Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

79. Minutes of White House Meeting, February 2¹

February 2, 1962

PARTICIPANTS

• • The President
  • Mr. Robert S. McNamara, DOD
  • Mr. Roswell L. Gilpatric, DOD
  • General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, DOD
  • Dr. Harold Brown, DOD
  • Dr. Gerald W. Sol
  • Mr. Paul M. Nitze, DOD
  • Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, AEC
  • General Austin W. Bathe, AEC
  • Mr. Robert Amery, Jr., CIA
  • Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., CIA
  • Dr. McGeorge Bundy, WH
  • General Maxwell Taylor, WH
  • Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, WH
  • Dr. Carl Kaysen, WH
  • Mr. Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., WH

Minutes of Meeting on the Status of U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Tests—February 2, 1962

At the request of the President, representatives of the AEC, CIA, and DOD presented a status report on U.S. and Soviet nuclear tests. This report constituted a summary and up-dating of information previously presented to the President.

U.S. and Soviet capabilities in higher yield nuclear weapons as of the completion of the 1958 test series and as of the completion of the proposed U.S. atmospheric test series in the Spring of 1962 were compared in the following table:

U.S./U.S.S.R. TN CAPABILITIES

	AFTER		AFTER
Weight	1958 TESTS		1961/62 TESTS
Class (lb.)	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	U.S.	U.S.S.R.
[text not declassified]

In discussing the present Soviet capabilities as reflected in the above table, the following points were made by the CIA representative:

[text not declassified]

In discussing the significance of the proposed U.S. atmospheric tests on the status of U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities, the AEC representative made the following points:

(1) [text not declassified]

In reviewing the 17 tests which were originally proposed by the Seaborg Committee for inclusion in an atmospheric test series (see Chart B), the AEC representative pointed out that, in order to minimize the number of atmospheric tests, it was now planned to conduct [text not declassified].

With regard to the possibility of conducting larger yield tests underground, it was stated that tests of a few hundred kilotons could certainly be conducted underground although at greater cost than in the atmosphere and with some time delay. It was also noted that if there were sufficient incentive, it would probably be possible to test as high as 1 MT underground. [text not declassified].

The AEC representative reviewed [text not declassified] in the present series and summarized the principal objectives of [text not declassified]. These include [text not declassified].

[text not declassified] The two experiments were hastily broadened to obtain data on a broad range of phenomenon including radar and communication blackout. However, the instrumentation was not good and the data obtained was incomplete. While general information was obtained on radar and communications blackout, the data did not include close-in observations of radar blackout by the fireball. Nevertheless the [text not declassified] was increased as a result of this test in an effort to minimize the radar blackout. There was general surprise at the extent of the visual and the atomic phenomena associated with these tests. In addition, in the late Summer of 1958 the U.S. conducted the ARGUS experiments which involved the firing of three small yield weapons at altitudes of a few hundred miles in the South Atlantic. These experiments were initiated in an attempt to determine if electrons could be injected onto the earth’s magnetic field as a possible AICBM weapon, a concept that was subsequently shown to be marginal at best. Although the experiments produced useful scientific information they were poorly instrumented and produced generally inadequate data for the purpose of understanding effects.

The DOD representative described in detail the two proposed high altitude effects tests. These tests will obtain data in two different high altitude environments on the nuclear blackout of radar and radio communications and on the vulnerability of weapons to various nuclear effects. Particular attention will be given to the observations of the various forms of interferences with normal radar reception which can result from a nuclear explosion. These effects (see Chart G) which were described in some detail are very difficult to calculate. To date, there is no information on the exact extent of the radar blackout caused by the nuclear fireball itself, although it is certain this will be very evident. The study of the vulnerability of nuclear weapons to nuclear effects will [illegible in the original] on the effect of neutrons. It was noted that this latter effect could also be studied to a considerable degree in underground experiments.

[text not declassified] There is also some uncertainty as to the nature of the effects since this will depend on the extent to which the weapon debris is ionized and, if it is, on how it interacts with the earth’s magnetic field. The different effects that might occur in this test were discussed (see Charts 1 and 3). It is actually anticipated that the effects from this test will involve a combination of the effects discussed in these two extreme cases. [text not declassified]

With regard to the problem of proof tests of weapons in stockpile, the AEC and DOD representatives stated that the weapons already in stockpile had either been tested in their present configurations or in similar forms from which extrapolations could be made with confidence. In the case of the Minutemen warhead, [text not declassified]. However, the designers and the AEC had certified this design with essentially the same confidence that they had in weapons that had been tested in their [illegible in the original] configurations. The DOD representative indicated that if systems tests were undertaken they considered that a complete systems test of [text not declassified] would be most useful. The DOD indicated that it was proceeding with planning for these tests, and if a decision to carry out atmospheric tests was made, it would recommend that these systems tests be included in the series.

Prior to the status report on U.S. and Soviet nuclear tests, the CIA representative briefed the President on the intelligence on the Soviet underground test at Semipalatinsk that had been detected earlier in the day (2 February); and it was decided that a public announcement should be made by the AEC.

1. Status of U.S. and Soviet nuclear tests. Top Secret. 11 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing, 497th NSC Meeting, Keeny Report.