142. Disto 727 from Geneva, August 161
Paris pass USRO. Dean, Fisher and Wiesner met privately August 15 with Kuznetsov and Lachs in Dean’s hotel room for completely informal exchange on test ban problems. Each side spoke freely and [Typeset Page 377] relatively frankly so that we now feel sure that there is no misunderstanding of position in either direction.
US side explained carefully why we consider on-site inspection essential to any agreement on test ban which includes underground environment. We explained need for verification measures which could furnish some degree of confidence not only to US officials but also to members of Congress and American public. We stressed that we were not seeking perfection or 100 percent elimination of risk, but had to feel assured that there would be some small opportunity through random sampling under inspection for dealing with some of unidentified events which would be turned up by any worldwide detection system.
Kuznetsov made it crystal clear that Soviet Government considers on-site inspection problem to be entirely political. It was not question of divergence of views between Soviet and American scientists, and he even implied agreement to idea that there would be some number of unidentified events every year. However, as practical matter in present political situation, [Facsimile Page 2] Soviet Union just would not be willing to give US any assurances other than those obtainable from system of control posts alone. He, therefore, repeatedly, urged us to assume this allegedly small degree of risk because no other solution of test ban problem was presently possible. Insisted international supervision would change essential character of nationally manned detection stations and was not acceptable.
Impression of inflexible Soviet position only hardened under further questioning. Kuznetsov was explicit in saying that no amount of semantic tinkering with terms of 8-nation memo to create Soviet obligation to issue invitation for on-site inspection on every occasion when commission might request such invitation would be acceptable. Invitation was matter which had to be left solely and entirely to unfettered discretion Soviet Government. In addition, when Wiesner offered to send scientists to Moscow to clarify situation on technical level or to discuss significance of random sampling arrangements with Soviet statisticians, this was also turned down on ground that this could not have relevance to political decisions which had to be sole basis of present position.
Since there was not repeat not slightest Soviet feeler for negotiation on this issue, it appears that USSR is presently more willing to accept continuation of arms race in nuclear weapons (with all implications which this has for third countries, which we discussed) rather than to make any compromise in its adamant opposition to obligatory on-site inspection. Several references were made to possibility of changed circumstances in next few years, including potential developments in identification of seismic events by long distance instrumentation which might make us more willing to consider test ban without inspection. [Typeset Page 378] Short of that, however, no hope was held out on new basis for [Facsimile Page 3] agreement, and we believe that this must be accepted as fact of Soviet policy which is not likely to change, however we may choose to play this subject for political and propaganda purposes at this conference or elsewhere. Partial test ban, for all environments except underground, was never discussed during conversation.
Am lunching with Kuznetsov Saturday. Godber (UK) leaving for London with Wright (UK) in charge.
- Geneva negotiations: readout of informal exchange with Soviet delegation on on-site inspection issue. Secret. 3 pp. Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8–1662.↩