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J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff1

secret
C. C. S. 402
[Aboard the U. S. S. “Iowa”,] 18 November 1943.

Statement of United States Strategic Policy in the Balkan-Eastern Mediterranean Region

The United States Chiefs of Staff note that nowhere among our agreed C. C. S. papers is there a definitive statement of the United Nations strategic policy concerning the Balkan-Eastern Mediterranean region. We propose the following, and recommend that it be accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Statement of United Nations Strategic Policy in the Balkan-Eastern Mediterranean Region

1.
This statement of policy supersedes all prior C. C. S. agreements concerning the entire Balkan-Eastern Mediterranean region.
2.
Recognizing that (1) the Balkan-Eastern Mediterranean approach to the European Fortress is unsuitable, due to terrain and communication difficulties, for large-scale military operations, (2) the implementation of our agreed strategy for the defeat of Germany will require all available military means, and (3) our experience shows that the acceptance of limited objective operations, however attractive in themselves, invariably requires resources beyond those initially anticipated, we are agreed that our strategy will be best served by causing Germany to dissipate her defensive strength in maintaining her position in the Balkan-Aegean area. So long, therefore, as the present strategic situation in this area remains substantially unchanged, operations in the Balkan-Eastern Mediterranean region will be limited to:
a.
The supply of Balkan guerrillas by sea and air transport.
b.
Minor action by Commando forces.
c.
The bombing of vital strategic targets.
3.
We agree that it is desirable to bring Turkey into the war at this time but this must be brought about without diversion of resources that would prejudice the success of our commitments elsewhere. To this end, in full collaboration with the U. S. S. R., we should bring pressure to bear on Turkey to enter the war and conduct offensive operations in the Balkans to the extent possible with the resources presently available to her. It must be made clear that military assistance to be furnished Turkey by the United States and Great Britain is limited to such supplies and equipment as can be furnished without prejudice to the successful accomplishment of our commitments elsewhere.
  1. For Roosevelt’s approval of the text of this paper prior to its submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see ante, p. 195.↩