368. Letter from Bowles to Goodwin, March 181

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Dear Dick:

I am concerned about the lack of a sense of urgency and importance in the present draft of the President’s message on foreign aid. While it adequately explains the serious need for improved organization of our aid operations, for long-range planning, and for clear concepts and more effective operations in the handling of the aid programs, I feel that it fails to put these ideas in a framework that reflects the challenge which we face.

More specifically, I am concerned that the message as drafted does not make clear to the American people the appalling problems we face in the lesser developed areas of the world, and the fundamental adjustments in the dimensions and direction of our policies which must be made if America is to remain a major influence in world affairs.

Most Americans are pretty well aware of the tremendous importance of the military challenge from the Soviet Union and Communist China, which we are now moving to meet more effectively. In the longer run, however, I believe that the future of Western civilization is more likely to be determined by political and economic considerations, and I think the political and economic challenge at this moment is even more acute and in many ways more difficult to deal with than the military challenge.

Our task is made more difficult by the fact that most Americans are only dimly aware of the proportions of the revolution in the lesser [Typeset Page 1570] developed half of the world—the dimensions of the needs and demands—the critical importance of the time factor—and its implications for the future of our own society.

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I believe they are unaware of the fact that time is running rapidly against us unless we are able to offer substantial assistance quickly in meeting the demands and needs of the lesser developed nations.

Up until the present time the Soviet Union and Communist China have contributed smaller resources to the lesser developed areas than we have. However, with the growing economic power of the Communist societies, these resources are rapidly increasing.

Furthermore, because of their controlled economies, the Communist governments have proved capable of using their limited resources with considerable effectiveness, by applying them selectively in critical situations.

In the case of Cuba, for example, we contributed approximately $10 million a year to Cuban economic development over a period of years, while the Soviet Union, since the beginning of the Castro regime, is committing more than $500 million.

I am well aware of the limitations on the size of this year’s aid request, including the balance of payments problem and the desire to keep the budget within bounds. However, unless we move immediately to inform the American people about the nature of the position we are facing, I fear it will become impossible to do so at a later date.

If we want an adequate aid program in the years ahead, we must begin now to help the people and the Congress to understand the real nature of the situation we are facing and the initial significance of the decisions we are making.

I know there are many who believe that the American people are incapable of understanding, much less meeting, the challenge. They say that the economic needs of the lesser developed areas are too tremendous—that the Communist economic offensive is too enormous and fierce. They say that we cannot possibly persuade the Congress and the people to commit the resources required.

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Yet our present-day skeptics are no more vociferous or determined than these who opposed F.D.R. in 1941 when he proposed the Lend Lease program and Truman when he proposed the Marshall Plan. By clearly describing the challenge and the response necessary to meet it, they demonstrated that large ideas are easier to sell the American people than small ones.

I strongly suspect that if the Marshall Plan had been limited to two or three countries and perhaps a half billion dollars, it would never have been approved by the Congress.

I think our responsibility is to put the full facts and their implications to them clearly and to ask the right questions.

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I believe the speech is now cast in a rather low key and that it deals too much with technical considerations which are likely to be more appealing to professionals than to the general public.

I would like to see the entire speech emphasize points which I have made in this letter, with a broad, bold sweep which will help us to capture the public imagination.

As a minimum, I suggest a new introduction to the speech, together with a few other specific moderations in its text, which I am attaching to this letter.

It is impossible for me to overestimate the importance I attach to this matter. I believe that the future history of this country and the world may well depend upon the boldness of our concepts at this critical moment and upon our ability to communicate these concepts widely. If we fail to do so now, when the President’s popularity is so great, I seriously doubt we will be able to do so in 1962, 1963, or 1964.

I have written frankly, as I know you would want me to do.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles
  1. Concerns about present draft of President’s message on foreign aid. No classification marking. 3 pp. Department of State, Central Files, 700.5–MSP/3–1861.