Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

78. Memorandum from Wiesner to President Kennedy, January 25¹

January 25, 1962

In recent discussions and correspondence relating to Christmas Island and the resumption of atmospheric testing, there has been frequent mention of new initiatives in the field of disarmament prior to the scheduled starting date for our atmospheric nuclear test series, but there has been little explicit discussion of what such initiative might be beyond the proposal of an atmospheric test ban treaty.

I would like to suggest that consideration be given to two more comprehensive proposals which I believe would have greater political appeal than an atmospheric test ban proposal. If either proposal were acceptable to the Soviets, we would accomplish a major step forward in the disarmament effort.

With regard to nuclear testing, it would be possible to take a significant new initiative on the complete test ban treaty by restating our inspection requirements in a fashion which would in large measure satisfy expressed Soviet fear of espionage in connection with inspection while not significantly reducing the degree of confidence we could place in the Geneva System. The size of the inspection quota has been the key issue in the Geneva negotiations. We have called for an annual quota of 20 inspections while the Soviets have called for an annual quota of only 3 inspections. In an effort to accommodate the Soviet position, we offered last Summer to reduce the quota on a sliding scale to as few as 12 inspections if future data on the frequency of earthquakes permitted. In a new proposal, we could offer to accept the Soviet number of 3 inspections to cover all of European Russia and almost all of Siberia. We would reserve the balance of our 20 inspections (or a minimum of 12 with the sliding scale) for use in the relatively small, remote areas in south central and far eastern Siberia where most of the earthquakes in the Soviet Union actually occur. In return for this major move to meet Soviet objections to our inspection proposals, we could ask the Soviets to support the other elements of the test ban treaty we have tabled in Geneva.

Although the possibilities of using the localization of earthquakes to simplify the inspection problem was not recognized until last Summer, the fact that most earthquakes occur in limited areas of the Soviet Union has long been recognized by seismologists. For example, the 1960 RAND study on the capabilities of the Geneva System estimated that the seismicity of the Soviet Union is divided approximately as follows: Kamchatka-Kuriles-Sakhalin Island—62%; Pamire area—30%; and the remainder of the Soviet Union—8% (of which half is in the Caspian Sea area). It is significant that these areas of high seismicity are very remote, isolated areas of little real security interest to the Soviet Union. While these numbers would appear to justify only 2 inspections for the remainder of the Soviet Union, I have suggested 3 in keeping with the Soviet proposal since the percentages are not known with great precision and since I believe a number less than 3 would be difficult to utilize without running the risk of exhausting the quota too early in an annual inspection period. A similar localization of earthquakes exists in the case of the United States, where the seismicity was estimated by RAND as follows: Aleutian Islands—43%; Alaska—40%; California-Nevada—16%; and the remainder of the U.S.—1%. I have attached a rough map showing how inspections might be divided between various regions in the USSR and U.S. under this plan. I am confident that, if this approach were deemed a useful initiative, it would be possible for our seismologists very quickly to delineate these regions accurately and to break down the quota in a fashion that would adequately cover the uncertainty in our knowledge of the location and frequency of earthquakes.

A much more comprehensive initiative would involve the so-called Foster Plan for comprehensive disarmament. This plan represents a substantial step beyond any previous comprehensive disarmament plan proposed by the Soviet Union or ourselves in that it sets forth specific disarmament measures and associated inspection requirements. Although under active consideration, this plan has not been agreed to within the U.S. Government. However, I believe that with your support existing disagreements between the Department of Defense and the Disarmament Agency could be resolved by about two weeks of hard work. I am confident that we could have the proposal ready for private discussions with the USSR prior to March 1. If this were accomplished, we would have a fairly detailed proposal built upon the principles of your U.N. speech. This proposal would be exciting to the world and realistic enough to provide the basis for meaningful discussions if the Soviet Union is interested.

Finally, the two proposals could be linked, if desired, with the complete test ban becoming part of the first stage of the Foster Plan.

I believe that by making either of these proposals, we would take an important initiative which would receive wide support here and abroad whether or not the Soviets reacted favorably. If the Soviets accept our initiative, we will have made a great gain for world peace.

Jerome B. Wiesner

1. Proposed expansion of U.S. disarmament initiatives. Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subject Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 1/23/62–1/26/62.