Secretary’s information.

Attachment

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Dear Bob:

As you know, there have been recently several informal discussions and exchanges of memoranda regarding a possible international agreement on the non-diffusion of nuclear weapons. Specifically, within the past two weeks we have sent to the Department of Defense the following papers: 1) a copy of a memorandum to the Secretary of State from me, dated September 13, 1962, enclosing a draft memorandum to the President, draft letters to the heads of the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, and a draft declaration on non-diffusion; 2) a memorandum for the Committee of Principals, dated September 18, 1962, containing revised versions of some of the above-mentioned documents sent to Defense on September 13; 3) a draft Minute, which might be transmitted to the Soviet Foreign Minister, further clarifying the United States view on a multinational nuclear force, sent to Defense on September 19, 1962; and 4) copies of a memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President outlining a course of action for the United States to follow in attempting to negotiate a non-diffusion agreement, dated September 21, 1962, and which was sent to Defense on September 22, 1962.

The purpose of this letter is to request that the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to give active consideration to the various papers mentioned above, particularly the memorandum to the President of September 21, 1962. The course of action outlined in the memorandum, including three attachments, is directed toward the formal submission [Facsimile Page 3] to the Soviet Union and other countries by the United States of a declaration on the non-transfer of nuclear weapons.

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The prevention of the further diffusion of nuclear weapons among individual nations has been a national security and foreign policy goal of the United States for some time. It is incorporated in the United States disarmament proposals of September 25, 1961, and of April 18, 1962. The United States voted for the Irish Resolution, passed unanimously by the 1961 session of the United Nations General Assembly, which called upon all states to secure an international agreement on the non-transfer and non-acquisition of nuclear weapons.

As a result of recent conversations between the Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister and Soviet Ambassador, the United States should consider pursuing an agreement with the Soviet Union and other countries on the non-transfer of nuclear weapons which would not preclude the possibility of international nuclear weapons arrangements of a truly multinational nature of the type which might be developed within the NATO framework. A non-transfer agreement which would not preclude the possible development of a NATO multinational nuclear force and which would not in any way call into question existing custodial arrangements for the storage and deployment of United States nuclear weapons would be in the interest of the NATO alliance as well as in the national interest of the United States. It would be in the interest of NATO with respect to the defense of the countries in the alliance, with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security generally, and with respect to the strengthening of countries in the West and elsewhere believing in free and democratic institutions and individual liberty. In negotiating a non-transfer agreement with the Soviet Union and other Communist states, the United States would seek the active participation and support of the NATO countries, especially the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany.

To my knowledge, the Department of Defense has no planned arrangements for the deployment or transfer of [Facsimile Page 4] nuclear weapons which a non-transfer agreement of the type proposed in the memorandum to the President would preclude. If any such arrangements are being considered it would be important to have them discussed at this time, before negotiations for a non-transfer agreement proceed further.

The draft declaration on non-transfer is one which would not require any special international verification machinery. There would be little incentive for the Soviet Union to want to violate clandestinely the terms of a non-transfer declaration. If a violation occurred, it would be more likely to be done openly than not. The United States can have a high degree of confidence that the Soviet Union would comply with a non-transfer agreement because it is in Soviet self-interest not to spread nuclear weapons capabilities among other states, including states allied with it.

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It would be helpful if I could receive by the close of business on Wednesday, October 3, comments of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the memorandum and enclosures sent to the President on September 21, 1962. No meeting on this is planned at the present time, but I shall keep you informed of any developments.

Sincerely,

William C. Foster
  1. Transmits copy of letter from Foster to McNamara on status of non-diffusion issue for Rusk’s information. Attached letter from Foster to McNamara is dated September 26. Confidential. 4 pp. Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611–GE/9–2762.