Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

82. Memorandum from Wiesner to President Kennedy, February 21¹

February 21, 1962

I am attaching for your consideration a possible plan which could serve as the basis for a new disarmament initiative involving a nuclear test ban. I believe that this proposal could shift the present unproductive nuclear test ban debate to new ground with much broader significance without abandoning important features of our previous nuclear test ban proposal. Specifically, the plan would include the following measures with appropriate controls: 1) a complete ban on nuclear weapons tests in all environments; 2) the cessation of all research and development on nuclear weapons; and 3) a complete cut-off of the production of fissionable material except for agreed quantities to be used for peaceful purposes.

I believe that such a proposal might serve to bridge the gap between Soviet objections to the elaborate control and inspection requirements associated with the rather modest objective of the present U.S. Geneva test ban proposal, which would permit underground testing below a certain “threshold,” and our desire for even more effective protection against possible clandestine testing and protection against covert preparations for the resumption of development testing under the cover of a treaty. By making a new proposal calling for a complete ban on nuclear tests coupled with a prohibition on research and development on nuclear weapons and a cut-off of fissionable material production for weapons, we would very substantially increase the content of our proposal and thereby justify a higher level of control.

The attached proposal would essentially retain the control system and the provision for 20 annual inspections contained in the present U.S. draft test ban treaty with the exception that inspections could be conducted against any located seismic events that are considered suspicious. In this connection, it should be noted that the Geneva system could locate events far below the so-called “threshold” of the present U.S. draft proposal, (i.e., down to a fraction of a kiloton) and that the current Nevada tests have shown that on-site inspections would be much more effective than had previously been claimed in some quarters. The access resulting from the 20 annual inspections could be reduced by allocating them within the Soviet Union and the U.S. to those areas where practically all of the seismic activity actually occurs. For example, as I proposed in my memorandum of January 25, it would be possible to restrict the number of inspections within all of European U.S.S.R. and most of Asian U.S.S.R. to 3 and to allocate the remaining 17 inspections to certain small remote areas in south central and far eastern Siberia.

The ban on research and development on nuclear weapons would be implemented by prohibiting all laboratory work in this field. This measure would be controlled by placing permanent inspectors in all weapons laboratories and by maintaining a check on the activities of all scientific personnel previously engaged in weapons work. This measure would complement the test detection system by providing a mechanism to control the conduct of nuclear tests that might not otherwise be detected because of their small size and would prevent extensive preparations for a weapons development test series under the cover of the treaty. A small quota of peremptory inspections would permit detailed inspection of any sites suspected of being clandestine weapons laboratories. These inspections would be selected either on the basis of information obtained by the overt control system or by unilateral intelligence. Given our unilateral capabilities, I believe that the proposed control of laboratories and scientific personnel would probably prevent (or at least seriously interfere with) any attempt at significant clandestine testing or preparations for atmospheric or underground nuclear weapons development tests.

The measures to monitor the fissionable material cut-off would involve the stationing of inspectors at declared production plants, the control of fissionable material manufactured for and used for peaceful purposes, and a quota of peremptory inspections against facilities suspected of clandestine production of fissionable material. These measures have been studied in great detail over the past few years and were recommended in essentially the form in the attached proposal by the Perkins Panel which reported to the U.S. Disarmament Agency last year. Our intelligence in this area is very good, and I think there is general agreement that the proposed type of control would be very effective.

In summary, I believe that the attached proposal could provide a basis for a significant new initiative, if you should consider it desirable to shift the present unproductive debate on nuclear tests to new ground. I think there is no question that it would find a favorable reception in world opinion. If the Soviets should accept such a proposal, it would clearly be a much more significant step forward in disarmament than the present U.S. test ban proposals.

Jerome B. Wiesner

Attachment

Outline of a Proposed Plan to Control the Testing and Development of Nuclear Weapons and the Production of Fissionable Material

The parties to the Treaty would agree to a complete ban on nuclear weapon tests, to the cessation of research and development on nuclear weapons, and to a complete cut-off on the production of fissionable material except for specified quantities for peaceful purposes. The initial parties to the Treaty would be the U.S., U.S.S.R., and U.K. and all other states would be encouraged to adhere to the Treaty as soon as possible after it came into effect. The Treaty would be of indefinite duration except that any party could free itself of its obligations if after 2 years all members of the NATO and Warsaw Pact had not become parties to the Treaty, or if after 4 years all states deemed capable of achieving a nuclear capability in the foreseeable future had not become parties to the Treaty (or if after 6 years all states had not become parties to the Treaty).

Each country on becoming a party to the Treaty would declare the nature and location of the following facilities within its borders or otherwise under its control: all plants engaged in or capable of producing or processing fissionable materials; all power, research, and dual-purpose nuclear reactors; and all laboratories (and other facilities) engaged in research and development on nuclear weapons. Inspectors would be stationed at all of these facilities to assure that no fissionable material is produced except for peaceful purposes, that no research and development on nuclear weapons is undertaken at declared laboratories, and that no diversions of fissionable material occur from peaceful applications. In the case of any fissionable material production plants that continue in full or partial operation for peaceful purposes as well as power, research and dual-purpose reactors, the inspectors would have full access to the operation of the facility in order to permit both inventory and physical control of the operation. In the case of laboratories that continue operation in areas other than research and development on nuclear weapons, the inspectors would have sufficient access to these activities to assure that they do not involve work on nuclear weapons.

Each country, on becoming a party to the Treaty, would also declare the names and present location of all scientific and technical personnel who are at present, or who have ever been, involved in research and development on nuclear weapons. The inspection organization would determine on an annual basis by direct questioning the nature of the current activity and the location of employment of all the declared scientific and technical personnel and would obtain from each individual a declaration that he had not been engaged in research and development on weapons during the preceding year.

During the first year, the U.S.–U.K. could on demand undertake up to 3 peremptory inspections in the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.S.R. could on demand undertake up to 3 peremptory inspections in both the U.S. and U.K. in order to determine whether any undeclared facility was in fact engaged in the production of fissionable material or research and development on nuclear weapons. These inspections would be restricted to an area of ten (10) square miles and inspectors would be permitted to go up to the walls but not inside of any facility or structure. Inspectors may take technical samples, photographs, and identify and question personnel entering or leaving the installation. If any evidence pointing to undeclared production of fissionable material production or research and development on nuclear weapons is developed by the inspectors, further inspection would be authorized including full access to the suspected facility. Other parties to the Treaty could be subject to a single peremptory inspection during the first year of their accession to the Treaty. The site of the inspection would be selected by the Western Bloc states in the case of Communist Bloc states; by the Communist Bloc in the case of Western Bloc states; and the Control Organization in the case of non-aligned states.

During the second and each successive year, the U.S.–U.K. could on demand undertake 2 peremptory inspections annually in the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.S.R. could on demand undertake 2 peremptory inspections annually in both the U.S. and U.K. in order to determine if any undeclared facility were in fact engaged in the production of fissionable material or research and development on nuclear weapons. After the first year of their accession to the Treaty, other parties to the Treaty could on demand be subject to 1 peremptory inspection every two years. The site of the inspection would be selected by the Western Bloc states in the case of Communist Bloc states; by the Communist Bloc in the case of Western Bloc states, and by the Control Organization in the case of non-aligned states.

The Control Organization would periodically collect environmental samples on a broad grid in the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R., and in any other country deemed by the Control Organization as having or being capable of having a fissionable material production capability. The findings from this environmental sampling program could be used to select the site of an inspection but would not be a prerequisite for a peremptory inspection.

A technical system for the detection and identification of nuclear tests as described in the U.S. Draft Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests would be installed progressively on a world-wide basis over a six-year period on the schedule set forth in the U.S. Draft Treaty. It would be permissible to locate the indicated number of control posts within any given country in a manner to optimize the effectiveness of the system in the detection and identification of seismic events.

The U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. would each be subject annually on demand to up to 20 inspections of unidentified seismic events. In the case of the U.S.S.R., the 20 annual inspections would be divided as follows: 3 for the area of the U.S.S.R. excluding the region of the Pamirs and the region of Kamchatka-Kuriles Islands and Sakhalin Island; 6 for the region of the Pamirs; and 11 for the region of Kamchatka-Kuriles Islands and Sakhalin Island. In the case of the U.S., the 20 annual inspections would be divided as follows: 4 for the U.S. excluding Alaska and the Aleutian Islands; 8 for Alaska; and 8 for the Aleutian Islands. In the case of other parties to the Treaty, the number of annual inspections will be determined by the formula set forth in the U.S. Draft Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. The procedure for selecting events and conducting inspections will be the same as set forth in the U.S. Draft Treaty except the criteria for on-site inspection will be modified to include all located seismic events.

1. Plan for new disarmament initiative. Attachment outlines proposal. Secret. 7 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing, 2/17/62–4/4/62.