868.01/427
The Presidents Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Secretary of State
secret
Washington-, December 20, 1943.
Dear Cordell: Here is a memo which Eden handed me in confidence in Cairo,
which apparently was prepared for Eden by some of his associates prior to his talk with
the King of Greece.
Mr. Eden told me that he followed
this line of argument with the King and I gather he made it pretty
strong.1
Cordially yours,
[Attachment]
The British Embassy
Accredited to the Greek Government-in-Exile in Egypt
to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
(Eden)
[Cairo, November 25, 1943.]
Main Talking Points With the King
of the Hellenes
- 1.
- Refer again to your previous conversation when you told the
King that the strategical situation had changed and that it was
most [un]likely that any but quite inconsiderable British forces
would be sent to Greece when the Germans evacuate.
- 2.
- Point out that at the time when we thought a considerable
British army would go to Greece to drive the Germans out, we
strongly supported your desire to enter Greece with the British
and Greek forces. Under the changed conditions such British
forces as might go to Greece would be mainly concerned in
ensuring law and order and in assisting in the distribution of
relief supplies.
- 3.
- It would be essential for the Greek Government to function at
the earliest possible date in close association with the British
and in an atmosphere as far removed as possible from political
controversy. This Government would have to be mainly composed of
leading personalities who have lived in Greece during the period
of the occupation.
- 4.
- During the whole period of the German occupation acute
controversy has continued and grown increasingly strong on the
subject of the King’s return before the will of the people has
been expressed. The immediate return of the King in the teeth of
this opposition would inevitably raise this controversy to fever
point, and it would be impossible for the King himself to remain
outside political dissension. He would find himself confronted
with a situation even more acute
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than that which led to the Metaxas Dictatorship, and would
therefore start under every disadvantage, which would make it
impossible for him to return in the role which he and we desire
for him—that of a constitutional monarch.
- 5.
- The immediate confusion that will result from the difficult
social and economic conditions caused by the occupation will
make it essential for the Government [to] be in the hands of a
leading personality, who has made his mark through his bold
resistance to the Germans within the country. He will have to
form an emergency Committee prepared to act firmly and to put
down disorder. The first administration to be formed will be of
a temporary character to tide over the period until normal
conditions can be established and elections held. It would be an
undesirable situation for the King, when he first returned to
Greece, to be associated directly with an administration bound
to become unpopular and unable to accord all those freedoms
associated with a constitutional monarchy.
- 6.
- In these circumstances, the King should consider the choice of
the most suitable personality to head a Regency Committee in
Athens the moment the Germans evacuate. Archbishop Damaskinos is prepared to
undertake this responsibility, but must know in advance that he
can announce to the Greek people, as soon as the Germans quit
Athens, that he has the legal authority of the King for so
doing.
- 7.
- There is therefore every advantage for the King, in his own
interests as well as those of his country, to make it clear now
to his people that he does not intend to return to Greece until
such conditions have been established as will allow him to
function as a constitutional monarch. He has no desire to return
to Greece unless he can so function, but he also has no desire
to return unless he is convinced by a clear expression of the
people’s will that the system of constitutional monarchy is
desired by them.
- 8.
- An immediate declaration to this effect would rally moderate
opinion against any attempt made by a small section, who seek to
impose their will by force as soon as the Germans leave Athens.
This section have made capital out of the failure of the King so
far to make such a declaration.
- 9.
- There is reason to believe that if Zervas knew that such a declaration would be
made by the King, he would immediately ask that his irregular
forces should be incorporated in the Greek regular Army. If this
were immediately granted by the King it would act as a magnet to
draw large numbers of the officers and men in the ELAS forces to break away from
purely sectional political control and make a similar request
for incorporation on the same terms as those accorded to
Zervas. This would
bring the Greek Government in Cairo into close
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association with the resistance
movements inside Greece, and would thereby enormously enhance
the authority and prestige of the King and his Government, which
would then be reformed to include personalities from Greece and
would consequently provide a Government of which Archbishop
Damaskinos could avail
himself when he set up his Regency Committee in Athens.
British Embassy to Greece, Cairo.
25th November, 1943