Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Report by the Combined Staff Planners¹

secret
C. C. S. 424

[Cairo,] 5 December 1943.

Amphibious Operation Against the South of France

Reference:	C.C.S. Memo Directive
	1 December 19432

1. In accordance with the instructions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, we have examined the agreed operations against the South of France on the following premises:

a. That this operation should be carried out with a minimum of two assault divisions.

b. That the necessary resources shall not be found at the expense of Overlord.

2. We have in addition assumed:

a. That operation Anvil will approximately coincide with Overlord.

b. In Italy we have reached the Pisa-Rimini line and thereafter as strong pressure as possible is maintained consistent with the provision of forces for Anvil.

c. The Mediterranean forces will not be engaged in offensive operations elsewhere.

3. We have made tentative estimates, in the absence of any detailed operational plan, of the resources which will be required for the operation under two hypotheses where these apply:

a. That the assault is carried out within range of shore-based fighter aircraft.

b. That the assault is carried out beyond the range of shore-based fighter aircraft.

4. It appears that the following cannot be found from the resources which under present agreements will be available to General Eisenhower in the Mediterranean at the time of the operation:

A. Naval Forces

On the assumption that adequate shore-based, short-range fighter cover is provided:

(1) Additional escorts, probably 10 to 20.

(2) 2 A A fighter direction ships.

(3) In the event that the build-up exceeds one division before D plus 8, nine A/S A/A escorts will be required for each extra division.

This indicates that if a rapid build-up is necessary, more escorts will be required.

In the event that adequate shore-based short-range air cover can not be provided the following will be needed in addition to those above.

(1) 9 to 12 escort carriers with fighters.

(2) 6 A A cruisers.

(3) 18 screening vessels.

To meet these deficiencies, we must draw on other theaters, most probably from the Atlantic. It might prove possible for four CVE and six escorts which are taking part in Buccaneer to return to the Mediterranean in time. This, however, will be conditioned by the availability of fighters for reequipping these escort carriers. We have assumed that port parties will be provided from within the Mediterranean.

B. Land Forces

Certain service forces, the number and type of which cannot be determined without careful study by AFHQ.

On the assumption that French divisions will participate, the requirement will be lessened if, as recommended by General Eisenhower, some of the French divisions scheduled for activation are not formed but are converted to service forces.

C. Air Forces

The troop carrier resources in the Mediterranean will only be sufficient to lift one brigade and if the detailed plan requires a second brigade lift, this will have to be provided.

D. Shipping

(1) Personnel Shipping.

The Quadrant allotment of personnel shipping for 80,000 troop lift in the Mediterranean expires on 31 March. Initially, personnel shipping for 32,000 will be required until after the assault, and during the period of buildup, a total personnel lift for 15,000 will be necessary. It is proposed to use cargo ships for personnel lift to the maximum extent possible.

(2) MT/Stores Shipping.

The following sailings within the Mediterranean will be required in addition to those required for the maintenance of the remainder of the theater:

First month	—	128
Second month	—	90
Third month	—	75
Fourth and subsequent months	—	40

This can obviously be provided but until the present shipping examination is completed, we cannot assess the cost.

E. Assault Shipping and Graft

Assault lift for two divisions can be provided. Methods of providing this are shown in Appendix “A.”³

5. We consider that General Eisenhower should be directed to prepare an outline plan for the agreed operation against the South of France as a matter of urgency. We have accordingly prepared a directive to General Eisenhower, and this is attached at [as?] Appendix “B.”

Recommendation

6. That the directive in Appendix “B” be sent to General Eisenhower.

Appendix “B”

[December 5, 1943]

Draft Directive From the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, North Africa (Eisenhower)⁴

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an operation is to take place in conjunction with Overlord, with the object of establishing a bridgehead on the South Coast of France and subsequently to exploit in support of Overlord.

2. You will prepare in consultation with COSSAC and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as a matter of urgency, an outline plan for the operation.

3. The exact date for Overlord has not yet been decided upon, but it is to take place at the most suitable date during May 1944. You will be informed of the date once this has been decided, and operation Anvil will be timed approximately to coincide with operation Overlord—the exact date to be determined in consultation with COSSAC.

4. You will be given the assault shipping and craft for a lift for at least two divisions (each with two brigades in the assault).

5. You will inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff of your requirements which cannot be met from the resources which will be at your disposal in the Mediterranean on that date. In assessing your resources you should assume that your forces have reached the Pisa-Rimini line and that as strong pressure as possible is maintained, consistent with the forces required for Anvil; also that Mediterranean forces will not be engaged in offensive operations elsewhere.

1. Prepared with the collaboration of the Combined Administrative Committee. The text printed here incorporates the changes made by direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting of December 5, 1943, 3 p.m. (see ante, p. 723).
2. Not printed herein.
3. Not printed herein.
4. The Combined Chiefs on December 5, 1943, approved this message and directed that it be sent; see ante, p. 723.