Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

secret
C. C. S. 398

[Aboard the U. S. S. “Iowa”,] 18 November 1943.

Specific Operations for the Defeat of Germany and Her Satellites, 1943–44

The United States Chiefs of Staff propose the following specific operations for the defeat of Germany and her satellites in 1943–44.

1. Facilities in the Azores Islands. The facilities of the Azores Islands will be used for (1) intensified sea and air operations against the U–boat, and (2) air ferry operations. The British Chiefs of Staff reaffirm the assurance given by them in Quadrant¹ that everything will be done by the British as soon as possible to assist in making arrangements for facilities in the Azores for U. S. Naval participation in the anti-U-boat campaign and for the operational and transit use by U. S. aircraft.

2. The Combined Bomber Offensive. The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive from all convenient bases is a prerequisite to Overlord. The Combined Bomber Offensive continues to have highest strategic priority. We have directed that studies be made of the use of bases in the U. S. S. R. for shuttle bombing operations.²

3. Operation Overlord

a. This operation will be the primary U. S.-British ground and air effort against Germany. (Target date 1 May 1944.) In the preparatory phase immediately preceding the invasion, the whole of the available air power in the U. K., tactical and strategic, will be employed in a concentrated effort to create the conditions essential to the success of the assault. After adequate channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be directed toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy. Following the establishment of strong Allied Air Forces in France, an intensive air attack on Germany and her military forces, communications and installations will be launched, designed to precipitate the collapse of enemy resistance prior to a general assault on the hostile ground forces in the advance into the heart of Germany.

b. There will be a balanced ground and air force build-up for Overlord, and continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in the United Kingdom in readiness to take advantage of any situation permitting an opportunistic cross-Channel move into France.

c. As between Operation Overlord and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of insuring the success of Overlord. Operations in the Mediterranean Theater will be carried out with the forces allotted except in so far as these may be varied by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

d. The Supreme Allied Commander for Operation Overlord, when appointed, will establish contact with the Commander in Chief, North African Theater of Operations, and the Commanders in Chief, Middle East, or with the Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, if and when appointed, and recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff their general missions and objectives, and the timing of their operations, so as best to support Overlord.

4. Planning for Overlord. Pending the appointment of the Supreme Allied Commander, COSSAC will continue with the detailed planning and with full preparations for operations Overlord and Rankin.

5. Operations in Scandinavia

a. Strong carrier-based raids on German combatant ships in northern Norway should be undertaken in order to relieve naval units from the eastern Atlantic for operations in other theaters.

b. Plans should be developed for operations in the Scandinavian area in the event that circumstances should render the execution of Overlord impossible. Such plans should envisage collaboration with the U. S. S. R., with particular reference to opening communications to Sweden and developing a situation favorable for Sweden to enter the war. In the event Sweden enters the war, we should make use of her air bases to establish an air task force of suitable composition to aid in the strategic bombing of Germany.³

6. Operations in Italy. The maximum possible pressure will be maintained, with the forces allocated, on German forces in Italy, in order to assist in the creation of the conditions required for Overlord, and of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the re-equipped French Army and Air Force into Southern France. The Allied Commander, North Africa, (or the Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, if and when appointed) will, in the light of the changing strategic situation, make recommendations from time to time to the Supreme Allied Commander for Operation Overlord concerning the operations in the Mediterranean that will, in his judgment, make the greatest contribution towards insuring the success of Operation Overlord. Pending the appointment of the Supreme Allied Commander, these recommendations will be made, after coordination with COSSAC, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

7. Operations in the Balkan-Eastern Mediterranean Region

[Here follow, as paragraphs a and b, the paragraphs which are numbered 2 and 3 in the preceding document.]

8. Garrison Requirements and Security of Lines of Communication in the Mediterranean. Defensive garrison commitments in the Mediterranean area will be reviewed from time to time, with a view to effecting economy of force. The security of our lines of communication through the Straits of Gibraltar will be assured by appropriate dispositions of our forces in Northwest Africa, so long as there remains even a remote possibility of the Germans’ invading the Iberian Peninsula.

9. Coordinated U. S.-British-U. S. S. R. Operations. We are now examining, and shall continue to seek out, methods and means whereby the defeat of Germany and her satellites can be expedited through maximum coordination of United States, British, and U. S. S. R. operations.

10. Emergency Entry into Europe. We have directed that an extended Rankin plan be prepared in collaboration with the U. S. S. R., in order that available Allied forces may take prompt action in the event an opportunistic entry into Europe becomes possible. The extended plan will provide for emergency entry into Europe in collaboration with the U. S. S. R. of United Nations forces from the United Kingdom, the North African Theater of Operations, Middle East, and, if required, directly from the United States.

11. German Satellites. We are agreed that, in so far as means can be made available without prejudice to the over-all strategy agreed hereto [here agreed to?], effort should be made to separate the satellite powers from Germany.

12. Relations with Patriot Forces in Europe. Within the limits of available means and without prejudice to major operations, patriot forces everywhere within enemy occupied territory in Europe, should be furnished supplies to enable them to conduct sabotage, propaganda, intelligence and guerrilla warfare.

1. The records of the First Quebec (Quadrant) Conference, August 1943, are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the Foreign Relations series.
2. See ante, p. 136.
3. See ante, p. 125.