118. Memorandum of Conversation, March 30, among Rusk, Foster, and Amb. Ormsby Gore1
SUBJECT
- Letter from Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy—March 30, 1962
PARTICIPANTS
- Sir David Ormsby-Gore, British Ambassador
- The Secretary of State
- Mr. William C. Foster, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Secretary opened the conversation by stating that he had asked the British Ambassador to come in to discuss, in a preliminary way, our reactions to the Prime Minister’s letter.
The Secretary stated that he had not had a chance to discuss this in detail with the President but wanted the Ambassador to know of our preliminary reaction. Quite frankly, the Secretary said, certain parts of the Prime Minister’s suggested course of action in connection with another appeal to Khrushchev on the termination of tests was inconsistent with the position which the President had taken and which the Secretary on behalf of the U.S. had taken in his talks with Gromyko and others in Geneva. It was quite clear that from every viewpoint as [Typeset Page 313] far as the Executive Branch and the Congress were concerned, no agreement with the Soviets on termination of tests was acceptable except under an agreed Treaty which provided for adequate inspection and control. The Secretary said he had made quite clear, both privately and publicly, as had others at Geneva, that while we were willing to eliminate the threshold on underground tests, the necessity for control posts and for onsite inspections was as clear as ever and no radical scientific breakthroughs reducing the necessity for inspections had been revealed either by the British or American [Facsimile Page 2] scientists. If certain new ideas were aggressively followed up it is conceivable that control posts on Russian territory might after some years of development of these ideas become less necessary through radical improvements in identification capabilities. Such a breakthrough would however detect many more suspicious events than do present seismic instruments so that to check so many additional events there would be required many more on-site inspections. The Soviet representatives at Geneva had flatly rejected any inspection whatsoever on Soviet soil. Gromyko even went so far as to state that the Soviet Union would not allow even a single person to undertake such a mission on their soil.
The Secretary stated that in view of this flat position there seemed no likelihood that Khrushchev would accept any adequate treaty. It was dangerous therefore to suggest that by his accepting the principle of verification just before the date of proposed tests the United States and the United Kingdom would be willing to postpone the tests pending further development of that concession. The President had in his press conference of March 29th repeated his sincere desire to terminate all tests on the basis of a satisfactory treaty. It therefore appeared to the Secretary that any further appeal might indicate weakness in the President’s position and would not be tolerable from the viewpoint of the US public and in fact, from that of our allies around the world and even neutrals who depend on US strength for their security.
The Secretary said he would of course discuss the Prime Minister’s letter in detail with the President.
- Discussion of Macmillan’s March 30 letter to Kennedy. Top Secret. 2 pp. Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3–3062.↩