Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

secret
C. C. S. 300/2

[Aboard the U. S. S. “Iowa”,] 18 November 1943.

Estimate of Enemy Situation, 1944—Pacific-Far East (As of 1 November 1943)

the problem

1. To estimate the enemy situation in the Pacific-Far East, 1944, with due regard to Soviet and Chinese capabilities and intentions.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

2. We do not feel it practicable to attempt a summarization of the enemy situation in the Pacific-Far East as projected through 1944. Such a condensation, in our opinion, would inevitably result in incomplete treatment of factors essential to the over-all picture. Our view of the situation, 1944, is therefore attached as Appendix “A,” to which reference is hereby made.

3. As of 1 November 1943, we estimate Japanese intentions in the Far East, 1944, as follows:

a. General. Japan will probably remain on the strategic defensive unless convinced that the U. S. S. R. has decided to attack her or to grant to the other United Nations the use of Siberian air bases. In such an event Japan would attack the Soviet Union. It is probable, however, that Japan will assume the tactical offensive whenever she considers it necessary, and it may be expected that Japan will initiate local offensive actions to forestall operations by the United Nations in Burma and to prevent the establishment of air bases by the United Nations in China. Japan will take full advantage of any breathing spell permitted her by Allied inactivity to strengthen her defensive cordon with installations of all types in order to make Allied advance most costly in time and casualties.

b. North Pacific. We believe that Japan will continue to strengthen her defenses in the Kuriles and Hokkaido, but is not likely to depart from the defensive except in case of war with the Soviet Union.

c. Manchuria. We believe that Japan will continue to seek to avoid war with the U. S. S. R. in all circumstances except as already mentioned above. She will continue to balance Soviet strength in Siberia, reducing her forces in Manchuria only in case of necessity.

d. China (including Yunnan). Although Japan will continue to seek a satisfactory solution in China by political means, chances of success have deteriorated since the Moscow conference.¹ We believe that she will undertake decisive military operations only to prevent the United Nations from establishing offensive air bases for action against her vital installations.

e. Burma and Southeast Asia. We believe that Japan will seek to maintain her present position in Burma and Southeast Asia, devoting especial attention to Burma, while extending her efforts when necessary to prevent large scale reinforcements and supplies reaching China.

f. Southwest and Central Pacific. We believe that Japan will remain on the strategic defensive, continuing her efforts to build up her local defensive forces and facilities and her naval striking force.

4. Our estimate of Japanese intentions, as set out in paragraph 3 above, is in part based upon our beliefs as to Soviet and Chinese capabilities and intentions, which are attached as Appendix “B” and Appendix “C.”

[Appendix “A”]

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

secret

Estimate of Enemy Situation, 1944—Pacific-Far East (As of 1 November 1943)

1. Basic Factors in the Japanese Situation

a. Objectives. Japan’s basic objective is to establish undisputed control of an area in East Asia and the Western Pacific which shall be militarily secure and as nearly self-sufficient economically as possible. The area now occupied by her approximates the territorial requirements of this objective but is deficient in three respects, as follows: (1) the possession of eastern Siberia by a latently hostile power; (2) the existence in China of unoccupied areas within bombing range of Japan and of important Japanese lines of communication; and (3) the presence of United Nations forces in the Japanese defensive perimeter in the Melanesia area. Other territories beyond the limits of present occupation may be objects of ultimate Japanese aspiration, but only those specified are essential to the immediate basic objective.

b. Relationship to the Axis. Japan’s connection with the Axis is a matter of expediency only. Her action will be coordinated with that of Germany only in so far as she estimates that such coordination will contribute to the realization of her basic objective.

c. Relations with the U.S.S.R. There exists between the U.S.S.R. and Japan a basic conflict of interest. Japan cannot enjoy complete strategic security without gaining control of the eastern region of Siberia. The U. S. S. R. is determined to hold that region, the strategic security of which requires the ultimate expulsion of Japan from the mainland of Asia and from southern Sakhalin. For the present, however, both the U. S. S. R. and Japan desire to avoid war with each other in order to be free to direct their efforts against their respective enemies.

d. Relations with subject peoples. Wherever circumstances allow, Japan’s policy is to establish nominally independent, but actually controlled, national governments. This policy fits in with two powerful propaganda themes: (1) “Asia for the Asiatics”; (2) the “Co-Prosperity Sphere,” ostensibly a cooperative project.

Japan has recognized the “independence” of China, as represented by the Nanking puppet government, and has sought to enlist Chinese nationalism in support of that regime by surrendering to it various foreign concessions, notably those at Shanghai. She has granted “independence” to Burma and the Philippines, thereby seeking to enlist the relatively developed nationalism of those countries in her favor. She has hinted that other occupied areas, e. g., Java, may receive similar grants of independence. Thailand has been rewarded for cooperation by the cession of bits of neighboring territory to which she had some pretensions. By such policies, Japan hopes to strengthen somewhat her position among the subject peoples.

e. Strategic and economic position. Although the strategic initiative has passed from Japan to the United Nations, a far-flung perimeter of defense positions must be penetrated before areas of great strategic or economic importance to Japan are subject to attack. Within this empire, Japan is practically self-sufficient except for textiles. Furthermore, Japan, by stockpiling materials from the Outer Zone and by pursuing a policy of developing resources within the Inner Zone wherever possible, has obtained within the Inner Zone a high degree of short range self-sufficiency in most of the essential materials of war. However, the loss of Sumatra and Borneo would seriously impair Japan’s oil position, and loss of the Philippines would seriously impair her ferro-alloys position. Her manufacturing facilities, located mainly in Japan proper and in Manchuria, are accessible only to air attack. Meanwhile, the expansion of war production capacity undertaken in recent years will bear fruit in growing rates of output. For certain critical items, however, growing output is unlikely to offset attrition (ships) or to do more than keep pace with losses (planes). Japan should expect that ultimately greatly superior forces can be directed against her, but she will continue to hope that the United Nations will hesitate to face the tremendous logistical problems, or pay the price in lives, involved in an invasion of Japan proper.

f. Psychology and morale. The Japanese, traditionally, are a close-knit family whose broad characteristics are a toughness of fibre and a fatalistic singleness of purpose. They have been taught that they are of divine origin and that the Emperor is directly descended from the god-founder of the nation. They are taught that the Japanese are divinely and infallibly guided towards the establishment of a new world order dominated by Japan.

To attain this goal the Japanese soldier is taught to give blind obedience and to regard death in the service of the Emperor as an honor. He is told that he is invincible and that to show weakness or to surrender is to accept disgrace.

As a result of these teachings, the morale of the Japanese populace, and especially of the armed forces, remains high in spite of recent reverses. As much of popular morale is, however, based upon the theory of invincibility, a series of sharp defeats when and if brought home to them will tend to confuse and bewilder the people as a whole.

In contrast with the broad mass of the people, real power in Japan rests in the hands of small groups of leaders capable of manipulating the symbols of emperor-worship for their own self-interest. An early collapse of Germany would have a tremendously depressing effect upon such leaders. This, combined with ever increasing United Nations pressure and approach to the homeland, might conceivably bring about a re-shuffle of the ruling cliques followed by an attempt to secure a negotiated peace.

g. Propaganda. Official propaganda on the home front has shifted from that of the self-assured offensive to propaganda of the defensive, and determination to fight for existence is replacing exaltation in victory. The potential of the United Nations is admitted to be high, and the government has announced its intention to prepare for the defense of the capital and the production centers of the homeland. The government is also preparing the Japanese people for more serious German reverses in Europe. Japanese withdrawals are admitted, and it is implied that the Japanese have finished winning independence for other Asiatic countries and now must prepare to defend their own islands from frontal attack.

2. The Existing Over-all Situation

a. Military strength. We estimate the present strength of her armed forces to be as follows: (1) Naval, 11 battleships, 7 aircraft carriers, 5 auxiliary aircraft carriers, 14 heavy cruisers, 18 light cruisers, 78 destroyers, 89 submarines. (2) Air, 1,660 fighters, 1,770 bombers, 490 float planes and 300 other types. Of the total, 110 fighters and 130 bombers, and 185 float planes are ship-based. In addition to the above total of 4,220 U. E. combat aircraft there are some 1,375 combat type aircraft engaged in advanced operational training. (3) Ground, a total ground strength of 2,500,000 representing approximately 110 equivalent divisions, which include 65 infantry divisions, 18 independent mixed brigades, 1 infantry brigade, 3 cavalry brigades, 20 tank regiments, 13 border garrisons, 17 independent garrisons and other independent units. (4) Totaling in round numbers 3,500,000 men (exclusive of Puppet Troops).

Puppet Troops. There are some 330,000 Manchurian troops and more than 420,000 Nanking puppet troops. For the most part, both forces are organized into small garrison units lacking in automatic weapons and artillery. Some Manchurian combat divisions exist, and similar Nanking divisions are said to be forming (strength about 6,000 per division), but it is doubtful whether Japan can provide for them normal equipment in heavier weapons in view of her own shortages in those categories. Japan has found Nanking troops particularly unreliable in the past.

Burmese and other puppet forces are so small as to be inconsequential.

b. Positional strength. Japan is now on the strategic defensive. Her control of Burma, Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, Pacific islands and parts of China keeps United Nations forces at a distance too great for delivery of effective blows against Japan itself and prevents effective development and use of the Chinese war potential. Thus Japan’s position, facing United Nations forces from the North Pacific around to India, is one of great natural strength. At this time, her position in China is secure because of the present inability of either China or the other United Nations to mount large-scale operations there. Soviet commitments in Europe and Japanese strength in Manchuria insure for the time being the security of Japan’s northern flank, Japan is able at present to direct her maximum effort toward building up her economic and military strength.

c. Limitations on Japanese Power

(1) Shipping. Japan’s defensive position requires secure and adequate ocean transport over long lines of communication. The Japanese shipping situation has become acute, with her total tonnage being further reduced by sinkings in excess of total new construction. We estimate that 50–60% of her total tonnage is committed to maintaining her military forces outside the homeland and that the remainder is used primarily to maintain the essential part of her war economy. From this latter bracket some tonnage might still be found for new operations by diverting it from trade, and, provided such diversions were temporary, this would not necessarily have serious effects on Japan’s capacity to wage war. Since, however, Japan’s rate of building, though on the increase, cannot keep pace even with the present rate of sinkings, she would be reluctant to risk adding further to her shipping commitments. Although attempts are being made to improve the position by building a large number of small and medium-size wooden ships, the general shipping position is becoming increasingly difficult and may well become precarious in 1944. The situation in regard to tankers is also acute. Japan is attempting to meet a deficiency in this respect by continuing to fit out dry-cargo ships for use as oil carriers.

(2) Air requirements. Until recently Japan has not only been able to maintain her over-all air strength at approximately the same total figure but has kept her allocated air strength along the perimeter in reasonable balance with her requirements. At present, however, indications point to such a rapid attrition in the Melanesian area that she is having difficulty in replacing losses. We believe that as United Nations pressure increases along the outer defense frontier, she will be unable to maintain sufficient strength to offer effective resistance at all points under attack. Assuming that the United Nations carry out the agreed program for 1944, we are of the opinion that Japan’s defensive air requirements will preclude the possibility of her engaging in any offensive operation requiring heavy air support.

(3) Naval requirements. Japan cannot afford to risk large commitments of naval strength except for the defense of vital areas. Her extended lines of communication already entail a large commitment of naval strength for the protection of essential shipping. Their further extension, or indecisive action entailing heavy attrition, might well be unacceptable.

(4) Military requirements. A large proportion of Japanese ground forces is required for occupational duties and for concentration in Manchuria to balance Soviet forces in Siberia. Japan, however, has ample ground forces for any probable combat requirements, inasmuch as the insular character of much of the occupied area and the topography of New Guinea, the Indo-Burmese frontier and China limit the scale of ground operations in those areas. Developments of the last few months indicate the necessity of using her superiority in ground forces to compensate for her relative inferiority in naval and air forces. Her ability to move her strategic reserve is restricted by availability of shipping.

3. The Existing Local Situation

a. North Pacific. Japan is strengthening the fortifications and garrisons on her “Northern Fortress” (Shimushu [Shumushu?] and Paramushiru), and we believe that preparations are being made for a determined defense in the Kuriles.

b. Manchuria. Japanese ground forces in Manchuria probably balance the Soviet ground forces in Eastern Siberia-Outer Mongolia, but Japanese air strength is believed to be relatively inferior. Japan has the advantage in strategic position, equipment, and supply but is deterred from aggression by respect for Soviet armed forces and reluctance to commit herself further while her army is actively engaged in other areas. Japan is also apprehensive of vulnerability to bombing and submarine attack and fears the probability that in the event of war between Japan and the U. S. S. R., the United States would utilize air bases in Siberia for direct attacks on Japan.

c. China (except Yunnan). The front has been largely stabilized for years, with the Japanese in possession of the country’s principal productive areas and communications lines. The Japanese are deterred from further expansion primarily by logistical difficulties and secondarily by Chinese resistance. On occasion the Japanese engage in minor offensive operations to season inexperienced troops and accomplish limited objectives such as the temporary denial of facilities to the Chinese. Although nominally in overwhelming numerical strength, the Chinese forces are at present so poorly equipped, supplied, fed, and trained that they are unable to prevent these forays or to undertake other than local action. This Chinese military weakness springs in large part from China’s generally anemic condition, which has resulted from loss of productive areas, disruption of internal communications, isolation from outside support, and war-weariness.

d. Yunnan. Active operations have recently been launched by the Japanese along the Salween River. We believe these operations are to strengthen the Japanese position along the Burma frontier in anticipation of a United Nations increase in activity in that area.

e. Burma. The wet monsoon very greatly hinders major operations from May to October. Recently the Japanese have been increasing their ground and air forces in Burma. It may be that the supply to these forces overland via Indochina and Thailand may be increased considerably in the near future.

f. Southwest Pacific. The ground and air strength in the Timor-Inner Seas area and New Guinea-Bismarcks area appears to be defensive in character. Because of recent United Nations successes in this area, Japan, in order to maintain her defensive position has been forced to increase her strength by one division over and above replacements for her combat losses. Due to extreme losses in this area, it now appears that she is having difficulty in maintaining the air strength disposed heretofore.

g. Central Pacific. At present Japan bases 50–60% of her naval strength at Truk. The total air strength of this area has been increasing, particularly in the Marshalls and Gilberts.

4. Strategic Reserves

a. Air. We believe no strategic reserve exists as such. Although Japan’s staging facilities are sufficiently developed to enable her to fly even fighter planes to practically any part of her position, theoretically allowing the quick reinforcement of any threatened front, there are indications that simultaneous pressure on several fronts would prevent substantial reinforcements being sent to more than one area.

b. Naval. Normally Japan maintains her battleship and carrier strength in home waters and at Truk, shifting the center of gravity according to circumstances. A formidable striking force, which can reach any threatened point of the defensive perimeter in from 6–9 days, can be quickly assembled in either of these central areas. However, destroyer shortage is becoming critical.

c. Ground. Surplus ground strength in Central China constitutes Japan’s initial reserve. If hard pressed, she can also draw surplus strength from Japan and North China and in extremity from Manchuria.

5. Prospective Developments Through 1944

a. Air strength. Although Japanese aircraft production is expected to continue to increase gradually during the remainder of 1943 and during 1944, attrition will probably keep pace with and may even exceed this increased production.

b. Naval strength. Disregarding attrition, we estimate that Japanese naval strength should increase as a result of new construction to the following totals:

	Battleships	Aircraft Car.	Aux. Air-craft Car.	Heavy Cruisers	Light Cruisers	Destroyers	Submarines
1 Nov. 43	11	7	5	14	18	78	89
1 Jan. 44	12	8	5	14	18	85	97
1 June 44	12	10	6	15	19	95	113
1 Jan. 45	13	14	7	16	20	105	130

c. Ground strength. We expect that by the end of 1944 the strength of the Japanese army will have increased to 2,750,000, comprising approximately 120 equivalent divisions (including 73 infantry divisions and 14 independent mixed brigades, 3 cavalry brigades, and 24 tank regiments, 20 independent garrisons, and 13 border garrisons).

d. Shipping. Despite Japan’s strenuous shipbuilding efforts, estimates of the rate of loss and rate of construction of steel ships indicate that the Japanese may suffer a net loss of 1,500,000 gross registered tons of steel operating tonnage from 1 November 1943 to the end of 1944. However, construction of wooden vessels and further substitution of land transport may offset a part of the estimated net loss of steel ships.

e. War production. Assuming that Japan retains control of the productive areas now under occupation, that shipments by sea can be maintained, and that there [will?] be no effective bombing of Japanese industry or land transportation, Japan’s production of critical finished war goods may increase materially in 1944 as compared with 1943. Heavy industrial production as a whole, however, is not expected to show great gains in 1944, chiefly because steel output seems unlikely to rise by more than a few percent. The steady development of economically unprofitable but strategically important resources of Japan proper and immediately adjacent areas and the use of stock piles will make it possible for Japan’s war industry to continue for about two years at approximately its present rate of consumption of raw materials (except for oil, chromite, and possibly lead and zinc), even if cut off from access to resources south of the Yangtze River.

[Appendix “B”]

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

secret

U. S. S. R. Capabilities and Intentions in the Far East

1. Strength

We estimate that total Soviet air strength east of Lake Baikal consists of some 2,000 tactical aircraft. Of these, some 1,200 are believed to be organized into operational squadrons. This force is apparently disposed on the southern border of Soviet-controlled territory from Ulan Bator to Vladivostok. Existing airfields are believed adequate for flexible operation.

Naval strength is estimated to consist of one light cruiser, 9 destroyers, 6 torpedo boats, 60 submarines, 60 motor torpedo boats, and a number of assorted small craft of no combatant value. There are believed to be sufficient bases available for this force.

The ground strength east of Lake Baikal is estimated to total some 660,000 men divided into units as follows:

• 20 infantry divisions (15,000 men each)
• 11 cavalry divisions (6,600 men each)
• 1 mountain division (9,000 men)
• 2 motorized divisions (7,000 men each)
• 13 tank brigades (2,000 men each)
• 5 motorized brigades (4,000 men each)
• 9 infantry brigades (4,000 men each)
• 1 composite brigade (5,000 men) Corps, army, line of communication, and other troops (180,000 men)

Pending the defeat of Germany, reinforcement is unlikely. Although these forces in the Far East are supposed to be self-sufficient, their local sources of supply are actually both limited and vulnerable. Support, in any case, would have to be delivered via a long, and in part exposed, line of communication.

2. Capabilities

Offensively, the U. S. S. R. could scarcely hope for any success until her forces in the west have been released by the defeat of Germany or until after the other United Nations have gained access from the Pacific to the Sea of Okhotsk. Defensively the U. S. S. R. would probably be unable to prevent the isolation of the Maritime Provinces by the cutting of, or at least demolitions on, the Trans-Siberian Eail-road. Holding operations, however, should be possible on present stored reserves for at least six months. Subsequent developments in the whole area would depend largely on the effectiveness of the assistance of the other United Nations.

3. Intentions

Pending further information as to the results of the Moscow Conference, we estimate Soviet intentions as follows:

The U. S. S. R. is likely to intervene in the war against Japan at some stage, but not before the German menace to her has been removed. After that, she would be likely to intervene only when she reckoned that Japan could be defeated at small cost to her. It is unlikely that any arguments that we might bring forward, except substantial progress in our war against Japan, would greatly affect the timing of Soviet intervention. On the other hand, we believe that large-scale hostilities between the United States and Japan in the Northwest Pacific would make the Soviet Union’s present neutrality in the Far East increasingly difficult to maintain.

[Appendix “C”]

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

secret

Chinese Capabilities and Intentions

1. Strength

The Chinese active army has a nominal strength of 320 infantry and 16 cavalry divisions, plus 30 independent infantry brigades. Infantry divisions average 7,000 each; cavalry divisions and infantry brigades average 3,000 each. The combat efficiency of the bulk of the force never was very high and it has deteriorated considerably since 1938. At the present time malnutrition and lack of medical attention are prevalent and have reduced the combat potential of many units to a very low point. Armament consists almost wholly of infantry weapons. Such heavy material as is available is inadequate and is largely obsolete. The augmentation of this armament to any appreciable degree by the United Nations will not be possible until capacity of transport into China is greatly increased. We feel that, at most, not more than one-fifth of the Chinese Army is currently capable of sustained defensive operations and then only with effective air support; we believe that with the possible exception of the American-trained Chinese divisions, no large number of troops can be expected to undertake more than very limited objective offensive operations, at the present time.

Chinese guerrillas, whose strength is estimated to be 600,000 part-time troops, have proved of value. In recent months, they have done the bulk of the fighting against the Japanese. They share with the regular divisions credit for retaining substantial Japanese occupational forces in China.

2. Capabilities

If given adequate United Nations air support, China might be able to defend her major strategic areas against a Japanese offensive and might be able to execute a very limited objective offensive.

3. Intentions

The Chinese probably intend to remain generally on the defensive, pending the re-equipping and training of their army for offensive action at a later date.

1. October 18–November 1, 1943; see ante, pp. 112 ff.