273. Memorandum from Gen. Taylor to President Kennedy, June 221
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In response to your recent request, attached is a memorandum which the
Secretary of Defense, with the assistance of the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the Joint
Staff, has written on the relative US and Soviet military buildups since
January 1961, and on the probable effect of these relative buildups on
Soviet attitudes toward the Berlin situation during the months
ahead.
Secretary McNamara’s covering
memorandum concludes, on balance, that the relative improvement has been
in our favor. It also concludes that, for reasons which include the US
military buildup, the Soviets during the months ahead, although
maintaining a rigid position in negotiations on Berlin, will not make
any serious move to break them off.
There is only one point which I would call to your attention. When we
complete the release of the reserve units later this summer, our overall
military strength figure will fall by about 150,000—from the 2,825,000
which is shown on the last line of Secretary McNamara’s first page to around
2,680,000. This will represent the loss, among other things, of two Army
divisions, some tactical air fighters, and some naval units. Whether
these reductions are to be permanent presumably will be considered in
Secretary McNamara’s current
study on general purpose forces.
You may wish to refer this paper to State for comment.
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Attachment
June 21,
1962
SUBJECT
- US and Soviet Military Buildup and Probable Effects on Berlin
Situation
REFERENCE
- General Taylor’s
Memorandum of 14 June to the Secretary of Defense,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff and Acting Director Central
Intelligence
General Taylor’s memorandum
asked for a comparison of the military buildup of Soviet forces with
that of United States forces over the past eighteen months and for
our views of the probable effect of the current relative strengths
on Soviet attitudes toward the Berlin situation in the coming
months. I shall treat these as two separate but related subjects in
this report which has been prepared with the assistance of the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Staff and Defense
Intelligence Agency and has the concurrence of the Director of
Central Intelligence and the Director, Joint Staff.
Forces Buildup
The size and composition of the USSR’s military forces have been influenced importantly
by Soviet policy decisions of the past year and a half, in which the
Berlin crisis has been an important factor. A programmed reduction
in military manpower and in older air and naval equipment was
underway in 1960 and had cut total military strength to 3,000,000
men in the first part of 1961. In response to our reaction to the
Berlin pressures, the process was reversed in the summer of 1961 by
calling some key reserves and delaying the discharge of conscripts
in the Fall of 1961. We believe that the force level now stands at
about 3.25 to 3.5 million men. The increase in personnel strength
seems to have been used to bring existing units up to strength and
provide needed combat and service support units rather than to raise
the number of divisions. We believe Soviet Army strength is now
approximately 145 divisions, of which 79 are at 70% or higher
strength and have an immediate combat capability. The remaining 66
vary in strength and training status but are essentially cadre units
of 40% or less strength.
During the same period the United States armed forces have been
increased by 325,000 to 2,825,000. More significant
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than the
number is the form which our buildup has taken. We have made a major
increase in operational missiles, both tactical and strategic. We
have filled out skeleton combat units, relieved tactical forces of
basic training missions, added needed support units, reequipped with
modern weapons, increased mobility, improved the alert status of
both strategic and tactical forces, eliminated critical shortages of
equipment, and raised
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forward stockage levels—in sum, we have put
our forces on an increased war readiness basis.
It is difficult to be precise in cataloging specific measures taken
by the Soviets and particularly in determining the timing of their
moves. However, the Soviets have made important qualitative
improvements, notably in mechanizing their ground forces, adding to
their formidable submarine fleet, and in expanding their strategic
nuclear capabilities. Soviet missile capabilities for nuclear
delivery and air defense have continued to increase in the past 18
months, and the tempo of the ICBM
program has quickened. At present, the USSR possesses a ballistic missile force capable of
delivering massive nuclear attacks against targets in the European
area, and a much more limited force of missiles and bombers suitable
for attacking the United States.
In sum, we believe that the measures it has adopted since 1 January
1961 mean that the USSR is now
retaining ground, air, and naval forces at levels higher than
originally planned, while at the same time proceeding with an
expansion of capabilities with advanced weapon systems. But, on
balance, we believe there is no question that the relative
improvement has been in our favor and that the Soviet leadership
knows it. I have attached to this report two annexes, one showing,
for both sides, strengths and changes in personnel and in key
organizations and weapons and another describing measures taken to
improve combat readiness in critical categories.
Implications for Berlin
With reference to Berlin, I feel certain that our improved military
position and our firm response to provocation have had a major
influence on Soviet attitudes. From the beginning Khrushchev has sought to develop
his campaign against Berlin in such a way as to avoid serious risk
of general war. At the same time, he evidently believed that Allied
concern over a military confrontation would lead the West to
compromise its position in Berlin.
While the Soviet leadership has received a firmer reaction than
expected from the West, it has been beset with mounting
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than to
resort to major unilateral action, such as a separate treaty. Most
likely of all is a continuation for the present of the same rigidity
in negotiations without at the same time any serious move to break
them off. While this judgment in the NIE is derived from an interpretation of recent Soviet
behavior, rather than from any significant body of intelligence
data, we feel that it is the best evaluation which can be made at
the present time. The chances are good that there will be a new
round of Berlin harassments, intended primarily to keep pressure on
West Berlin morale and on Western negotiators.
