7. Nusup 1083 to Geneva, March 151

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Following instructions are for guidance of USDEL at Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests resuming March 21.

1. Objective. Objective is to determine as early as practicable whether treaty along general lines called for by United States positions is negotiable with USSR, and if so, to conclude negotiations rapidly on this basis. While seeking agreement, USDEL should also build basis which will permit maximum flexibility for future US actions in event of failure to agree.

2. General Tactics. Our tactics in initial stage should be designed to present to Soviets and to world, fully and persuasively, new US proposals on test ban treaty and attendant commitments with view to determining whether an agreement can be reached on the basis of those proposals. Accordingly, in early meetings of resumed negotiations US representative should place on conference record in form suitable for subsequent public scrutiny detailed explanation of position and its [Facsimile Page 2] rationale. Full account of US positions should be made public through press briefings as positions are tabled in conference. USDEL should make clear its expectation that early response to these proposals will be forthcoming from SovDel. Informal consultations should be held as appropriate with Soviet Del.

3. Specific Positions. USDEL should submit new proposals as follows:

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(a) Safeguards for seismic research program. USDEL should propose removing the requirement from our present position which calls for joint contribution of nuclear weapons to a pool. USDEL should also offer to permit inspection by original parties of detailed drawings or blueprints of the devices used as an aid to the actual inspection of device. Pertinent data obtained from the seismic research program would be published. USDEL should make clear that implementation of this proposal on the part of the US is subject to Congressional authorization. USDEL may further inform SovDel that when safeguards arrangement for the research program can be agreed and Congressional authorization obtained we would expect to begin and carry out a program which the US may deem necessary to ascertain system capabilities or potential for improvement with Sov participation but with no right to veto any part of the program.

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(b) Moratorium. USDEL should modify present proposal by stating that since research program will be extended to three years (including a three-month review period) moratorium should be correspondingly lengthened to coincide with length of research program. Moratorium will be effective on date of signature of treaty. USDEL should point out, as appropriate, that US hopes treaty can be concluded in near future and that research program will begin at same time but that US may wish seek agreement that seismic research program begin before signature of treaty. Towards end of research program, during review period, original parties should consult to determine whether or not the moratorium should be continued and/or whether the threshold should be changed. USDEL should make clear parties regain freedom of action at the end of the research program as regards further obligation below threshold.

(c) Number of control posts. If initial attempt to obtain agreement on basis dropping two posts from Phase IB in USSR (for total of 19) is not successful, USDEL may agree that total of 17 control posts will be installed in territories of Soviet Union, including one on Soviet island. Two posts will be located in the European part of Soviet Union and 14 in Asian part of Soviet Union. Number of posts in North American territory of United States will be reduced from 11 to 10. Six [Facsimile Page 4] control posts will be established on US islands. Condition for modifying our original proposal should be that control posts which we previously proposed be located just within national borders of US and Soviet Union will be located in adjoining countries in later phase. Phasing of installation of control posts should be: USSR: Nine continental posts plus one island post to be established in Phase IA (0–2 years after treaty enters into force); seven continental posts to be established by end of Phase IB (0–4 years after treaty enters into force). US: Six continental posts plus six island posts to be established in Phase IA; four continental [Typeset Page 58] posts in Phase IB. Number and phasing of control posts for UK will remain as previously described, but we would be ready to follow any arrangements satisfactory to UK on posts in Australia and Africa requested by USSR for Phase I. On-site inspections will begin as soon as events can be certified eligible for inspection which will, in any event, be no later than the end of Phase IA.

(d) Number of On-Site Inspections. USDEL should initially reaffirm previous US proposals for number of on-site inspections (i.e. 20%–30% formula and flat number of 20). US proposal of twenty annual on-site inspections in USSR should be buttressed by appropriate technical argumentation; Soviet proposal of 3 inspections should be attacked as entirely inadequate deterrent in light of frequency of seismic events in USSR. At discretion [Facsimile Page 5] of USDEL, fallback position may be introduced as follows: USDEL should propose that the minimum annual quota for each original party will be 10 inspections, but after 50 seismic events in any one year above seismic magnitude 4.75 have been located by application of the criteria as eligible for inspection in the territories of any of the original parties, one additional inspection will be added to the quota for each increment of five located events. Total number of on-site inspections which may be carried out annually on territory under jurisdiction or control of an original party shall not exceed 20. In presenting this proposal USDEL should point out it combines advantage of fixed number, as advocated by Soviets, with advantage of adjusting number according to actual frequency of seismic events. Treaty language, including provision for Control Commission review of number of on-site inspections, will be sent in separate telegram.

(e) High Altitude. USDEL should propose that treaty provide for discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests at high altitude and in outer space. Control system shall include equipment suggested by high altitude technical working group. Treaty shall provide for installation during first phase of high altitude equipment in control posts, of Argus satellite, and of far earth satellites recommended by high altitude technical [Facsimile Page 6] working group. USDEL should point out that additional research (e.g., background measurements in outer space) will be required to confirm estimates of capabilities specified by high altitude technical working group. US prepared to carry out such research independently and through control system and hopes USSR will do likewise. Purpose of research should be to ensure high altitude detection capability at least as great as that indicated by TWG-I experts. USDEL should introduce specific treaty language to be sent in separate telegram. Study being made to determine whether present treaty language adequate to allow for parties’ being released from high altitude treaty obligation in event subsequent research shows control system will fail to meet estimates of capability made by TWG-I experts.

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(f) Composition of Control Commission. USDEL may state that it is prepared to accept 4–4–3 control commission contingent on agreement on control system which is reliable, rapid, and effective and which in its day-to-day tasks as regards, at the very least, the original Parties operates largely independently from control commission participation.

(g) Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions. USDEL should state that US will drop “black-box” method of preventing peaceful detonations from being used for military purposes. US adheres to alternative method of full disclosure of internals [Facsimile Page 7] of devices used and will permit examination by original parties of detailed drawings or blueprints of devices used, as an aid to actual inspection of device. USDEL should also seek inclusion of provision authorizing Control Commission, with assent of original parties, to prescribe alternative safeguard procedures for peaceful uses explosions.

(h) Parties to the Treaty. USDEL authorized drop reference to “authorities”. Specific treaty language to follow in separate telegram.

(i) Budget and Finance. USDEL should propose that conference accept idea of unanimity of original parties in voting on total amount of budget; we would not accept veto of individual items of budget. This conditioned on understanding that annual contribution of US and USSR would be equal, while UK contribution would be smaller. Also, if 4–4–3 Control Commission composition adopted, voting on financial questions other than total budget must be by simple majority vote to avoid giving Sov bloc de facto veto.

5. Other Issues. USDEL should generally adhere to existing US positions on following matters except for modifications noted:

(a) Nationality of Inspection Teams. As fallback position to be used at USDEL’s discretion, proposal may be made to add prohibition on service on teams by nationals of countries [Facsimile Page 8] allied with host country and to drop requirement that teams in original party territory be exclusively “other side” nationals. On this and following item USDEL may state it prepared agree neutrals might serve on inspection teams and special flights. Numbers of neutrals would be subject for discussion at present negotiations provided that neutrals may not comprise more than 50% of team or flight.

(b) Nationality of Control System Specialists on Agreed Special Flights. As fall-back position to be used at USDEL’s discretion, USDEL may propose adding prohibition on service by nationals of host country allies and dropping requirement that specialists on flights over territories of original parties must be “other side” nationals.

(c) Chiefs of Control Posts. These should not be nationals of host country or ally. In original parties, “other side” rule shall apply. USDEL should consult with DEPT concerning use of following amendment if [Typeset Page 60] negotiating situation indicates its introduction would be helpful: Except in regard to official reports to Administrator of data collected from instruments at post, host country deputy could independently present views to control organization headquarters on administrative procedures, management, and general activities of post.

(d) Seismic Research Program. Should be of three years duration including review period but unchanged as regards [Facsimile Page 9] content, especially number and purposes of nuclear shots. (See safeguards section for other aspects.)

(e) Criteria for On-Site Inspection. The USDEL should continue to reject as technically unsound Soviet proposal that event must be located within 200 square kilometers area to be eligible for inspection.

(f) Phasing of Installation of Complete System. Present schedule should be adhered to for all components. USDEL should, however, introduce language to extend Article XIV, Annex I, to allow Control Commission, with consent of each of original parties, to postpone, add to, or refrain from establishing any of components of control system in Phase I, as presently provided for Phases II and III.

5. More detailed instructions will be despatched as required on foregoing and ancillary issues.

  1. Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests: guidance for USDEL. Confidential. 9 pp. Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611–GE/S–1561.