Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President¹

secret
op[erational] priority

Moscow, 1 November 1943.

Personal and secret for the President from the Secretary of State.

Mr. Eden sent me today a cable which he had dispatched to the Prime Minister covering the points of his conversation with Molotov on the Turkish question yesterday afternoon 31 Oct. as follows.

From the Secretary of State for the Prime Minister.

1. Molotov and I discussed the Turkish question this afternoon. Ismay and the Ambassador² were with me.

2. Our urgent need for airfields in southwest Anatolia was explained by me and later Ismay developed this point in detail. I explained that I was prepared to see the Turkish Foreign Minister in Cairo on my return journey to the United Kingdom and inform him that we required (a) immediate use of airfields; and (b) authority to pass submarines in company with two or three merchant ships carrying important stores into Black Sea.

I should tell him if he were not to concede these points at once that our supply of arms and equipment would stop forthwith. I said that this would be a first step only and if Turkish acquiescence did not involve her in war with Germany we should be prepared to consider within a month the [idea of?]³ presenting Turkey with a formal demand on part of Soviet Union, United Kingdom and United States to enter war immediately.

3. Molotov disagreed with this sort of approach. “Why should time be wasted with relatively trivial matters such as bases when it was our right to insist that Turkey immediately enter war as a full partner and it was her duty to comply.

4. The first two sentences of your paragraph two⁴ were quoted textually to Molotov without moving him. He reiterated again and again that if our three countries were really determined that Turkey should enter the war she would have no choice; and he stressed the fact that while the Conference had for the most part gone exceedingly well, to his military colleagues it had been a bitter disappointment that not one suggestion presented by the Russian Delegation for shortening the war had been approved; and also that alternative proposals to that end had not been put forward by either the Americans or ourselves. Obviously he felt that this was a sore which might fester once the good effects of the Conference had worn off. Why could it not be decided here and at once that it was desirable for Turkey to come into the war now. Once that principle was accepted our tactics could be considered further.

5. I replied that our Government was in complete agreement that before the end of the year Turkey should enter the war, and that I was prepared to sign at once on the dotted line to that effect. Question of tactics was only difference between us. He wanted only one bite on cherry while I wanted two. I [dwelt?]³ further on fact that in southwest Anatolia airfields were urgently needed for our operations, not only to prevent a disaster at Eros [Leros?] and Damos [Samos?], but also to make it possible for us to capture and support Rhodes which we felt was the key to the Aegean and would lead to substantial results; and I pointed out that if we were to make a formal demand to Turkey to enter the war and she were to refuse there was a danger that we would not only have gained nothing but also would have lost all chance for airfields.

6. Obviously Molotov was pleased by my statement that we shared fully the Russian view that Turkey should be brought into war this year; but he did not agree to my argument that if we attempted to rush things our air bases might be lost. “In any case” he said “let us agree as far as the principle is concerned and later work out the tactics.” I agreed to this and stated that I would give much to be able to put the coping stone on the Conference’s work by arriving at an agreement on Turkish problem. Tomorrow afternoon I shall see him again.

7. During discussion Molotov asked if American Delegation would go with us in this matter. I replied that I could not say for sure. As a matter of fact Hull and I had had a talk before by [my] meeting with Molotov and he indicated that he was in favor of the line I proposed to take with the Russians. End of Eden’s message.

I have replied to Mr. Eden as follows

“My Dear Mr. Eden Thank you for your letter of Oct 31st enclosing a memorandum of your conversation with Mr. Molotov on the afternoon of October 31st on subject of Turkey.

I am quote [quite?] glad to have benefit of your enclosure. While as I stated to you some days ago I should be glad to see a full examination and if necessary reexamination of the Turkish matter in the direction of Turkey[’]s entry into the war, I must repeat what I stated to you and Mr. Molotov during the earlier stages of the discussion of Turkey, that the Government at Washington must make the decision. I shall therefore be glad to acquaint my Government with the scope and nature of your conversation with Mr. Molotov on yesterday in which you propose more advanced and expeditious steps that [than] theretofore. Sincerely yours Cordell Hull” End letter.

Mr. Eden called on me this afternoon to acquaint me with a further conversation he had today with Molotov in which he again urgently asked for agreement that the British bring pressure on the Turks to give them use of air bases. He explained that he had had word from Prime Minister that unless this privilege was forthcoming from the Turks promptly it would be impossible to hold Leros.

Molotov continued to object but after a long discussion they finally came to following agreement.

Soviet Govt would approve the British immediate demands on Turkey for the air bases and Eden agreed that British Govt would join with Russia at a later date to bring pressure on Turkey to come into war before end of year.

Molotov asked whether I would join in this and add it as a part of the Conference understandings. I explained to Mr. Eden that I had no authority to join in such an agreement. Eden has undertaken to explain this to Molotov. If there is time Eden will put his verbal agreement with Molotov into memorandum form.

You may wish to reexamine this question from the standpoint of Turkey’s entry into the war. Politically I would favor this. Since the British and Russians are going forward with the matter you may wish to send instructions to Harriman.

1. Sent to Washington by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels, and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt at Hyde Park.
2. Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.
3. Garbled group or groups.
4. Various messages from Churchill to Eden regarding Turkey, dated during the Moscow Conference, are printed in Churchill, pp. 285 ff. It is not clear, however, that any of the messages printed in that source is the one referred to here.
3. Garbled group or groups.