740.00119 Control (Germany)/4–2244

Memorandum by the Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs (Matthews), Temporarily at London

most secret

Memorandum of Conversation

Subject: Partition of Germany

Participants: Sir William Strang
Mr. H. Freeman Matthews

Following our meeting with Dr. Bowman, Troutbeck, O’Neil and Harrison, Strang took me aside and permitted me hastily to read in strictest confidence the British minutes of the Tehran Conference having to do with the ideas of the three leaders as regards the partition of Germany. The minutes were about four pages in length and apparently concerned two conversations, one between Stalin and Churchill alone, and one at which President Roosevelt was present.1 These minutes revealed several things quite clearly:

1)
All three favored some partition.
2)
Churchill seemed inclined to a division of Germany into three parts, the first comprised of Prussia to which area he ascribed all the evil that exists in Germany. (Neither Stalin nor the President appeared to concur in this view, both holding that the peoples of other areas of Germany were equally predatory and militaristic.) The second zone was Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden; and the third comprised the rest of Germany. Churchill did say that some of his advisers held different views on partition.
3)
The President suggested a five-zone division and spoke strongly in favor of partition as the best means of preventing German rearmament and a resurgence of German nationalism. He made it clear, however, that he had reached no final conclusions.
4)
Stalin throughout was most outspoken in his determination to see Germany completely crushed and never again permitted to be a menace to the peace of the world. He said that he preferred the President’s five-way partition plan to the Prime Minister’s three-way partition and indicated an even greater number of separate states would please him better. When the Prime Minister said that this [Page 880] might merely give incentive to the states to join together again, Stalin briskly stated that the Allies should see to it that this did not happen and that as long as he lived Russia would prevent any such efforts. He did not want to see Austria reunited to Hungary or any other strong unit formed. When the President spoke of controlling the German armament industries Stalin remarked: “What about the watchmakers and the tablemakers? Experience has shown that such industries can readily be transformed into arms manufacturers.” Any reference to the need for German reconstruction to teach them ways of peace or the need of a healthy Germany to have a healthy Europe he dismissed abruptly. He once questioned the depth of Churchill’s determination to keep Germany weak. When Churchill asked if Stalin favored having only small states on the continent he replied that France and Poland were large states who might help keep Germany down and that was enough. He emphasized throughout, however, that it was the duty of the three major Allies to keep Germany weak and poor.

H F[reeman] M[atthews]
  1. This may refer to the discussion of this subject at (1) the tripartite dinner meeting of November 28, 1943, at which the ChurchillStalin conversation continued after Roosevelt had retired, ante, p. 511, and (2) the tripartite political meeting of December 1, 1943, ante, p. 600.