Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

45. Telegram 428 to USUN, September 2¹

September 2, 1961, 7:53 p.m.

Paris pass USRO For Disarmament Del. In bilateral disarmament discussions with USSR to be resumed Sept 6 in New York USDel should continue be guided by instruction contained Deptel 137 to Moscow of July 14, rptd info Paris 274, London 209, Rome 125, Ottawa 38, Geneva NUSUP 1327, New York 64, with amendments as follows:

1. Framework: Substitute revised statement of principles follows:

QTE 1. The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a program which will ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

2. The program for general and complete disarmament shall ensure that states will have at their disposal only those forces, armaments, facilities, and establishments as agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and to support and provide agreed manpower for a UN peace force.

3. To this end, the program for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions for:

(a) Disbandment of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;

(b) Elimination of stock-piles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons;

(c) Elimination of means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction;

(d) Abolishment of organizations and institutions designed to organize the military effort of states, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions;

(e) Discontinuance of military expenditures.

4. Disarmament should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time limits. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are agreed and, when appropriate, ready to operate.

5. All measures of disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any state or group of states gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all.

6. All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to and under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honoring their obligations. The scope of control would depend on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures carried out in each [illegible in the original] control over and inspection of disarmament measures carried out in each [illegible in the original] implementing control over and inspection of disarmament. An International Disarmament Organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised. The International Disarmament Organization and its inspectors should be assured of unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

7. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the program of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force. This force should be used only for purposes consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and should be subject to arrangements which will ensure that it will not be used for purposes of one state or group of states as are contrary to the Charter and that it will be able to perform the functions assigned to it.

8. States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption. [illegible in the original] the total program has been achieved, and [illegible in the original] to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of [illegible in the original] disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement or the total program and in such [illegible in the original] these measures would facilitate and form part of that [illegible in the original] UNQUOTE.

USDEL should not accept or propose changes of substantive nature in above text without referral to Dept.

2. Date: USDel should propose resumption of multilateral disarmament negotiations after UN General Assembly and should suggest January 23 as suitable time.

3. Tactics: USDel should seek to emphasize informal character of meetings by increased use of small informal drafting sessions in place of on the record presentation of prepared speeches. No firm terminal date for discussions should be set at this time but USDel should indicate to Sovs US hope reach agreement prior to UNGA. In absence agreement US should seek clear definition remaining issues by that time. Department considering possibility your handing Sov Aide-Mémoire which will-establish record.

FYI

Our willingness to resume bilateral disarmament talks in New York will help maintain our posture of reasonableness. However, since the Soviets are now in a highly vulnerable propaganda position we should not repeat not make any undue or unnecessary concessions in order to achieve agreement on principles. The pressure is on the Soviets to make a basic change in their position and we should stand essentially on the same statement of principles as have been previously given to the Soviet Union or on the above modified version which contains only minimal changes of a non-fundamental character. In the present context of Berlin and Soviet testing an agreement on principles would tend to confuse public opinion and be a sham rather than reality. If the Soviets make fundamental concessions, we of course will have to review the situation.

Re forum, our four proposals make excellent record. While we will have to refer to all, delegation should emphasize Disarmament Commission, or 5–5–10 as sub-committee of D.C., as best and most stable kind of arrangement.

Rusk

1. Guidance for September 6 disarmament discussions with Soviets. Confidential. 6 pp. Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/9–261.