Defense Files
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy)
Memorandum of Talk With Averill [Averell] Harriman November 21, 1943
On the evening of the twenty-first I had dinner with Mr. Kirk in his town house in which Mr. Harriman was staying. During the course of the evening Mr. Harriman asked that I come into another room with Mr. Douglas as he wanted to tell us something about the Soviet situation. He started out by saying that he was here only as a reporter of what the Soviet attitude was, that he did not wish to express himself as being in favor of any particular line of military policy.
He said the chief impressions he has had during his stay in Moscow had been of the passionate desire of the Soviets to end the war. They were still a mighty force but were growing tired, all their facilities and energies were strained, they felt that a prompt application of all the forces that the United Nations now had available would cause the Germans to crumble quickly and they were desperately anxious to close the war against Germany successfully and immediately. He said they had a very firm belief that it was within our power in some form to take more divisions off their front than we had thus far accomplished. They now took for granted and would insist on the completion of Overlord in full vigor but they wanted more activity this winter. The Autumn war had become merged in the Winter war and it looked for the moment as if the chief force of the Soviet attack had been checked; it would require the further weakening of the German front before they could again break through. They were [Page 266] impressed with the effects of our bombing and did not minimize that contribution but were absolutely convinced that we could substantially add to the German troubles this winter if we went about it. When I pressed Harriman for some indication of what they thought we might do and still prepare ourselves to mount an adequate Overlord he said that neither he nor they were in a position to suggest anything to our planners as neither were sufficiently familiar with the facts to say what we could do. On one point, however, he said the Soviets were quite clear, and that was that we should immediately intensify in the most realistic manner our pressure on Turkey. He felt that it was quite possible that if Turkey came into the war this winter the Soviets would be satisfied. Harriman felt that we should apply at least as much pressure as Eden had recently done with some success.1 He said the Soviet government felt that the entry of Turkey into the war would involve a further number of German divisions as well as give great air and psychological advantages to the United Nations position. He felt quite certain that the President and our staffs would find Stalin and the Soviet delegation united along these lines.
Before leaving he made it quite clear that in spite of some implications in certain of General Deane’s cables to the contrary, the Soviets were no less interested in or insistent upon a second front which to them meant a cross-channel operation. They did feel the energies of the U. S. and U. K. could be so organized as to enable a more prompt and greater application of power this winter than was contemplated. Harriman said that perhaps the entry of Turkey into the war was all that would be required and that no very substantial diversions need be made to accomplish it, at any rate none that could not be effected by some economies in Italy and elsewhere.