J. C. S.
Files
Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of
Staff
secret
C. C. S. 400
[Aboard
the U. S. S. “Iowa”,] November 18, 1943.
Integrated Command of U. S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean
Area
the problem
1. The provision of a directive to insure the most effective utilization
of the U. S. Army Air Forces strategic bombing capabilities from all
available European-Mediterranean bases in the accomplishment of the
objectives of Pointblank.
discussion
(See Enclosure)
conclusions
2. a. That control of all U. S. Strategic Air
Forces in the European-Mediterranean area, including the control of
movement of forces from one area to another, should be vested in a
single command in order
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to
exploit U. S. heavy bomber aircraft capabilities most effectively; and
that these forces should be employed primarily against Pointblank
objectives, or such other objectives as the Combined Chiefs of Staff may
from time to time direct.
b. That such a command should likewise be charged
with the coordination of these operations with those of the R. A. F. Bomber Command.
c. That the responsibility for over-all base
service and administrative control of these Strategic Air Forces should
remain in the appropriate Commanders of U. S. Army forces in the United
Kingdom and in the Mediterranean area.
d. That provision should be made to assure the
assignment of resources, supplies and other services between tactical
and strategic operations so as to bring the required support to Pointblank
as the air operation of first priority.
e. That the headquarters of such U. S. Strategic
Air Forces should be established in the United Kingdom because of the
facilities available, the existing weight of the respective bomber
forces, and the necessity for continuous integration of operations with
the R. A. F.
recommendations
3. It is recommended that:
- a.
- There be established a U. S. Strategic Air Force Command with
Headquarters in the United Kingdom, charged with the direction and
coordination of all U. S. Strategic Air Force operations in the
European-Mediterranean area.
- b.
- A directive to implement the above, attached as Appendix,1
be issued to the following:
- Supreme Allied Commander,
- Commanding General, ETOUSA
- Allied Commander in Chief, NATO
- Commanding General, U. S. Strategic Air Forces in
Europe.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of
Staff
secret
Discussion
- 1.
- There are at present in the Mediterranean Theater the 12th U.
S. Army Air Force (Tactical) and the 15th U. S. Army Air Force
(Strategic), as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in a
directive issued to General Eisenhower (C. C.
S. 217/1, Appendix “C”),2 under
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which directive the Allied Commander in
Chief, NATO, is charged with
employing the 15th U. S. Air Force primarily against the
selected targets of Pointblank. It is
additionally directed that the operations of the 15th U. S. Air
Force will be closely coordinated by direct liaison with the 8th
U. S. Air Force.
- 2.
- The division of heavy bomber units between the 8th and the
15th U. S. Air Forces is likewise set forth in the above
directive, upon a quarterly basis, resulting in the deployment
of 41 heavy bomber groups in the U. K., and 21 heavy bomber
groups in the Mediterranean, by 30 June 1944. This directive
provides that those units of the current 12th U. S. Air Force,
assigned to the newly organized 15th U. S. Air Force, may
continue to be employed primarily against objectives other than
Pointblank until such time as the air base
objective area, north and east of Rome, is secured, and further
that, should a tactical or strategical emergency arise,
requiring such action, the U. S. Theater Commander is
authorized, at his decision, to employ the 15th U. S. Air Force
for purposes other than its primary mission, informing the
Combined Chiefs of Staff of the action taken.
- 3.
- Strategic bombing operations from bases other than the United
Kingdom which compel German forces to spread in breadth and
depth for the defense of other areas, or cause parallel
destruction of selected Pointblank objectives, and
particularly to [of?] the German fighter
aircraft and aircraft industry, will contribute heavily to the
success of Pointblank, hasten the deterioration of
the enemy over-all position and decrease losses.
- 4.
- Timing and coordination of the mutually supporting operations
of the two Strategic Air Forces from the various bases is
essential to achieve the most effective exploitation of U. S.
heavy bomber aircraft capabilities. Forces should be moved
promptly from one area to another to take immediate advantage of
varying weather conditions, dispositions of enemy forces,
current tactical operations or other circumstances of
opportunity. The present command arrangement with the 8th Air
Force under CG, ETOUSA and
the 15th Air Force under CG, NATO requires decisions to be reached on a mutually
cooperative basis in which both commanders must agree. The
integration of timing and services, to capitalize fully upon the
mobility of aircraft and the need for prompt command decision
not possible under the existing situation require a cohesive
over-all control, not existent under present command
directives.
- 5.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the air war in Europe
has reached a stage where the necessity for command direction
over the components of the Strategic Air Forces is imperative.
Unified command is necessary in order to achieve effective
results from the concerted efforts of the bomber forces, and to
reach the vital targets with minimum losses from the formidable
defenses established by
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the enemy. Base facilities in the United Kingdom and the
Mediterranean provide a potential flexibility which must be
exploited to confuse, saturate and disperse the enemy defenses
and reduce our losses. We feel that it is most urgent that we
adopt every means known to us to save the lives of our men and
sustain the impetus of their offensive. The one effective method
is to insure the rapid, coordinated employment of the two
components of our daylight striking force on a day-to-day basis,
in order to obtain the maximum dispersion of enemy defenses and
to take advantage of weather conditions in the United Kingdom
and in the Mediterranean. Unified command over the Eighth and
Fifteenth U. S. Air Forces must, therefore, be established
without delay.
[Subenclosure]
Draft Directive From the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Certain Allied and American Commanders3
secret
Draft of a Proposed
Directive
- To: The Supreme Allied Commander
- The Commanding General ETOUSA
- Allied Commander in Chief NATO
- Commanding General U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe
- 1.
- Effective 1 January 1944 there will be established an air
command designated “The U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe,”
for the purpose of directing and coordinating the operations of
the U. S. Strategic Air Forces in the European and Mediterranean
areas. Headquarters for this air command will be established in
the United Kingdom.
- 2.
- Lieut. General Carl
Spaatz is designated “Commanding General, U. S.
Strategic Air Forces in Europe.”
- 3.
- The U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will come directly
under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander at a date to
be announced later by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In the
interim the commander of the U. S. Strategic Air Forces in
Europe will be directly under the Combined Chiefs of
Staff.
- 4.
- The U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will consist
initially of the Eighth and Fifteenth U. S. Army Air
Forces.
- 5.
- The U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will be employed
initially to achieve the objectives of the Combined Bomber
Offensive, as directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The
Commanding General, USSAFE,
will be charged with the strategic direction of the U. S.
Strategic Air Forces, and he will assign missions to them,
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keeping the
appropriate theater commanders informed. In carrying out his
strategic objectives, the Commanding General, U. S. Strategic
Air Forces in Europe is authorized to allocate, reallocate, or
move any or all of the air force units placed under his
command.
- 6.
- The Commanding General, U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe,
will be charged with the coordination of the operations of the
U. S. Strategic Air Forces with those of the R. A. F. Bomber Command, through
the Chief of the Air Staff R. A.
F.
- 7.
- The commanders of the U. S. Army Forces in the United Kingdom
and in the Mediterranean area will continue to be responsible
for administrative control of the U. S. Army air units in their
respective areas, including the provision of base services. They
will exercise a judicious allocation of resources and supplies
and other services between tactical and strategic air forces in
such manner as to provide the necessary support to Pointblank as the air operation of first
priority.
- 8.
- Should a strategical or tactical emergency arise requiring
such action, theater commanders may, at their discretion,
utilize the strategic air forces, which are based within their
respective theaters, for purposes other than their primary
mission, informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the
Commanding General, USSAFE,
of the action taken.
- 9.
- The Commanding General, USSAFE, will employ six heavy bombardment groups
and two long-range fighter groups of the Fifteenth Air Force to
meet the requirements of the Commanding General, NATO, in operations against
objectives other than those prescribed for Pointblank, until such time as the air base
objective area, north and east of Rome, is secured, in
accordance with the provision of the directive issued by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff on 22 October (Fan 254).4
