34. Telegram 1387 to Geneva, August 151
Dept agrees your suggestion contained SUPNU 1733 for proposal to formalize procedure for consulting on threshold question at end of moratorium period. Proposal along lines you suggest should be worked into statement on moratorium.
Dept wishes lay basis for best possible US position to deal with expected Sov attack on our moratorium position in forthcoming GA, which Sovs probably count upon as being vulnerable enough to avoid GA focusing to its disadvantage on Sov position on administrative council and inspection quota. Accordingly opening statement which USDEL is drafting for first session should include review of development of moratorium idea, pointing out how Sovs accepted threshold treaty concept and themselves proposed moratorium. Statement should stress that combined threshold treaty-moratorium-research program proposal was constructive and imaginative way to surmount impasse reached due on the one hand to US unwillingness on principle [Facsimile Page 2] accept treaty obligation not to test in areas we knew beyond shadow of doubt were out of reach of Geneva control system and on the other to Sov unwillingness contemplate changes in Geneva control system despite its recognized inadequacy to police total test ban.
USDEL should state that if this solution to problem no longer acceptable to Sovs (as is indicated by their attack on moratorium), US prepared consider with SOVDEL methods of immediately extending control system to lower threshold level or entirely to eliminate threshold. Statement should stress that US objective is and has always been ending of all tests under adequate control and that moratorium arrangement or threshold treaty for its own sake is not US objective. USDEL should reiterate US view of interrelationship among 1) number of control posts 2) number of inspections, and 3) level of threshold. USDEL should refer to possibility relocating present number control posts to provide for greater density in seismic areas as one method which might improve capability for detection and identification underground events. (Dept assessing effect of widening of spacing in aseismic areas on system capabilities with respect high altitude detection). With such relocation present threshold of 4.75 could no doubt be lowered. If stations were relocated and additional stations included in system, level of threshold could be lowered, probably to level envisaged by [Typeset Page 123] 1958 experts. Adding sufficient unmanned seismic stations to Geneva network is another [Facsimile Page 3] possibility and would allow for complete elimination of any threshold and possibly aid in reducing number of inspections needed.
If Sovs prepared examine such solutions to underground test control problem, US fully prepared to negotiate changes in treaty which might eliminate threshold. If Sovs unprepared, however, contemplate any change in present control system which their scientists as well as ours know to be inadequate for identification small underground tests, Sovs and not US must bear responsibility for preventing achievement comprehensive treaty from outset. US prepared to consider any alternative proposals which Sovs might make in this connection in order demonstrate to Sovs and to world that it is prepared exert utmost efforts to reach earliest possible comprehensive agreement barring any and all nuclear weapons tests. Short of Sov willingness reconsider its position on controls, however, threshold treaty and limited moratorium arrangement to allow for further research program seems to US to be best solution present situation. Nevertheless we are willing listen to any better ideas which Sovs might have and which are consistent with objective of agreement on cessation of all nuclear weapons tests under system of effective international controls, which Sovs have espoused as their objective since the beginning.
We are also considering tabling text of amendment to treaty which would require lowering of threshold at end of moratorium [Facsimile Page 4] period and incorporate same provision as to feasibility and basis for right to terminate we now have in provisions for outer space even though some scientists continue somewhat pessimistic about overcoming decoupling problem. If we do not make such moves however neutralists resolution calling for end to all testing regardless of agreement on controls may receive substantial vote in general visceral reaction all testing is bad.
Above will be discussed tomorrow or Friday with President. Request USDEL comments soonest.
- Negotiating guidance on threshold question at end of moratorium period. Secret. 4 pp. Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611–GE/8–1161.↩