Office of the Historian

J. C. S. Files

Report by the Combined Staff Planners

secret
C. C. S. 427
[Cairo,] 5 December 1943.

Amphibious Operations in Southeast Asia Alternative to “Buccaneer”

problem

1. On the assumption that the amphibious lift available for Buccaneer is reduced in certain respects, to consider what minor amphibious operations or raids might be carried out in the Southeast Asia Theater, in order to harass Japanese communication, destroy Japanese installations and equipment, or alternatively to support the land advance on the Arakan coast and obtain airfields with which to support further operations in Burma.

resources available

2. An appendix is attached1 showing a list of the resources which we assume will be left in Southeast Asia. This list is based on the assumption that the bulk of LST and LSI (L) will be withdrawn together with a proportion of the naval forces and escort carriers now allotted to Buccaneer, as these are the resources which are chiefly required in the European Theater.

[Page 801]

3. With resources remaining in the Southeast Asia Theater it would be possible to land a force of one infantry battalion group up to one brigade group, depending on the scale of transport to be landed.

possible operations

4. Detailed study by the Force Commanders of intelligence maps and photographs is necessary before any definite opinion can be formed as to the practicability of any operations.

5. From a general survey of the possibilities however we consider that the following merit examination and might assist Operation Tarzan:

a.
Amphibious operations along the Arakan coast in conjunction with the land advance of the 15th Army Group on Indin-Rathedaung-Kyauktau, which is timed to start in mid-January and be completed in February.
b.
An amphibious operation to capture and secure the northern tip of Ramree Island, prior to the beginning of the 1944 monsoon. This operation might be covered by shore-based aircraft at Maungdaw. Maintenance of a garrison in this area by sea might prove costly as convoys will be subject to air attack. It might be possible to extend air operations against Japanese communications in Burma, and to infiltrate on the Taungup-Sandaway [Sandoway] coast. The provision of fighter support to any such operations would have to be carefully balanced against the requirements of Tarzan.

6. Unless a target can be found to justify the landing of a raiding force, we do not believe that any raids should be attempted other than carrier-borne air raids.

  1. Not printed herein.↩