Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

292. Memorandum from McNamara to President Kennedy, May 27¹

May 27, 1963

SUBJECT

• Free World Tactical Air Capabilities (U)

As a result of your memorandum of November 9, 1962, we have again re-examined the adequacy of our tactical air forces for nonnuclear conflict. I thought it would be best to delay my reply to the questions you have raised until I could carefully review all the pertinent data and particularly the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As the Chiefs pointed out to me, the problem of tactical air power cannot be divorced from the over-all problem of our military posture generally. They correctly note that “the air situation in a military operation must be judged in conjunction with that of the ground and naval forces. Without considering the complementary capabilities of all forces to deal with the broad range of threats, it is impossible to arrive at a specific requirement for any single weapon system such as a fighter aircraft.” The Chiefs also noted that even with regard to tactical aircraft, alone, other critical factors such as airfields and the disposition of the aircraft on those fields, the availability of trained pilots and support personnel, other means of air defense, electronics countermeasures, logistics support, POL and munitions must also be taken into account in evaluating the adequacy of our tactical air power.

With all of these factors in mind, I believe it is fair to say that we have sufficient tactical aircraft programmed to cope with the kinds of military conflicts we are likely to encounter anywhere in the world. NATO Europe offers certain special problems: vulnerability of the aircraft on the ground and the lack of nonnuclear logistical readiness; however, these problems cannot be solved by simply increasing our procurement of tactical aircraft. The procurement schedules incorporated in our fiscal year 1963 and 1964 budgets and the procurement programmed for the next few years will, in my judgment, assure a significant over-all qualitative and quantitative tactical aircraft advantage over the Sino-Soviet Bloc for the foreseeable future, providing the Bloc does not reverse the downward trend of its tactical aircraft force levels.

We have, of course, greatly increased our planned procurement of tactical aircraft over the number I reported to you in my memorandum of September 24, 1962, to which you refer in your memorandum of November 9, 1962. We previously planned on procurring 1,892 F–4 and RF–4 tactical aircraft for the Air Force and Navy; we now plan on 2,845, the increment being for the purpose of modernizing the Air Force, and increasing its reconnaissance capability. And, as you know, we are also starting the development of an even more advanced tactical aircraft, the F–111 (TFX), for both the Air Force and the Navy. As shown in Table I below, we have substantially increased the procurement of tactical and interceptor aircraft for modernization over the 1961 level, especially the higher performance aircraft.

TABLE I

TACTICAL/INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT BY FISCAL YEAR

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
F–111A/B					10	70
RF–111A						2
F–4A/B	72	147	123	132	132	132
F–4C		1	307	343	336	336
RF–4B/C		2	24	141	188
F–105	180	231	107
A–5 (A3J)	42	20	23	8
F–8E (F8U–2NE)	94	102	90
Subtotal—higher performance A/c	388	503	674	624	666	540
A–4C/E (A4D–2N/5)	180	200	180	120	120	120
EA/A–6A (A2F–1/1H)	12	24	55	60	57	48
TOTAL	580	727	909	804	843	708

In evaluating the adequacy of our over-all tactical force levels, we must take into account not only U.S. and Soviet forces but all tactical aircraft that are likely to be available to both the Free world and the Communist Bloc, now and over the next several years. While we know our own force projections and production schedules, we do not know as much about the plans of our Allies, and we have very little hard intelligence on what the countries of the Communist Bloc are likely to do in the next five years. Nevertheless, based on the best information available, the Free World and the Sino-Soviet Bloc are almost matched today in numbers of tactical aircraft assigned to operational units, and the United States and its Allies have a distinct edge over the Bloc with regard to quality and performance as shown in Table II.

A detailed analysis of the relative capabilities of the tactical air forces of the Free World and the Sino-Soviet Bloc is available if you wish further information on this subject.

Robert S. McNamara

TABLE II

WORLD-WIDE SINO SOVIET AND FREE WORLD TACTICAL AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED TO OPERATIONAL UNITS

	1963		1965		1968
Fighter/Interceptor1	U.S. & Allies	Sino Soviet Bloc	U.S. & Allies	Sino Soviet Bloc	U.S. & Allies	Sino Soviet Bloc
Advanced	214	20	797	400	2,044	1,820
Current	4,013	3,280	5,211	3,915	4,698	3,005
Obsolescent	5,101	7,950	2,723	5,195	2,143	2,375
Lt. Bombers & Prop	1,004	900	763	300	632	—
Asian Air Forces2	1,232	xx	1,162	xx	1,120	xx
TOTAL	11,564	12,150	10,656	9,810	10,637	7,200
Rev. Total3		12,965		10,590		6,980

1

U.S. and Allied	Soviet Bloc
Advanced: F–111, F–4B/C, Lightning	Advanced: TF–66, AW–65, Fiddler, Flipper
Current: F–105, A–5, F–100D, CF–100, F–104D, F–101, F–102, F–3, 8, 6, Mirage 111, F–5A	Current: Fitter, Fishbed (Mig 21), Firebar A, Farmer (Mig 19), Fishpot, Firebar B
Obsolescent: F–84F, F–86H, A–4, G–91, Sabre, Scimitar, Hunter	Obsolescent: Fresco, Fagot, Flashlight
Lt. Bombers & Prop: B–57, B–66, A–3, A–6A, P2V, Canberra, Lancaster	Lt. Bombers & Prop: Beagle

2 See Appendix, Table 8, for break-out by country.

3 Based on NIE 11–4–63, approved March 22, 1963. The NIE showed minor variations in Sino-Soviet operational totals (7 per cent increase in 1963, 8 per cent increase in 1965, 3 per cent decrease in 1968), and that the Soviets are introducing somewhat fewer advanced type aircraft into operational inventories while retaining older aircraft longer. I agree with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the variations noted do not warrant revision of the tables.

Attachment

ANALYSIS OF TACTICAL AIR CAPABILITIES
OF FREE WORLD AND SINO-SOVIET BLOC

In addition to the roughly 11,500 aircraft shown on Table II for the U.S. and Allies, there are approximately 5,000 tactical combat aircraft used for combat crew training and in the logistics pipeline. The corresponding number of such aircraft in the Sino-Soviet Bloc is unknown. While we are reasonably certain that no training aircraft are included in the 12,150 aircraft shown for the Sino-Soviet Bloc, we are by no means sure that the logistics pipeline aircraft are wholly excluded. From a preliminary review of the method by which intelligence on Bloc aircraft is collected, I do not believe that we can really distinguish between combat aircraft in operational units and those in the logistics pipeline. If we have indeed counted logistics pipeline aircraft in the Sino-Soviet Bloc total, we have understated the comparable figures for the Free World by approximately 3,000 aircraft, or about 25 per cent. In that case, the U.S. and our Allies may actually have about 20 per cent more tactical aircraft than the Bloc at the present time.

With regard to the future, it would appear that the Free World may have a slight numerical advantage by 1965 and a numerical superiority of almost 50 per cent by 1968. I should caution, however, that the 1968 figures for the Sino-Soviet Bloc are highly conjectural, considering the production leadtimes involved. The number of tactical aircraft the Sino-Soviet Bloc will have in operational units in 1968 depends upon decisions which may not yet have been made, and which need not be made until two years from now. Indeed, the estimated downward trend in the level of Soviet fighter forces could be reversed either through retention of currently active aircraft, by continuing production of aircraft longer than now estimated, by introducing new aircraft in quantity, or by a combination of these options. A complete reversal would be very difficult economically, but some reaction is probable in response to the buildup of U.S. tactical capabilities. Nevertheless, the best available information we now have on Bloc aircraft production, the age distribution of aircraft now in operational units, etc., indicates that the size of their operational force will decline substantially over the next five years.

Numbers of aircraft, alone, of course, are not the sole measure of effective air power. Equally important is the quality of performance of the aircraft. As shown in the tabulation above, the Free World now has a distinct advantage in this regard over the Sino-Soviet Bloc and, if our projections turn out to be correct, this margin of qualitative superiority will be considerably widened over the next five years.

Soviet tactical aircraft design appears to emphasize air defense and close support of ground forces in the manner of the World War II “Blitzkrieg”. For these support missions, immediate responsiveness to the demands of the ground forces may be more important to the Soviet thinking than large bomb loads or combat ranges.

U.S. tactical forces have been developed to accomplish the entire spectrum of tactical tasks, but have particularly emphasized the long range interdiction and counter-air missions. To achieve these long ranges, external fuel is carried on multiple (usually 4 or 5) fuselage and wing pylons. These same pylons can be used for carrying ordnance instead of fuel thereby increasing operational flexibility particularly in the close support role. Most Soviet aircraft have only two pylons. However, it may be possible for the Soviet Bloc to modify their aircraft to provide more pylons or multiple racks. Some representative examples of aircraft of comparable performance capability are listed below:

(1) In the advanced class, the F–4C, if used as an interceptor with four SPARROW III missiles has a combat radius of 280 miles at a maximum speed of 1350 knots. The FLIPPER, its Soviet counterpart, is slightly faster (1450 knots) but has a combat radius of only 100 NM at maximum speed. The F–4C, if used as a fighter-bomber, can only be compared with the Soviet FIDDLER, which has far less speed capability (900 knots) but has 10 per cent more combat radius at the same payload. Of course, both aircraft are subsonic with external ordnance. The F–4C has a combat radius of 325 NM with a 12,000 lbs payload, while the FIDDLER is estimated to be limited to only 2,200 lbs. In the dual fighter/interceptor role, the F–4C has no single counterpart in the Soviet inventory.

(2) Of the current aircraft, the F–105 can be compared with the FITTER and the FISHBED in speed capability; however, these aircraft have far less combat radius (67 per cent for the FITTER and 41 per cent for the FISHBED). The FIREBAR A, the primary Soviet tactical fighter-bomber aircraft, cannot match the F–105 in speed and again has only 66 per cent of its combat radius.

(3) In the older class of aircraft, the F–84 and the A–4 (A4D) have comparable maximum speeds but exceed the range of the FRESCO and FAGOT by a factor of three to five.

Table 1 of the Annex to this memorandum provides a more detailed breakdown of tactical aircraft assigned to operational units, Free World versus the Sino-Soviet Bloc, for the three years, 1963, 1965, and 1968. Table 2 shows the aircraft models included in each category. Table 3 shows the performance characteristics of the more important U.S. and Soviet tactical aircraft models. Table 4 provides a breakout of Sino-Soviet Bloc tactical aircraft by category and model for the three years, 1963, 1965, and 1968, and Table 5 shows the production estimates related to these force projections. Table 6 provides a breakout by category and model for U.S. and European Allied air forces and Table 7 shows U.S. production related to these force projections. Table 8 provides a summary of Free World Asian tactical air forces.

Although a direct comparison of U.S. and USSR tactical air capabilities is not as meaningful as a comparison between NATO and Warsaw Pact air forces, it is useful in bringing out the relative efforts being made by the two principal antagonists. As shown below, the United States today has almost 50 per cent more tactical fighters and light bombers than the USSR, but the USSR has 50 per cent more air defense interceptors. (A more detailed breakdown is provided in Table 9 in the Annex.)

TABLE III

U.S. & USSR TACTICAL AND AIR DEFENSE AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED TO OPERATIONAL UNITS

		1963		1965		1968
Category	Mission	U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR
		Tactical Aircraft Fighter
I, II	Advanced	—	—	425	100	1359	700
III, IV, V	Current	1564	1175	1734	1300	1204	700
VI	Obsolescent	1449	925	1167	300	912	—
VII	Lt. Bomber & Prop.	681	400	538	—	545	—
	TOTAL	3694	2500	3864	1700	4020	1400
		Air Defense Interceptor
I, II	Advanced	177	20	309	300	525	1100
III, IV, V	Current	1950	1225	1696	1425	1466	800
VI	Obsolescent	373	2655	325	1175	325	—
	TOTAL	2500	3900	2330	2900	2316	1900
		Total Aircraft Fighter/Interceptor
I, II	Advanced	177	20	734	400	1884	1800
III, IV, V	Current	3514	2400	3430	2725	2670	1500
VI	Obsolescent	1822	3580	1492	1475	1237	—
VII	Lt. Bomber & Prop.	681	400	538	—	545	—
	TOTAL Aircraft	6194	6400	6194	4600	6336	3300

In total we are about even. However, in terms of modernization we are far ahead of the USSR in both tactical aircraft and air defense interceptors. Over the next five years our margin of superiority in tactical fighters and light bombers is estimated to increase and by 1968 current intelligence projections suggest that we may have three times as many aircraft in these categories as the USSR. In the case of air defense interceptors, by 1968 we should have a substantial numerical margin, although the USSR could have a qualitative margin at that time. This is, of course, highly conjectural since we cannot be sure whether the USSR will actually produce the number of advanced interceptors reflected in the above tabulations. There is no evidence of any development or production tooling to support the estimate of the 570 advanced interceptors and 580 advanced tactical fighters which are assumed to be in production beginning in 1964.

As I noted earlier, the area of principal concern with regard to tactical air power is NATO Europe. But here the problem is complicated by the fact that U.S. air forces must be planned in context with other NATO air forces in that area, and indeed in context with the entire military situation there, particularly the status of the ground forces. In that connection, I reported to you last year in my memorandum on the General Purpose Forces:

While the forces proposed will not provide adequate nonnuclear forces for NATO, the remedies lie primarily with the other NATO countries rather than with a major increase in U.S. forces. Although the political obstacles loom large, and many of the deficiencies require considerable time to overcome, I think we can demonstrate to our Allies that the NATO nonnuclear inferiority stems from specific remediable deficiencies.

Elsewhere in that memorandum I pointed out that to carry out the forward strategy desired by SACEUR, a substantial number of M-Day units should be relocated and others provided with means for more rapid deployment. This strategy cannot be implemented without air superiority and effective tactical air support.

Although the problem in Europe involves much more than the adequacy of our tactical air power, we may be far better off in that regard than we are with regard to ground forces. As indicated in Table IV below, the NATO nations now have in Europe a total of about 5,100 tactical aircraft, including interceptors, compared with about 3,850 for the Warsaw Pact countries, including interceptors in the Satellite countries. U.S. and USSR interceptors for Homeland air defense have been excluded since their use would degrade strategic capabilities.

The margin in our favor is likely to be maintained through 1965 and may widen considerably by 1968. If both sides were to deploy tactical aircraft from their respective homelands into the theater of operations, this advantage should still prevail or even increase. However, because of their geographical position, the Soviets could probably move their aircraft forward more quickly and more clandestinely than we could. Nonetheless, even if the Soviets were able to get all of their deployable aircraft into the theater of operations before we were able to deploy any of our own, which is highly unlikely in view of our ability to move over 600 aircraft to Europe within 7 days, NATO would still have a small quantitative advantage over the Warsaw Pact countries during 1963, and both a quantitative and qualitative advantage in 1965. By 1968, this over-all superiority could be very substantial, as shown in Table IV.

TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF NATO REGION AND U.S. DEPLOYABLE AIRCRAFT WITH SOVIET BLOC AIR FORCES1
EUROPEAN CONFLICT

				NATO Forces			Soviet Bloc Air Forces
	In-Place			Deployable US Aircraft2	Total NATO		In-Place			Deployable USSR Aircraft	Total Warsaw Pact
Allied	US	Total					Pact	USSR	Total
						1963
Fighter/Interceptors
Advanced	37	24	61	60	121		—	—	—	—	—
Current	439	754	1193	711	1904		615	525	1140	540	1680
Obsolescent	3279	120	3399	485	3884		2035	405	2440	425	2865
Light Bombers	312	129	441	128	569		150	125	275	75	350
Total	4067	1027	5094	1384	6478		2800	1055	3855	1040	4895
						1965
Fighter/Interceptors
Advanced	63	133	196	256	452		—	45	45	45	90
Current	1721	639	2360	771	3131		650	610	1160	580	1740
Obsolescent	1231	48	1279	407	1686		1760	145	1905	135	2040
Light Bombers	225	78	303	143	446		100	—	100	—	100
Total	3240	898	4138	1577	5715		2510	800	3210	760	3970
Fighter/Interceptors
Advanced	160	492	652	704	1356		10	420	430	280	710
Current	2038	353	2381	512	2893		640	380	1020	200	1220
Obsolescent	906	48	954	282	1236		1150	—	1150	—	1150
Light Bombers	87	48	135	119	254		—	—	—	—	—
Total	3181	941	4122	1617	5739		1800	800	2600	480	3080

1 Excludes US and USSR Homeland air defense aircraft. Some portion of the USSR air defense west of Urals (1365 in 1963, 1100 in 1965, 565 in 1968) could be employed against Allied aircraft penetrating Polish air space at the expense of a degraded strategic posture.

2 Numbers provided by JCS.

Table 10, in the Annex, provides a detailed breakdown of the Soviet Bloc air forces available for a European conflict. Table 11 provides a similar breakdown for the NATO forces. Table 12 provides further detail on U.S. deployable aircraft.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated that 2,411 U.S. aircraft could be committed in 1963 to Europe with 90 days strategic warning. This includes 1,027 U.S. aircraft in place in Europe, augmented by an additional 1,384 aircraft deployable from CONUS.

Such a commitment of only 50 per cent of our deployable aircraft assures us of a significant strategic reserve, particularly when compared to the Soviet commitment in Europe of between 84 per cent and 92 per cent of deployable aircraft. The remaining 2,300 to 2,500 U.S. aircraft in operating units, together with the 1,500 aircraft of our Pacific Allies, should be more than adequate to counter the 2,000 to 3,000 Chinese Communist and North Korean aircraft, of which 90 per cent are obsolescent and considerably inferior to our tactical forces.

Although, over-all, including deployable aircraft, NATO now has and probably will continue to have a qualitative as well as quantitative advantage, the qualitative advantage derives primarily from U.S. efforts. By 1968, the Warsaw Pact is estimated to have 710 advanced type tactical aircraft out of a total of 3,080 tactical aircraft, or about 23 per cent. For the U.S., 1,359 out of 4,020 or 34 per cent will be of advanced types. However, at that time only 160 out of 3,181, or 5 per cent, of the non-U.S. NATO aircraft are now programmed to be of advanced types. About one-third of the Allied (non-U.S.) aircraft planned to be in the inventory in 1968 are considered obsolescent by today’s standards.

The only aircraft to be produced in large numbers for Allied countries is the F–104G, constituting 34 per cent of the planned Allied air forces in 1968. This aircraft, which had its first flight in 1954 and which was last procured by the U.S. in fiscal year 1957, will probably not be able to meet the threat of Soviet attack aircraft of the 1968 time period. Its military effectiveness is restricted by its short range and limited ordnance carrying capability. The very limited radar range and the lack of all weather intercept capability limits its usefulness in the European environment where close ground control of the SAGE type is not available and cloud cover is prevalent.

Only 109 F–104’s are left in the active U.S. forces. However, our European Allies plan to procure 1,300 of these aircraft between 1961 and 1965. To date, approximately 220 have been produced. Although the F–104 is cheaper than the F–4C, the effectiveness of NATO air forces could be increased through procurement of smaller numbers of a more effective aircraft. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated, “For modernization, we might encourage military assistance sales of F–4C’s for our NATO allies.” Nevertheless, the F–104G program was undertaken about four or five years ago with the encouragement of the United States, and the European Consortium is only now beginning to work smoothly. This problem will require more study and discussion with our Allies.

Quite apart from numbers of aircraft and their operational capabilities, the nonnuclear capabilities of NATO air forces are seriously deficient because of three critical factors. These factors can be changed much more easily and quickly than the number and performance of aircraft, and should be given a high priority by both ourselves and our Allies. The causes of our weaknesses in nonnuclear air capability in NATO are:

(1) The vulnerability of aircraft on the ground;

(2) The lack of nonnuclear logistics preparedness; and,

(3) The requirement to be responsive to both nuclear and nonnuclear tactical air operations.

Although our tactical air forces are now and will increasingly be larger and better equipped than the Warsaw Pact forces, several recent war games and studies on nonnuclear conflict in Europe have concluded that the enemy could achieve air superiority in one to three days, with or without tactical warning even if we were to initiate pre-emptive attack. The principal reason is, of course, the vulnerability of our bases and aircraft to enemy air attack. Our active air defenses in Europe are just barely adequate against high altitude targets and are very incomplete and very inadequate against low flying aircraft. There are no active air defense missile or gun systems in local defense of our airfields and almost no passive defense measures are now being practiced. In view of the fact that our main operating bases in Europe are located within 7 to 25 minutes flight time from forward enemy bases, it is not surprising that a very large part of the NATO air forces in Europe could be destroyed on the ground in a surprise attack with little loss to the attacking force and without the use of nuclear warheads or surface-to-surface missiles.

I believe that the theater commanders can, within their own resources, effect some reduction in the vulnerability of our forces. Major improvement will require funds in addition to the $30 million provided in the FY 1964 budget for aircraft shelters for protection against nonnuclear attack. I have requested the Air Force to conduct a detailed study of additional required measures and expect a final report by October 1, 1963. I recognize that effective protective measures will have manpower and balance of payments implications. We will keep these to a minimum. However, in view of the very large investment in personnel and matériel now unprotected, I believe we must face up to this issue.

In reply to your specific question, aircraft attrition under future combat conditions is indeed difficult to estimate. The average World War II fighter attrition was 0.9 per cent per sortie (9 losses per 1,000 sorties). Korean jet fighter (F–80, F–84, F–86) attrition averaged 0.3 per cent per sortie. However, historical data may not be a reliable guide in view of vastly improved air defense environments and ordnance. Any future conflict in Europe probably will lead to attrition rates greatly exceeding those previously experienced.

As high as attrition rates are likely to be, we must insure that: (1) enemy attrition rates are at least as high; and (2) enemy aircraft production acceleration capability is no greater than ours. We must take additional steps to assure that the enemy’s inventory will decline as rapidly or more rapidly than ours, thus at least denying him air superiority. Second, we must increase our capacity to rapidly accelerate production in order to prevent his gaining air superiority at some later date. These measures promise to produce far more capability per dollar for sustained nonnuclear operations than a peacetime expansion of forces or of production.

The ability of our forces to sustain operations in an overseas theater is as much a function of logistics support and command and control as it is of numbers of aircraft and the ability to deploy.

Current USAFE plans provide for the use of 17 bases, and 15 are presently being used by U.S. forces. In addition, there are 39 bases for which the United States has entry rights or which otherwise could be made available. Thus, a sufficient number of airfields exists to accommodate about 2,200 U.S. land-based aircraft.

While these bases are capable of accepting sizeable tactical forces, they are not now equipped logistically to support such forces on a sustained basis. While tactical squadrons deploy with fly-away kits containing sufficient spare parts for 30 days consumption, they must rely upon the deployment area for fuel, war consumables, support equipment and communications. These are critical factors in continuous operations. Adequate pre-stockage of nonnuclear ordnance and other war consumables is not now available in Europe. Assuming free interchangeability between bases and depots, there is enough modern ordnance available to permit about five sorties per aircraft, and even including obsolete ordnance, there is enough for only about 40 sorties per aircraft. (Further details are provided in Table 13 of the Appendix.) This situation will improve as a result of the increased procurement funded since fiscal year 1962, but much more needs to be done.

The nonnuclear readiness position of our NATO Allies is much worse. For example, as of January 1, 1963, they had only 38,000 units of nonnuclear ordnance, almost all of which are obsolete napalm and World War II or Korean vintage general purpose bombs. Some countries report little or no stocks. None report any modern ordnance such as CBU and BULLPUP which we are buying in large quantities and which greatly reduce the number of sorties required to destroy a given number of targets. It appears that, at best, our Allies can support only about 10 sorties per tactical aircraft with the ordnance reported, even assuming free interchangeability between countries.

Another fundamental problem in NATO is the requirement to be responsive to both nuclear and nonnuclear tactical air operations, i.e., to be dual capable. Over the past decade, the orientation of our tactical forces has placed primary emphasis upon nuclear capabilities. Substantial progress has been made in some areas in realigning these forces. Tactical air forces, especially stimulated by the Cuban crisis, have increased their training and readiness for nonnuclear conflict. In Europe, currently only the 72 U.S. F–84 aircraft located in France are assigned to nonnuclear missions as their primary tasks; and these will return to the U.S. in June 1963. While the remainder of our aircraft are technically dual capable, under current war plans, 12 aircraft in each U.S. wing of 75 are on 15-minute nuclear Quick Reaction Alert (QRA), and an additional 23 aircraft in each U.S. wing are to be nuclear ready in less than 3.5 hours. Under SACEUR’s Nuclear Strike Plan, the balance of the available aircraft are committed to follow-up on secondary nuclear missions. Within the Sixth Fleet, an average of 71 per cent of the deployed carrier-based attack aircraft are committed to nuclear strike operations.

While nuclear commitment does not entirely preclude their use in a conventional role, it is readily apparent that the attention of our air forces overseas is focused primarily on nuclear conflict. At the present time, almost one-half of the NATO committed attack aircraft are planned for employment in the nuclear strike mission and only a little over one-half are available for nonnuclear attack. (See Table 14 in the Appendix.) On the basis of present NATO planning, of the 1,800 attack aircraft expected to be assigned to NATO on 1 January 1965, about three-quarters would be assigned to the nuclear strike mission and only about one-quarter to nonnuclear attack.

I believe that a better balance can be achieved between the nuclear and nonnuclear uses of our tactical air power. As long as tactical aircraft are kept on nuclear alert, or are committed solely to nuclear strike missions, serious limitations in nonnuclear effectiveness have to be accepted. These limitations include reduced nonnuclear training, reduced flexibility in deployment and limitation in ordnance handling and storage. Maintaining aircraft on constant alert imposes a severe additional strain on manpower resources as well as equipment, reducing at the same time their availability for nonnuclear training. For carrier attack force operations, additional problems are generated by the limited storage space, the special handling required for nuclear ordnance, and the deployment restrictions imposed by the timing coordination requirements for nuclear targeted carrier-based aircraft.

In our forward planning, we should consider some shift in the allocation of tactical air to nonnuclear uses, especially since the improvements planned for our Strategic Forces and the increases in NATO mobile missiles (e.g., PERSHING and POLARIS) will enable those forces to take over many, if not most, of the stationary nuclear targets of particular interest to SACEUR in the next two or three years. Soviet mobile missile system targets and targets of opportunity will continue the need for a small amount of tactical air delivery of nuclear weapons. (Table 15 shows the NATO nuclear target list by type, location, and attack force, as of 1 January 1962.) In the interim, we should consider assigning a large portion of our tactical units the primary mission of nonnuclear readiness, with nuclear capabilities retained for a secondary role. This would place proper emphasis on nonnuclear capabilities while retaining flexibility in the use of tactical nuclear weapons. At the same time the primary mission of the units is changed, they should be relieved of their nuclear alert commitments.

In summary, I believe that our current production and force levels will assure us a quantitative and qualitative advantage for the foreseeable future. Our critical weaknesses are in vulnerability on the ground, the lack of nonnuclear logistics readiness, and the conflicting requirement to be responsive to both nuclear and nonnuclear air operations. We have already taken some steps to correct these weaknesses. Other steps are being subjected to detailed analysis.

The broader aspects of our tactical air posture and its readiness for nuclear and nonnuclear conflict will require further study. Within the near future I will forward to you specific recommendations as to what steps need to be taken so that we and our Allies may confront our enemies at any level of provocation with an appropriate military response.

1. McNamara’s comments regarding adequacy of U.S. tactical aircraft capabilities. Attachments provide written analysis and comparison tables. Top Secret; Sensitive. 21 pp. Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 3470, 452 Tactical 1963.