Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

117. Note from Amb. Ormsby Gore to President Kennedy, March 30¹

March 30, 1962

Dear Mr. President,

I have been asked by the Prime Minister to pass to you the enclosed message about Nuclear Tests.

Yours sincerely,

David Ormsby Gore

Following is text of Macmillan letter of March 30:

QUOTE

Dear Friend,

Now that the situation is a bit clearer I have been looking again at your message of March 20 to which I have sent you a direct answer although, of course, David Gore has been discussing the position with you and your office. As you know, I fully agreed with the points which you made in your second paragraph. Now the situation has clarified so far as Geneva, Rusk, Home and Gromyko are concerned. The curtain has fallen on this act. The question is what we are to do next.

In your message of March 20 you suggested that it might be appropriate in the second act for one or both of us to communicate with Khrushchev. Our purpose would be at the best to persuade him at the last moment to accept the principle of international verification on which everything turns. At the worst we should put ourselves in the best posture before the world, especially the neutrals, when tests have to be resumed. Many people seem to think that the Russians do not treat Foreign Ministers with the same respect that you and I do, that Khrushchev settles everything and that no deal can ever be done except with him direct. On this plan both of us or one of us might communicate with Khrushchev asking him once more the simple question which Rusk and Home have been putting over and over again to Gromyko, namely whether he will accept the principle of international verification on the spot of doubtful events. Alternatively, we could issue a joint statement on the lines of the draft which I sent to David Gore some days ago and which I think he discussed with you.

We could play the hand either way but I think we must do something more both for our own consciences and for the public opinion of the world before the time runs out. As I understand it, we have about 30 days before the first test and whichever way we play it, I think timing will be important. What do you think?

Perhaps you would allow David Gore to talk to you about this and then we can have a further interchange by message or telephone.

With warm regards,

Harold Macmillan

UNQUOTE

Rusk

1. Transmits Prime Minister Macmillan’s March 30 message regarding possible letter to Khrushchev on nuclear tests. Attached is telegram 5349 to London conveying text of Macmillan letter. Top Secret. 4 pp. Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan–Kennedy.