Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

Roosevelt Papers

The President’s Personal Representative (Hurley) to the President¹

Cairo, 20 November 1943.

I have inspected the Chinese Theatre of Operations. I spent considerable time with the American Generals, Lieutenant General Stilwell, Major General Chennault, and other Chinese and American Army Officers. I was accompanied into the Chinese Theatre by Major General Stratemeyer who is Commander of the American Air Operations in the India and China Theatres. I had two conferences with the President of China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The Generalissimo expressed his complete confidence in you, in your motives, and in the principles that you have promulgated.

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As President of China and as Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek will recommend that the coming conference reiterate the Atlantic Charter.² If possible he would like to have your Four Freedoms³ specifically included in the declaration of the Cairo or Teheran conference.

After conferences with the Generalissimo which covered approximately six hours, I have drawn the following conclusions:

(1) The Generalissimo and the Chinese people favor the principles of democracy and liberty.

(2) The Generalissimo and the Chinese people are opposed to the principles of imperialism and communism.

(3) He believes that you, of course, favor democracy and liberty. He understands, however, that you may temporarily have to temporize with imperialism and communism in the interests of the joint war effort.

(4) He is aware that the future co-operation and unity of the United Nations must depend upon your ability to assimilate rather than eliminate divergent ideologies. He is convinced that you must find principles on which the Big Four nations can agree. In seeking these principles he feels that you must have extensive freedom of action.

(5) He wanted me to say to you that he has implicit confidence in your motives and that he is committed to the fundamental principles which you have promulgated.

(6) He will, therefore, follow your leadership on the diplomatic and political questions that will be considered in the impending conference.

On strategy he finds himself unable to accept a subordinate position in the Asiatic area to Lord Mountbatten. He stated that so far as the Chinese Theatre of Operations is concerned he must be supreme. He stated that if he should accept a secondary position in that theatre it would divide his following and eventually so weaken his position that he could no longer maintain himself as the leader of all China. Notwithstanding this attitude he is ready to cooperate fully with Lord Mountbatten and he thinks that in Northern Burma and eventually in Thailand and possibly in Indo-China, there would be circumstances in which he would favor the control of British, American and Chinese troops being placed under one commander. He said that he personally liked Lord Mountbatten and that he could visualize future operations outside of China where he would want his Lordship to be the Supreme Commander of United Nations forces, including Chinese Armies. However, he was steadfast in maintenance of the principle that in the Chinese Theatre it is better for himself and China and the United Nations that he should remain the ultimate authority.

He expressed the opinion that the subjugation of Japan should be sought through an attack on Japan in Japan. Attacks should be made from various sectors of the Pacific Theatre, the India-Burmese and the Chinese Theatres simultaneously. These attacks should be co-ordinated and directed toward the ultimate occupation and conquest of Japan in Japan. Tokio and all Japan is the objective rather than any state, island or citadel outside of Japan. He also spoke with clarity of the strategy of attacking Tokio and all Japan through China.

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In evaluating the Generalissimo’s conversations it is advisable to consider with some skepticism the Chinese capacity, or readiness, to contribute materially to offensive warfare. It is advisable likewise to give consideration to the relative importance placed by the Chinese Central Government upon conserving its strength for maintenance of its postwar internal supremacy as against the more immediate objective of defeating Japan. These are questions I should like to discuss with you further.

Respectfully yours,

Patrick J. Hurley

Brigadier General, U. S. A.

1. For the passages which are omitted, see ante, p. 102.
2. August 14, 1941; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 367, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1603.
3. Set forth in Roosevelt’s annual message to Congress, January 6, 1941; Decade, p. 1.