146. Note from Kaysen to Shepard, September 211

[Facsimile Page 1]

Taz:

The attached folder on nuclear diffusion discussions is something the President has asked for, and you should give it to him at the earliest opportunity. It contains memoranda of conversations between Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Dobrynin, with a covering note by me. The President will want to talk to the Secretary about this matter.

[Typeset Page 384] [Facsimile Page 2]

Attachment

SUBJECT

  • Non-diffusion: Approaches to Adenauer and de Gaulle

I talked with several people on the German and French desks about the question you posed this morning.

GER believes that the odds are in favor of a positive German reaction to ACDA’s suggested approach. As far as the Germans are concerned, this scenario has a distinct advantage over the earlier ones in that it takes non-diffusion out of the Berlin and German contexts and puts it into the broader one of disarmament. Moreover, since the Germans do not believe that early agreement, or for that matter any agreement, is possible on such an arrangement, they would not be inclined to look at this move as one which would really inhibit future West German nuclear developments. This subject apparently has been discussed with the Germans and an official nod was given to a possible approach of this kind in a recent exchange. I have asked the Situation Room to get me the pertinent messages.

The French picture is somewhat different. The French Desk feels there is a 50–50 chance of a favorable de Gaulle reaction. This is based on an assumption that by according the French nuclear club membership, and therefore removing France from the group of nations subjected to the non-diffusion restrictions, the proposition might be attractive to de Gaulle.

David Klein
[Facsimile Page 3]

Attachment

SUBJECT

  • Nuclear Diffusion Discussions

1. Attached are the records of the two most recent conversations which Secretary Rusk had with Ambassador Dobrynin on this subject. His earlier conversations with Mr. Gromyko in Geneva in July add nothing to this record. In addition, there are: a talking paper still in draft form, produced jointly by ACDA and Defense, which shows what Rusk would say, and also the lines along which a piece of paper would be drafted; and several pieces of paper by ACDA which indicate the approach they would take to the problem, and the areas of their agreement and disagreement with DOD.

2. I talked to the Secretary again on the telephone this afternoon and indicated your desire to talk with him on the subject. He will be [Typeset Page 385] here in Washington until 4:00 p.m. on Saturday, 22 September. After 6:30 p.m. he will be at USUN at the Waldorf.

In my conversation, I told the Secretary that you were concerned both about the question of talking to our allies and whether we had to try to get agreement with them before talking to the Soviets, and the question of discussion within the Government and with the Congress and the attendant political problems that might raise. Ros Gilpatric has indicated that the Defense Department would go along with this proposal, but the Chiefs object to it strenuously. If possible, Bob and Ros would rather fight with them another time than now.

3. The heart of the problem, in my own judgment, is that Secretary Rusk feels he has to give a piece of paper to the Soviets. He may be perfectly correct that if he is to give a piece of paper to the Soviets, he must first give it to our allies. Otherwise, the Soviets could always use the piece of paper with Kroll, or someone like that, as evidence of our bad faith. However, it is not clear that more cannot be said to Gromyko or heard from him before pieces of paper are passed. Chip Bohlen shares the view Mac and I hold, namely, that we should [text not declassified].

[Facsimile Page 4]

4. As of the present moment, we think that the Germans would not be unfavorable to the proposed agreement, since the Soviets have for long pressed for special language concerning Germany, to which the Germans have always objected. The major change in Dobrynin’s last communication was his apparent willingness to do without a special reference to Germany.

On the other hand, the French remain the French—nobody thinks it is better than even money that they would be willing to be involved. I myself would guess that the two cables from Paris contained in your reading book this morning (Paris 1400 and 1406) point in the other direction.

Carl Kaysen
  1. Recommends passing to President attached information on non-diffusion issue. Two attachments, both dated September 21, provide background information on status of current discussions with the Soviets and the probable German and French reactions to the proposal. No classification marking on covering note; attachments are Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Non-Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons, 8/62–7/63.