Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

52. Memorandum of Conversation, September 14, between McCloy and Zorin¹

New York, September 14, 1961, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

• US-USSR Bilateral Talks on Disarmament (No. 22)

PARTICIPANTS

• USSR

  • V. A. Zorin
  • Gen. A. A. Gryzlov
  • A. A. Roshchin
  • I. J. Usachev
  • B. P. Krasulin
  • S. A. Bogomolov
  • R. M. Timberbaev
  • V. N. Zherebtsov

• United States

  • Mr. McCloy
  • Ambassador Dean
  • Mr. Spiers
  • Mr. Matteson
  • Mr. Akalovsky
  • Mr. Popper (USUN)
  • Major Gen. Smith (USAF)
  • Mr. Sonnenfeldt
  • Capt. Freeman
  • Mr. O’Boyle

Mr. McCloy opened today’s session by referring to the statement made by Mr. Zorin at the 21st Bilateral Talks Meeting, September 13, 1961, that the United States had failed to comment on the Soviet draft joint statement of July 27. In refuting this charge Mr. McCloy referred to the records, and pointed out that he had commented on the paper during the sessions held in Moscow on July 28 and 29, and again on September 6 when he had made an extensive paragraph-by-paragraph comparison of the U.S. paper of September 6 with the Soviet draft of July 27.

Mr. McCloy then introduced a suggested text for the preambular portion of the Joint Statement of Principles, calling attention to the fact that our text followed closely language proposed by the USSR on July 27. Mr. McCloy also handed the Soviet Delegation a memorandum summarizing the substantive positions set forth by the U.S. in the course of the current bilateral exchange of views.

In reply, Mr. Zorin thanked Mr. McCloy for the clarification of the items he had mentioned, as well as the additional documentation Mr. McCloy had presented. Mr. Zorin noted that he could not comment yet on this material but hoped to do so shortly. He then expressed regret that the U.S. presentation of such documentation was so late in light of the approaching date set for the convening of the United Nations General Assembly.

Mr. Zorin then proceeded to review the Soviet draft of July 27, reiterating such previously made points as the need for a single treaty covering both disarmament and nuclear testing, the need for reference to foreign bases, the need for the establishment of an overall time limit and Soviet insistence on “troika” type administration for international armed forces. During his remarks Mr. Zorin said it was most necessary for the USSR to know the U.S. position on these points in greater detail in order to ascertain whether or not there could be a basis for a Joint Statement. To accomplish this, he said, he felt it advisable to consider very thoroughly the dangers inherent in the international arms race. In this connection he said that the USSR believed that the most important part of Resolution 1378 (XIV) was the general and complete disarmament portion and he could not understand U.S. omission of this point in its draft.

Continuing, Mr. Zorin said that his second point was that the USSR had already made the Soviet position a matter of record; that all means of warfare should be destroyed and that the retention of certain type armaments for military forces must be only for the purpose of assuring internal security. This too, Mr. Zorin stated, was regarded as an essential element of a general and complete disarmament program.

Taking as his next point the scope and measures to be included in the Joint Statement, Mr. Zorin noted that the USSR wished to emphasize that it did not advocate the abandonment of all national security forces but that the USSR did want the elimination of delivery vehicles and foreign bases. The USSR sees such bases as actual threats to other nations but the U.S. documentation fails to cover such an important issue. On the contrary, Mr. Zorin continued, the U.S. has expressed the idea that such bases can be utilized to provide training areas for international forces.

The next point Mr. Zorin spoke about was the determination of the order of general and complete disarmament measures. The USSR feels it necessary that there be agreement on the subject of implementation timeliness and does not believe it impossible to designate a fixed final time limit in which complete and general disarmament can be effected. Without such a time limit, it would be impossible to verify the implementation of treaty provisions.

The major Soviet concern, Mr. Zorin then observed, was solution of the control problem. The USSR wanted controls to be strict and effective for each step. However, control must not go beyond disarmament measures, for if it does it becomes the collection of intelligence. Such excess, the USSR feels, would defeat the end of control measures, and, consequently, the USSR must be certain this will not become possible.

Next, discussing paragraph 7 of the Soviet draft, Mr. Zorin said it was designed to provide measures to keep international peace and security under general and complete disarmament by strict compliance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, which provides for the placing of contingents at the disposal of the United Nations Security Council. As both the U.S. and the USSR had agreed that neither side should be allowed to gain an advantage on the other, Mr. Zorin continued, this could be accomplished by making the administration of international armed forces subject to the “troika” arrangement advocated in the Soviet draft since the method outlined is designed to protect the interests of all states.

Referring to the last two paragraphs of the Soviet Draft, Mr. Zorin stated that he felt world conditions today required both sides to refrain from any actions that would tend to heighten the danger of conflict, and every effort should be made to assure cessation of actions that might contribute adversely to the international situation. Accordingly, he desired to urge the American representatives to analyze thoroughly the proposals sponsored by the USSR, and thus enable both sides to develop a mutually satisfactory Joint Statement. If the U.S. after such study might wish to amend or suggest revisions of the document, the USSR would gladly consider such matters and cooperate accordingly.

Responding to Mr. Zorin’s remarks, Mr. McCloy stated that he believed his earlier comments had covered much of what Mr. Zorin had said today, but that the U.S. would review the Soviet statement and perhaps have further ideas later. However, Mr. McCloy continued, he would now comment to some extent on the points raised by Mr. Zorin. Mr. McCloy said that he felt the USSR delegation had selected unfairly only one aspect of Resolution 1378 and had neglected to mention that the U.S. had suggested reference to all the provisions of Resolution 1378. He then expressed his personal opinion that it was more important in his estimation to achieve peace with justice rather than general and complete disarmament alone. Furthermore, Mr. McCloy observed, the idea regarding a single treaty was not mentioned in the Resolution, which was an expression of general hope that a disarmament program could be implemented. The United States, Mr. McCloy continued, felt it was of vital importance not to delay the entire program’s progress because of one single item. It was more important, he believed, that the two groups endeavor to make progress so as to offer the world hope that disarmament might be accomplished.

Commenting next on what weapons should be available after disarmament, Mr. McCloy stated that if Mr. Zorin’s objection was to the absence in the U.S. draft of reference to “small arms,” that was an attempt to negotiate details, and he doubted if this was what the United Nations intended the two groups to do. Mr. McCloy pointed out that no line of distinction had been made regarding what constitutes small arms and that it involved such possibilities as squirt guns in Berlin as well as tanks in Hungary.

Mr. McCloy next discussed the use of the word “all” in reference to the disbanding of armed forces, and explained that we felt it was more properly descriptive of what the situation should be. However, he said, there was no need for that one word to stand in the way of a mutual agreement.

Referring to Mr. Zorin’s comments on foreign bases, Mr. McCloy said that the U.S. position favored abandoning all military establishments including bases regardless of whether such bases were foreign or local installations. However, he wished to know if Mr. Zorin meant bases in the same sense that the U.S. did. For example, Mr. McCloy asked, what was the Soviet position regarding bases in a taken-over area? The U.S. position, Mr. McCloy observed, can be readily identified on this subject. International forces might have to have bases at some future date and, therefore, negotiations on this specific point at the present time do not appear to be essential to disarmament discussions.

Commenting next on the subject of time limits, Mr. McCloy stated that the U.S. position on this point was more realistic than that proposed by the Soviet delegation, since the former provided needed opportunity to examine progress at each and every stage. Existing documentation, he pointed out, clearly outlines in detail our reasons for advocating this position. Mr. McCloy then acknowledged that inspection as recommended by the United States could present problems for both countries. However, Mr. McCloy continued, he could see no justifiable reason for the U.S. not demanding authentic verification. The U.S. does not want or intend to engage in clandestine operations, but we do insist on mutual trust and confidence. Weapon reduction, he said, demands adequate inspection to assure compliance.

Referring to the USSR position on the administration of international armed forces, Mr. McCloy stated that we do not agree with the Soviet concept of the world being divided into three groups. This “troika” theory, he continued, is in basic opposition to the idea of effectiveness since it permits the veto to be applied to the United Nations Armed Force. The U.S. is convinced, he said, that the “troika” is a negation of the concept of an international armed force designed to assure peace. Thus, Mr. McCloy added, serious negotiation on disarmament depends upon a clear realization that the “troika” idea is an obstacle to progress in any disarmament discussions.

In response to Mr. Zorin’s contention that the U.S. statement failed to prohibit nuclear weapons, Mr. McCloy remarked that in the Khrushchev-Sulzberger interview the former had deprecated commitment against the use of nuclear weapons. Regarding paragraph 7, Mr. McCloy strongly opposed the attitude that nothing could be done to eliminate or solve the difficulty it presented.

In reference to the last two paragraphs of the Soviet statement, Mr. McCloy said that the U.S. preamble covers the points in question since it was not conceivable that the USSR had any desire to increase world tensions. The U.S., he added, has stressed the obligation of acknowledging international agreements and our affirmations on the subject are both realistic and sound.

Referring to Mr. Zorin’s remark that it was regrettable that the United States had not made known its position earlier in view of the scheduled convening date of the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. McCloy said he did not like to attach blame to the situation, and for that reason would not make any countercharge as to where blame should be placed. Rather he thought it more proper that both sides now discuss what would be the proper approach to the United Nations regarding the report on the results of the Bilateral Talks.

In reply Mr. Zorin said he appreciated Mr. McCloy’s extensive coverage of his request for U.S. position clarification and felt that progress had resulted from today’s exchange of views. Mr. Zorin then stated he could not agree with all of Mr. McCloy’s statements, especially his comment on Mr. Khrushchev’s reported remark on nuclear weapon usage. He added that the hour did not allow any more detailed reply at this time, and suggested adjournment with selection of the next meeting to be determined by further consultation between delegations.

1. U.S.–U.S.S.R. bilateral talks on disarmament (No. 22). Limited Official Use. 6 pp. Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/9–2861.