740.0011 Moscow/341
Most Secret Protocol of the Moscow
Conference
secret
[Moscow, November 1, 1943.]
Most Secret Protocol
of the Conference between the Secretary of State of the
United States of America, Mr. Cordell
Hull, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the
United Kingdom, Mr. A. Eden, and
the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, Mr. V. M.
Molotov, which took place in Moscow from the 19th through
the 30th of October, 1943.
The following took part in the discussions:
| For the
United States: |
Mr. Harriman, |
|
Major General Deane, |
|
Brigadier General Vandenburg [Vandenberg], |
|
Captain Ware. |
| For the
United Kingdom: |
Sir A.
Clark-Kerr, |
|
Lieutenant General Ismay. |
| For the
U. S. S. R.: |
Marshal K. E.
Voroshilov, |
|
A. Ya[.]
Vyshinski, |
|
Major General Gryzlov. |
“the consideration of measures to
shorten the duration of the war against hitlerite germany and
her allies in europe”
(Proposed by the Soviet Delegation on the 19th October,
1943)
On the question put on the agenda of the Conference of representatives of
the Governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the People’s Commissar of Foreign
Affairs, V. M. Molotov on the
19th October, 1943, made the following proposals which were handed in
writing to Mr. Anthony Eden and
Mr. Cordell Hull:
“For the purpose of shortening the duration of the war it is
proposed:
(1) To put into effect such urgent measures on the part of the
Governments of Great Britain and United States of America in
1943, which will ensure the invasion of Anglo-American armies
into Northern France and which, together with the powerful blows
of the Soviet forces against the main forces of the German army
on the Soviet-German front, must radically undermine the
military strategic situation of Germany and lead to a definite
shortening of the duration of the war.
In this connection the Soviet Government considers it necessary
to determine whether the statement made by Mr. [Page 135]
Churchill and Mr.
Roosevelt in the
beginning of June, 1943,1 to the effect that Anglo-American
forces will carry out the invasion of Northern France in the
spring of 1944, remains in force.
(2) To propose to the Turkish Government on behalf of the three
Powers that Turkey immediately enters the war.
(3) To propose to Sweden on behalf of the three Powers that she
should provide the Allies with air bases for the struggle
against Germany.”
| (a) With regard to
point (1) of the proposals of the Soviet Delegation of 19th
October 1943, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain,
Mr. Eden, and the
Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr.
Hull, on the 20th
October 1943, endorsed the statement made by the British
Lt-General Ismay and the
American Major-General Deane (see appendices: statement of Lt-General
Ismay and statement
of Major-Gen era I Deane)
as being an accurate presentation of the most recent decisions
of their Governments, taken at the Quebec Conference in August
1943.2 |
The People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs,
V. M. Molotov, stated
that the Soviet Government take note of Mr. Eden’s and Mr. Hull’s statements, as well as of
the statements of Lt-General Ismay and Major-General Deane, and express the hope
that the plan of invasion by Anglo-American troops of Northern
France in the spring of 1944, contained in these statements,
will be carried out on time. |
| With regard to the question put by the Soviet
Delegation: whether the statement made by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt in the beginning of
June, 1943, to the effect that Anglo-American troops will carry
out the invasion of Northern France in the spring of 1944,
remains in force, Mr. Eden
and Mr. Hull gave an
affirmative reply declaring that the decision to undertake the
invasion of Northern France in the [Page 136] spring of 1944 had been reaffirmed at the
recent conference in Quebec, subject to the conditions quoted by
General Ismay in his
statement. Mr. Eden and
Mr. Hull added that this
decision has not been changed and that preparations to carry out
the above mentioned operation are being pressed forward as
rapidly as possible. |
|
| (b) With regard to
points (2) and (3) of the proposals of the Soviet Delegation
(regarding Turkey and Sweden) |
Mr. Hull, Mr. Eden, and V. M.
Molotov recognize the desirability of the
Governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom and
Soviet Union continuing to study the question of Turkey and
Sweden. |
(c) The United States
delegates placed the following proposals before the conference.
- (1)
- That, in order to effect shuttle bombing of industrial
Germany, bases be made available in the U. S. S. E. on
which U. S. aircraft could be refueled, emergency
repaired, and rearmed.
- (2)
- That more effective mutual interchange of weather
information be implemented. In order to effect this, it
is essential that means of communication between the U.
S. A. and the U. S. S. E. be strengthened.
- (3)
- That air communication between these two countries be
improved.
|
V. M.
Molotov said that the U. S. S. E. agrees to the
United States proposals in principle and that the appropriate
Soviet authorities will be given instructions to meet with
Generals Deane and
Vandenberg for the
consideration of concrete measures which would be necessary to
carry out these proposals. |
Cordell
Hull
B. Mojiotob3
Anthony
Eden
[Page 137]
[Appendix 1]
Statement Made at the Moscow Conference by the
Chief of Staff to the British
Minister of Defence (Ismay)
secret
Statement Made by Lt. Gen.
Ismay Before
Tri-Partite Conference on October 20th, 1943
I am instructed to address myself to the following proposal put
forward by the Soviet Delegation:-
“In order to shorten the duration of the war it is being
proposed:
That the Governments of Great Britain and the U. S. A. take
in 1943 such urgent measures as will ensure the invasion of
Northern France by Anglo-American armies and, coupled with
powerful blows of Soviet troops on the main German forces on
the Soviet-German front, will radically undermine the
military-strategical situation of Germany and bring about a
decisive shortening of the duration of the war.
In this connection the Soviet Government deems it necessary
to ascertain whether the statement made in early June, 1943,
by Mr. Churchill and
Mr. Roosevelt to the
effect that Anglo-American forces will undertake the
invasion of Northern France in the spring of 1944 remains
valid.”
The answer to both the points raised by the Soviet Delegation is
provided by the decisions taken at the recent Anglo-American
Conference at Quebec, which was presided over by the President of
the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain and
attended by the Chiefs of Staff of the two countries. Thus I shall
be speaking on behalf of the American Delegation as well as the
British Delegation; but my American colleague, General Deane, will, I hope, interrupt if I
say anything with which he does not agree, and will in any case
amplify and explain those matters which are predominantly American
interests.
Let me say at the outset in all truth that at every single
Anglo-American Conference since we have been in the war together,
the thought uppermost in all our minds has been so to arrange our
affairs as to ensure the maximum possible diversion of enemy land
and air forces from the Russian front. I do not for a moment suggest
that in so doing we have thought only of Soviet interests. On the
contrary, it has been unanimously and invariably recognized as the
soundest strategy in the interests of the Allies as a whole. Let me
also say that the urgency of the business has always been present in
our minds. Thus the following resolution was adopted at one of our
earliest Conferences and was absolutely confirmed less than two
months ago at Quebec:-
[Page 138]
The overall objective is—
“In co-operation with Russia and other Allies to bring about
at the earliest possible date repeat at the earliest
possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.”
I should not, however, like to be inferred that we can concentrate
the whole of our combined resources against the Axis in Europe. It is essential for us to maintain
and extend unremitting pressure against Japan for the purpose of
continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from
which her ultimate surrender can be forced. If the Conference so
desires, further information on this subject will be furnished by
General Deane.
I now turn to describe the decisions taken at Quebec as to the
operations to be undertaken in 1943–44 for the defeat of the Axis
powers in Europe. First, there is the bomber offensive. I mention
this first, as not only does it come first in chronological order,
but it is an essential prerequisite to the invasion of North West
Europe. It was decided that the progressive destruction and
dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system,
the disruption of vital lines of communication and the reduction of
German air combat strength by the prosecution on an ever increasing
scale of the day and night bomber offensive against Germany and
German Occupied Europe from all convenient bases, should continue to
have the highest strategic priority.
As is well known, the American Air Force stationed in the United
Kingdom carry out precision bombing by day whenever the weather is
suitable, while the British Royal Air Force concentrate more
particularly on area bombing against German war industry by night.
The prodigious scale of the damage which has already been done is
not generally recognized. The American Delegation have therefore
brought with them an officer who can give as full details as the
Conference may desire of the effects of the day bombing, while the
British Delegation have similarly brought with them an officer who
can unfold the story of the British night bombing offensive. The
graph which I now pass round4 shows the steadily mounting weight
of bombs that have been cast on German war industry by the Royal Air
Force alone during the past few months. In August alone it amounted
to over 20,000 tons. The graph also shows by way of contrast, the
weight of bombs cast on England when the whole weight of the German
Air Force was concentrated on us.
It is also to be noted that this combined bomber offensive is to be
prosecuted from all convenient bases. It is hoped that shortly we
will be in possession of airfields in the vicinity of Rome, which
will enable us to attack important war industries in Southern
Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Rumania with almost the same
intensity that we [Page 139] have
been attacking Northern Germany during the past year. These
industries have hitherto been out of reach or at extreme range.
I now turn to the cross-Channel operation which it has been decided
to undertake in 1944. It has been decided that the invasion of
Northern France by Anglo-American forces will be the primary U.
S./British ground and air effort against the Axis in Europe in 1944.
This invasion is to be launched as soon as practicable after weather
conditions in the English Channel become favourable.
The scale of the initial assault is to a large extent dictated by the
quantity of special assault shipping and special landing craft which
is available when the time comes. Both in the United States and in
the United Kingdom the greatest efforts are being made to increase
the production of these vital craft. The recent success of the
antisubmarine campaign has enabled us to take the risk of turning
over a larger part of our shipbuilding capacity to the construction
of this type of vessel. It is to be remembered that these special
craft are essential not only for the assault itself, but for
maintaining and reinforcing the invading armies across open beaches
until such time as deep water ports have been captured and put into
order. At a conservative estimate, it is calculated that we will
have to maintain and reinforce over the beaches for a period of two
or three months. It is for this reason, apart from any other, that
it is a physical impossibility to undertake the operation in the
period of winter storms. Comparatively settled weather is
essential.
I cannot yet give details of the scale of the initial assault as this
is still under urgent and detailed examination, but our plans and
preparations are based on being able to get about 18 divisions
ashore after 14 days, together with an appropriate strength of
supporting aircraft. After 90 days we hope to have 30 divisions
ashore, again with an appropriate strength of supporting air
formations. Thereafter three to five divisions per month will be
sent from the United States direct to the theatre of operations.
The German strength in France and the Low Countries is estimated at
40 divisions at the present time, including coastal, G. A. F. and
training divisions. The beach and coast defences of France and the
low Countries have been built up over the long period of German
occupation. Our experience at Dieppe5 showed without any doubt that, even to gain a
footing in North West Europe, is a most formidable operation.
Moreover, the enemy disposes of excellent lateral communications
across Europe which enable him to move reinforcements to the West by
road and rail far quicker than we could reinforce our [Page 140] initial lodgments by sea.
The enemy rate of reinforcement is thus limited by the availability
of his forces and not by his communications.
In view of the above, it was agreed at Quebec that certain conditions
must be present for the invasion to have a reasonable prospect of
success. We are fairly confident that these conditions will be
fulfilled.
First, there must be a substantial reduction in the strength of the
German fighter force in North West Europe between now and the date
of the assault. It is expected that the ever increasing
Anglo-American bomber offensive will produce this result.
The second condition is that the German reserves in France and the
Low Countries as a whole must not be more on the day of the assault
than about 12 full strength, first quality, mobile divisions. This
is of course exclusive of coastal, training and German Air Force
divisions. Furthermore, it must not be possible for the Germans to
transfer from other fronts more than 15 first quality divisions
during the first two months of the operations.
It is hoped that these conditions may be rendered possible by the
following:—
- (I)
- The softening effect of the Anglo-American bomber
forces.
- (II)
- The maintenance of unremitting pressure by Anglo-American
land and air forces in Italy.
- (III)
- Allied landings in Southern France—threatened or actual,
synchronizing with the invasion of Northern France.
- (IV)
- Operations in the Balkans by guer[r]illa forces which will
be sustained by sea and by air.
- (V)
- And lastly, but of course by far the most important of
all, co-ordinated pressure on the Eastern front by the
Soviet forces.
The third condition is that the problem of beach maintenance of large
forces in the tidal waters of the English Channel over a prolonged
period must be overcome. The success of our plans depends on our
ability to construct at least two artificial ports. The experiments
which have been pursued for some time hold out good promise.
I now turn to the decisions covering operations in Italy. These were
conceived in three phases.
- (I)
- First phase:
- The elimination of Italy as a belligerent and establishment of
air bases in the Rome area and, if feasible, further
north;
- (II)
- Second phase:
- Seizure of Sardinia and Corsica;
- (III)
- Third phase:
- The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in
Northern Italy and the creation of the conditions required for
the cross-Channel assault and of a situation favorable [Page 141] for the eventual entry
of our forces, including the bulk of the re-equipped French Army
and Air Force, into Southern France.
It is to be particularly noted that operations in Italy are to be
carried out by the forces already in the Mediterranean theatre.
Seven U. S. and British battle-tried divisions are to be brought
back in the near future from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom
in order to form the spearhead for the assault across the Channel.
These are divisions which have had experience in amphibious warfare.
It has been laid down that, wherever there is a shortage of
resources of any kind, the governing principle will be that they
will be distributed and employed with the main object of ensuring
the success of the invasion of Northern France.
The operations described above will stretch our resources to the
limit. It has therefore been decided that Operations in the Balkan
area will be limited to the supply of the Patriot Armies by air and
sea transport, to minor Commando forces and to the bombing of
strategic objectives.
That concludes my survey of the decisions taken at Quebec. It remains
to say a few words about the urgent measures which are being taken
to give effect to these plans. In the first place, U. S. divisions
are being concentrated in the United Kingdom at the greatest rate
that shipping resources allow, and their training in amphibious
operations pressed forward vigorously. General Deane will elaborate this point.
Secondly, United States air forces in the United Kingdom are being
reinforced at the greatest possible rate. General Deane will also speak on this
point. Thirdly, it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the
United Kingdom is being turned into one vast airfield. Fourthly, a
cross-Channel invasion on the scale contemplated against long
prepared defences, manned by German troops, is an operation of a
character which has never before been attempted in the history of
war. It requires most extensive and elaborate administrative
preparations at the ports of embarkation and on the lines of
communication leading to the ports. All these measures are being
pressed forward with the greatest vigour.
[Appendix 2]
Statements Made at the Moscow Conference by the
United States Military Observer at the Conference
(Deane)
secret
Statements Made by Major General
J. E. Deane, U.
S. A., Before Conference 20 October 1943.
In the first proposal submitted by the Soviet delegates they
recommended that urgent measures be undertaken in 1943 which would
[Page 142] insure an invasion of
Northern France. I should like to outline some of the measures that
are now under way.
In the first place we consider the combined bomber offensive from the
United Kingdom as being by far the most positive and important
preparation for a cross-channel operation. In this connection we
should welcome an opportunity to make a complete presentation to you
gentlemen, and to such others as you may wish, which would give a
comprehensive picture of what has been accomplished in the bomber
offensive and what is planned for the future. As a preview to this
presentation I have asked General Vandenberg to present pictures6 of our most recent bombing operation against
Marienburg. Target in this instance was the Focke-Wulf aircraft
factory. It was moved to Marienburg by the Germans for security
reasons. Its destruction was almost complete. This particular
picture was selected as an illustration because the objective was
the most distant from the United Kingdom that has been attacked thus
far and also it is the closest to the Soviet front. (At this point
General Vandenberg displayed
several pictures of bombing operations and explained their
significance.)
As I have said, our most urgent preparation for a cross-channel
operation is the bomber offensive of the British-American air forces
from the United Kingdom and from the Mediterranean. The mission of
the offensive is the progressive destruction and dislocation of the
German military, industrial, and economic systems, and the
undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where
their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. It is
estimated that the bomber offensive shall be far enough advanced by
1 May 1944 to permit the release of its entire strength to support a
cross-channel operation. The build-up of the force necessary for the
bomber operations will be, for the most part, accomplished by the
addition of United States formations. At the present time the United
States has in the neighborhood of 20 Groups of 4–engined heavy
bombers in the United Kingdom. It is planned that this force will be
expanded to approximately 48 Groups or approximately 2,300 aircraft
by 1 April 1944. Planned fighter aircraft expansion will be from
approximately 9 Groups at present in the United Kingdom to 31 Groups
by 1 April 1944. This should amount to approximately 2,300 fighter
aircraft by that date. The E. A. F. strength will be about the same
and the existing formations will be maintained and kept at full
operation strength.
The expansion indicated above is progressing on schedule, the
necessary ground installations are being constructed, the ground
crews and the operating personnel are being assembled. In order to
furnish fighter support for the cross-channel operation it is
necessary that approximately 100 additional airfields be constructed
in Southern [Page 143] England. This
construction is underway and will be completed prior to the time the
operation is launched.
The cross-channel operation agreed upon calls for a build-up of 30
mobile infantry and armored divisions to be in the United Kingdom by
April 1944. This force will include appropriate corps, armies, and
service troops and will be utilized for securing the initial
bridgehead.
The build-up of the ground and air force in Britain will necessitate
transporting more than one million men from the United States to
Great Britain in the next seven or eight months. This will require
the unloading of 400 personnel ships and over 1,000 cargo vessels in
the United Kingdom during that period. To do so will tax the port
capacity of Britain to the utmost and require that it be diverted
exclusively to this purpose.
Approximately 3,300 assault ships and craft will be necessary for the
operation. To obtain these the landing craft program has been
expanded 35% in the United States despite resulting dislocation in
the over-all production program.
It must be expected that German forces will accomplish almost
complete destruction of German port facilities in France prior to
their capture. It will therefore be necessary to support the
operation initially over the beaches, a condition which will
probably exist for the first 90 days of the occupation. In the early
stages it is estimated that 15,000 tons of supplies per day will be
necessary. This figure will increase as the operation expands.
I have presented but a few of the preparations that are now being
made. I have selected them because they are of major importance, but
as you know for an operation of the magnitude contemplated there are
a great many others. The military mission of the United States in
Moscow is authorized to keep the Soviet thoroughly informed as to
the progress of our preparations. It is hoped that this mission will
be utilized as a medium for closer collaboration between our
respective staffs.
With a view to measures which might be adopted for hastening the
conclusion of the war against Germany I have been authorized to make
certain proposals which I shall read and then distribute the
translation of them for your information. The proposals are as
follows:
That, in order to effect shuttle bombing of industrial
Germany, bases be made available in the U. S. S. R. on which
U. S. aircraft could be refueled, emergency repaired, and
rearmed.
That more effective mutual interchange of weather information
be implemented. In order to effect this, that U. S. A. and
U. S. S. R. communications be strengthened.
[Page 144]
That improved air transport be effected between the two
countries.7
Later, in response to a question presented by Mr. Molotov as to the validity of the
decision for a cross-channel operation I made the following
statement:
The decision to undertake a cross-channel operation in the
spring of 1944 was reaffirmed at the last conference in
Quebec. Now it must be understood that such decision, as is
the case with any military decision made far in advance, is
subject to certain conditions existing at the time the
operation is to take place. The conditions in this case have
been stated to you. We confidently feel that these
conditions will exist and are proceeding with full scale
preparations to launch the attack. One can only appreciate
the firmness of the decision by witnessing the intensive
spirit with which preparations are now being carried out. I
have spoken previously of the landing craft program which
has recently been expanded in the United States. The effects
of such a readjustment are felt not only in England but
throughout the breadth of the United States including the
California coast. Such a change in production effects [affects] the shipyards along the
coast and the engine manufacturers in the middle west. It is
inconceivable that such dislocation of industry would be
permitted if the intention to launch the operation was
questionable.
