Office of the Historian

141. Memorandum of Conversation, August 8, between Rusk and Dobrynin1

August 8, 1962
[Facsimile Page 1]

SUBJECT

  • Test-ban Agreement

PARTICIPANTS

  • Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R.
  • Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor, Embassy of the U.S.S.R.
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Philip Valdes, EUR/SOV

The Secretary said he hoped Ambassador Dobrynin’s government could give serious thought to moving on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We would like to move on one, and we think there are possibilities of narrowing the gap. We frankly do not understand Soviet preoccupation with espionage, but if this is a genuine preoccupation, our representatives can work out arrangements that cannot possibly involve espionage. Khrushchev indicated, he pointed out, that our two countries know enough about each other to destroy each other. We cannot move without, for example, on-site inspection, but he cannot see why the amount of such inspection which would be necessary to avoid recurring waves of suspicion should cause difficulties.

Ambassador Dobrynin asked if, after our studies, we really believe national means are not enough. This, he said was the crucial question. The Soviet Government believes it, and Soviet scientists believe it.

The Secretary said that instruments have been improved, but beyond a certain range our instruments cannot differentiate between [Typeset Page 376] earthquakes and tests. If the Soviets have instruments that can, they should advance them at Geneva. We do not say you do not have such instruments, but if you do, let us know.

Dobrynin said the Soviets have no explanation for our insistence on on-site inspection other than espionage. He noted that after Vela we said we could differentiate between earthquakes and tests up to 3,000 miles.

The Secretary said we did not say we could do so comprehensively across a series of events. He noted that the Soviets have a large number of observers [Facsimile Page 2] in our country.

Dobrynin demurred, suggesting that if we counted this sort of thing on each side, we would be on the leading side.

The Secretary said he hoped the Soviet Government would take another look. If it turned out they cannot or will not move on this, why not consider the possibility of an atmospheric ban, on all but underground tests. This would not be entirely satisfactory, but would take account of the major concerns.

Ambassador Dobrynin replied that Soviet policy is in favor of banning all tests, and there is no change in Soviet policy on this.

The Secretary commented that it looked, then, as though there is not going to be an agreement, and there will be continued testing.

Dobrynin observed that the majority of countries oppose testing.

The Secretary agreed that they did, and said that the Soviets will not accept public opinion on on-site inspections, and we will not accept it on an agreement without inspection. He said he wished Ambassador Dobrynin would transmit his urging that the Soviet Government take another serious look at the comprehensive treaty, and if this is not acceptable, at an atmospheric treaty.

  1. On-site inspection concerns. Confidential. 2 pp. Department of State, Central Files, 611.6112/8–862.↩