Frank, forgive this rather long and rambling discourse, but as you know
my heart’s in the right place. I see your report on MAP/AID
coordination as the charter you need to bring MAP under control, and am anxious to give all the help I
can.
Attachment
May 2,
1962
SUBJECT
- AID Draft on Methods for
Improving the Coordination of Military and Economic Aid
Programs
Our meeting on April 30, and the preliminary agency comments, all
convince me that the exercise called for in NSC Action 2447 is of crucial importance. In effect,
the purpose of the exercise is to give the AID Coordinator the necessary
tools to do his job. Without these tools we will not get
the unified and optimized overall aid program which the
Administration seeks. Therefore I feel that we should take the time
necessary to refine the draft report, assimilate the experience of
the Greek, Turkish and Korean restudies and achieve inter-agency
consensus if possible.
Viewed in the above light, Charles Wolf’s draft marks a definite step
forward. While one may cavil with some of his ideas, in general he
seems on the right track. For example, his three suggestions for
meshing the MAP and AID planning and programming cycles
seem non-controversial; as essential groundwork for any coordination
process, perhaps they should be carried out as soon as feasible,
without waiting on the rest.
However, I believe that the report needs to be strengthened in
several respects.
1. Most important, the basic objective toward which we are working is
to devise techniques and machinery for achieving the best possible
[Typeset Page 1673]
“mix”
of total US aid, military and economic. To this end we want to unify
foreign aid planning as much as possible, while preserving the
freedom of the agencies concerned with various aspects of US aid to
make the case for their own programs. Hence I feel that how to get
the best “mix” should be the central theme of the report and more
fully developed.
2. On this score, I feel that the so-called “high-low” approach to
constructing alternative “mixes” is, despite the many complexities
involved, the best available technique for assessing the pros and
cons of various options open to us. Admittedly, it is as yet a very
rough technique, which we’ll have to refine as we go along. But only
by presenting alternative program options can we get a rational
framework for choice.
“High-low” of course is a misnomer. What we really mean by “low” is
the minimum program the US could support
without taking wholly unacceptable military or political risks. By
high we mean the optimum
[Facsimile Page 3]
program
we would like to undertake within the constraints of available local
resources and absorptive capacity. In effect the MAAG would outline both what it would
really like and what it could get along with if it had to. So would
the USOM. Then we can have a
useful dialogue as to which program we want to optimise and which to
try to carry at minimum ongoing cost.
In some cases, we may want to optimize both the MAP and AID programs (Turkey may be one); in others we may want
to “carry” a country at minimums on both. In yet other cases we may
want to split the difference in some way. Moreover, we always want
to retain flexibility to shift emphasis from one country to another,
if there is a case for doing so. For these reasons, while agreeing
with Bill Bundy’s point that “high” and “low” military and economic
programs will seldom be of similar dollar magnitudes I don’t see
this as a bar to the “alternatives” approach.
3. The paper as presently drafted confines itself primarily to
techniques for coordinating MAP and
AID programs; it is very lean
on the bureaucratic machinery needed to ensure that these techniques
are effectively carried out and that the inevitable differences
which will arise are suitably aired and resolved. For example, what
happens after the two planning and programming cycles are meshed,
and a number of alternative mixes for MAP and AID programs
have been proposed? What machinery is there for adjudicating these
differences and if necessary pushing them up the line for decision?
This is of course the function of the Coordinator, but I would like
to see this function spelled out so that everyone would have it
clearly in mind. It might run as follows: (1) PRCS would prepare a
list of issues arising from the comparison of MAP and AID programs, etc.—this list with its recommendations
[Typeset Page 1674]
for
solution would be sent to the Coordinator; (2) the Coordinator would
rule on these issues, after suitable hearings; (3) If AID, State, or DOD still objected to certain of his
decisions, the Coordinator would submit these issues to the
Secretaries of State and Defense jointly; and (4) if unresolved at
that level, they would be taken to the President.
Therefore, the report should have a section on machinery for carrying
out coordination.
Equally important is adequate machinery for achieving prior agreement
on overall program guidelines before each five year guidance is sent
to the field. I regard this as a very important exercise, because
[Facsimile Page 4]
it
tends to set the pattern for the annual program cycle. Yet, while
AID and DOD each devote great effort to
working out the guidelines for their own programs (and Congressional
presentations), any impression is that all too little time is spent
on the inter-relationships between these programs. The
“alternatives” approach to key countries would almost force a more
meaningful exercise along these lines.
4. Shouldn’t greater emphasis be placed on the role of the country
team in doing the first stage analysis of the optimum mix desired in
a given country. We want the Ambassador himself to consider
meaningful choices between MAP and
AID inputs and to render the
initial judgments. But we will not be able to get him to do so
unless he has real reason to believe that if he opts for a road
instead of a Hawk battalion he’ll have a fair chance of getting it.
None of the techniques for developing
meaningful alternatives will be worth a hoot unless we actually
decide back here to pursue one or the other in a few key cases,
and thus prove we mean what we say. But perhaps I’m putting
the cart before the horse.
5. The AID report should specify when the recommendations are to be put into
effect. I gather that there is some testing this should not be done
before the FY ’65 planning cycle.
Shouldn’t we at least consider moving up the date for the meshing of
the planning cycles to FY ’60
instead of trying to take everything in one big [illegible in the
original]. We should begin moving as soon as possible in the
directions suggested by the report.
6. More emphasis might be given to expounding the essential rationale
for MAP and AID coordination which underlies the
report. Pages 6–9 of Wolf’s draft make a good start but could be
somewhat beefed up.
7. Finally, while AID ought to be
allowed the time to do the job right, an interim report would be
useful to show that you’re moving and to keep the momentum. It will
relieve the pressure for an early final report, and justify your
taking another two months or so. Propose a new final deadline and
we’ll concur.
