Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

263. Memorandum from Hughes to Rostow, March 6¹

INR–62

March 6, 1962

SUBJECT

• Comment on the Basic National Security Policy Paper

In response to your request, INR has prepared comments on the draft paper concerning basic national security policy, some of which were reflected in INR comments at the Saturday discussion. Others occur here for the first time. I thought you would be interested both in INR’s composite general observations, and in the specific comments made by Offices within INR, chiefly on sections of the paper that deal with regional areas of responsibility.

Some General Observations

The notion of a world order based upon a community of free nations sharing, or with the capacity eventually to share, political and social values is appealing—it is even necessary—if one posits as the simple, irrevocable alternative a communist world order.

Nonetheless, with respect to vast areas of the underdeveloped world, neither have we as great a capability as the paper supposes to create a community of values between the West and the new states, nor, failing the achievement of such a community, are these areas quite as vulnerable to organization by the Bloc as the paper supposes. The in-between world is just that. For the foreseeable future, it is susceptible of organization by neither side.

We must, of course, discriminate. History and geography afford relatively impressive opportunities for US initiatives to create a durable community of interests and an expanding community of values in Latin America. These opportunities, with isolated exceptions, are not so obviously available in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. In these areas, the notion of an order sponsored by the West is either irrelevant (many of these states are so preoccupied with the creation of a viable national order that they find little meaning in the notion of world order) or suspect (since they are still in the throes of disentangling themselves from the remnants of the old world order—the Western colonial system).

The assertion in the paper that government by consent and respect for individual liberties will play a larger, not smaller, role in the political affairs of non-communist nations in the years ahead bears little relationship to the facts in many parts of Afro-Asia. It could be argued that for the present the trend is exactly the reverse. In any event, one thing seems quite clear. The basic problem which will occupy many parts of Afro-Asia for some time to come is the development within the various states of central power and, with it, the capacity to assemble information and to make and effectuate social decisions.

That these areas are not ready to join the West in a community based on common values does not mean that the Soviet Union enjoys all the advantages. The new nationalism and the balance of weakness in which the impotent quasi-state can preserve a quasi-independence by appealing to either bloc inhibits the Soviet Union from organizing the emergent world as much as the same factors inhibit us.

Moreover, as we recede from the colonial era, intra-regional political disputes increasingly shape a political environment which at once affords and inhibits access of Eastern and Western powers in about equal measure. The Soviets cannot expect to win (unless by subversion) both the Ethiopians and the Somalis, both the Pakistanis and the Indians. We believe, incidentally, that the paper has not emphasized nearly enough the importance of regional disputes as they bear on Cold War competition for ascendancy in the third world.

In this part of the world, our central objective may well be to assure an environment of sustained progress, higher standards of wealth, social justice, individual liberties, and popularly-based governments—but we must expect that in normal course we shall be able to pursue this objective only through indirection. Our immediate strategy must be so to play the game that the communists are not permitted to swing the balance to their favor. If while playing the game we can nudge some of the players toward accepting our values, so much the better. It is a matter of appropriate emphasis.

In fact, appropriate emphasis may be critical. If our prime objective is the creation of a community of values, we are bound to suffer disillusionment. If we are careless in the way we talk about this community of values, we are likely, on ideological grounds, to alienate many with whom viable relations might be maintained on grounds of interest. If we emphasize overly much the use of our resources in aiding those purporting to share our institutions and values, we shall lose the flexibility necessary to maintain sufficient access and influence to offset Soviet advances.

This is not to suggest we repudiate the effort to create a world order based on a community of value. Every approach we make ought, so far as possible, to contribute to this objective. But it is an ultimate objective. The immediate demand is tactical effectiveness in the period of great fluidity that lies ahead.

Exploitation of Long-Term Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy—An Alternative Analysis

We are particularly interested in the main conclusions of paragraphs 18 through 20, which begin on page 124 of the paper. We do not disagree with these conclusions; we do believe the section could be improved by adopting a different analytical approach. We also believe the importance of the subject warrants a more detailed discussion.

We advance what is essentially a neo-containment thesis, but with several innovations. We take note of one trend in Soviet policy since Stalin’s death which consists to date in a mellowing of Soviet methods and—though basic objectives remain the same—which contains the seeds of a de facto renunciation of imperial goals by Moscow—the heart of the East-West conflict. Domestic conditions in the USSR, the growing conflict between Soviet national interests and those of have-not communist states and parties might further develop this trend and make possible a meaningful and profitable détente with the USSR. But before this occurs, we must meet the challenge of another trend in Soviet policy—a new assertiveness based on growing Soviet power and on Soviet perception of political opportunities in the new nations. If we meet this challenge, we will do much to convince the Soviet leaders that pursuit of imperial, revolutionary aims is not in the interests of the Soviet state.

Our long-range goal toward the USSR itself is to effect a change in Soviet policies so as to permit a meaningful stabilization of East-West relations. To achieve this goal our long-term policy should be along dual lines. We should combine a position of strength vis-à-vis future Soviet encroachments with a policy that fosters the emergence of a more accommodating Soviet policy.

Provided, therefore, the US maintains a position of strength vis-à-vis future Soviet encroachments, it could undertake action designed to foster and permit the emergence of a more accommodating Soviet policy, along these lines:

(a) keep open and develop lines of communication with the Soviet leaders, including exploratory bilateral summit meetings when appropriate;

(b) stress to Soviet representatives the basic compatibility of US and USSR national interests as opposed to Moscow’s representation and pursuance of the interests of world communism;

(c) seek out agreements on those relatively narrow problems concerning which there already exists a mutuality of interests;

(d) expand informational and cultural exchanges which will stimulate intellectual free-thinking in the USSR; and

(e) adopt a stance conducive to the further development of Sino-Soviet differences.

The Sino-Soviet Dispute—A Need For Guidelines

We would recommend that this section (page 138a, para. 32) be broadened in scope. We see a particular need for basic policy guide lines on this subject.

The draft implies that an open split would be to our advantage but does not state so specifically. We believe it should make this categorical judgment. Though an open split would complicate our foreign policy and might pose new dangers at the outset, we believe the gains to the US of a split greatly outweigh whatever dangers might be involved. It would weaken the over-all thrust of world communism, would weaken communist parties through increased factionalism, would in the long run facilitate the emergence of independent (communist) states in Eastern Europe, would (in the long run at least) encourage the USSR to adopt a more accommodating policy toward the West, and would (in the short run at least) lessen Chinese Communist expansionist capabilities.

US policy regarding the Sino-Soviet dispute prior to a possible open split—i.e., the best manner in which we can help a split occur—should be elaborated. We agree that the best US policy is to avoid direct involvement or direct exploitation. But we also believe that many US actions have an effect on the dispute. In taking certain actions we should try, where a coincidence of other US interests is involved, to maximize Sino-Soviet differences.

We believe that the question of US policy in the event of an open split should be discussed, if only in general terms. In our opinion, the US should publicly adopt a neutral stance, at least initially. But within this formal neutrality, we should:

(a) sound out the Soviets regarding a rapprochement on political issues of mutual interest;

(b) open up free world channels of commerce to Communist China to an extent that will enable it to maintain independence from Soviet bloc trade resources;

(c) avoid seeking political deals with Communist China (the latter would not be likely to be responsive to any such deals, and attempts to achieve them would complicate the development of promising new relations with the USSR);

(d) allow full rein for the schizmatic effect of the split on other communist parties and states, particularly in the likely Chinese Communist sphere of influence; and

(e) abstain from military ventures against Communist China.

Western Europe

Are European Security and Tractability Interrelated?—What reason is there to suppose (as the paper seems to do) that maximum assurances from the US regarding European security will make the Europeans more tractable on issues affecting other parts of the world?

It might be supposed that insofar as European attention is riveted on the question of security in Europe it is diverted from problems of the less-developed countries. However, European views of the Southern Half are not conditioned by apprehension for safety in Europe, nor by the same apprehensions that we have over communist expansion elsewhere. While relaxation of tensions in Europe might release additional energy for overseas, the direction which that energy takes will not necessarily coincide with the one which we judge best. Indeed, it seems more probable that the same differences in view which now separate us are likely to persist and new ones to develop.

East German Attraction to the West—Is there any prospect of the GDR being “attracted” to Western Europe—any more than it already is? If so, how would this improve prospects for Germany’s reunification?

There are no doubt some variations in the degree of affinity which the nations of Eastern Europe feel for Western Europe, but the available evidence suggests that the attraction of Western Europe is already so strong that it can be restrained only by military force. This is especially true in the case of East Germany, where there is no real desire even for independent nationhood; the Berlin Wall is dramatic evidence of the westward pull. While it might be hoped that this situation will eventually be resolved through relaxation of the forcible restraints imposed by the Soviet Union, at present the danger in the situation is that violent efforts will be made to break those restraints, to the profound embarrassment of US policy.

Total Disarmament is Utopian Hope—Is it actually our belief that “general and complete disarmament” would be in the US interest? (Para. 37, pp. 52 ff).

It has often been suggested that the elimination or reduction of arms can only follow, and not precede, the elimination or reduction of political conflicts. But, be that as it may, the notion of a totally disarmed world, except for domestic and international police forces, raises a host of disquieting questions. What effect would this have on the balance of power relationships? How would the international force be constituted and controlled, and how would its use be determined? Or, more generally, would not any arrangement simply be the framework within which the struggle for control of this ultimate source of power would go on? What stage of international law and organization would this require, and what are the prospects of reaching it? Do not these and many other questions which the idea raises suggest that “total disarmament” might better be stated as a utopian hope rather than as a practical policy for current guidance?

European Demand for Nuclear Control May be Tenuous—Does not the paper exaggerate the extent and intensity of the demand by European NATO countries for a role in the control over strategic nuclear forces, as well as their demands for a multilateral MRBM force? (Pp. 89b–90, paras. 15–16).

The “political requirement” for sharing with other NATO countries the control of nuclear forces has been the subject of general study in recent weeks, but our researches suggest that the European demand is tenuous. Recent discussions of the problem have reflected a considerable misunderstanding, or lack of information, on the part of the Europeans, which needs to be, and probably can be, dispelled by further consultation. Even now, however, the “European” demand, aside from the current UK and French national programs, boils down to some agitation by German leaders which is not yet a demand and conceivably need not become one. In any case, it is as yet far from clear whether the European anxiety (or the consideration of national prestige) which underlies recent European discussion of the subject can be met by any of the specific proposals (e.g., multilateral MRBM force) presently under consideration. Europe’s concern is still focussed on the adequacy of the NATO defenses to deter, or defend against, aggression in Europe, and the powers’ primary need seems to be for constant reassurance not only that the total military strength of the Alliance is adequate but that especially the strength of the US is totally and irrevocably committed to the defense of Europe.

The Middle East

Cross-Purposes With Our Allies—The paper refers (page 94) to awkward cross-purposes among the major allies with respect to alliance policy toward a number of areas. The Middle East is listed among these areas. We do not believe there are any major cross-purposes among the allies with respect to this area which work to our disadvantage. It is true that the French have a special relation with Israel. However, this relationship probably works to our net advantage since it maintains the military strength of Israel without laying on us and the British the major onus for such action. Nor does it appear that we and the French are at serious odds with respect to British policy in the Persian Gulf. We regard this policy as necessary to assure the continued availability of oil to Western Europe, so necessary for the continued strength of the alliance.

CENTO—A Different Emphasis—The paper states (page 97): “Neither CENTO nor SEATO has proved a very satisfying instrument; in CENTO we are not a member and the enterprise is overhung with ambiguity as to how Iran could be defended in a limited war.” Is this statement meant to imply that CENTO is not a “satisfying instrument” because we are not a member, or that CENTO itself, rather than the distribution of Free World forces and the basic strategic factors involved, is responsible for the difficulties which we face in defending Iran? CENTO has not posed serious problems for us since Iraq left the alliance. Instead of blaming CENTO, we should turn our attention directly to the security and political difficulties in the area that extends from the Bosphorus to India. These difficulties are two in number: (a) the problem of defending Iran, and (b) the problems that arise within the area from the fact that Pakistan is aligned with the West while India and Afghanistan are not.

Because of limitations imposed by geography and the amount of indigenous military strength which it is possible to build in the area, we can expect very little help from Turkey and Pakistan in defending Iran. The problem of defending Iran thus can be solved only through dispositions of US and other Western military forces and arrangements within Iran and in the area. As for the second major problem, as long as we maintain a US-Pakistani alliance we shall continue to feel certain adverse effects in our relations with Afghanistan and India.

Southeast Asia

Can Southeast Asia Defend Itself?—Is it really feasible in Southeast Asian countries which border the bloc (see page 49 of the paper) to attempt to build local forces which have the capacity to deal with both conventional and guerrilla attacks? How long could their conventional forces hold? How effective would they be in complementing our own and Allied forces subsequently brought to bear? Would it not be better to shift primarily to counter-guerrilla training on the theory that harassment of the invaders would be as useful as direct confrontation in a conventional holding operation?

Should We Favor Allies Over Neutrals?—In discussing our constructive goal of a community of free nations (page 11 ff.), we confront a problem of our own creation: by treating our allies and the neutralists in essentially the same manner, we reinforce rather than break down the environment of neutralism. Is there some room to consider giving special advantages to our allies, to make their alignment more satisfying to them than possible non-alignment? (e.g. Thailand.)

Japan’s Role—The critical role of Japan is made particularly complex by its unique position as Asia’s only “developed” nation. Our present policies toward Japan’s role in contributing to Free World defense are premised upon current realities of the domestic political environment. The underlying rationale is that Japan is already contributing to Free World defense insofar as the present pace of its economic progress plus US base rights and the advantages conferred by the bilateral defense agreement with the US constitute the most useful contribution Japan is capable of making. The evolution in Japanese thinking which would be a prerequisite to interest or participation in military or security problems beyond its own national boundaries may well be a long-term proposition. If Japan’s present passive role is judged to be inadequate in terms of our long-term policy objectives in Asia, then its leadership must be persuaded that a more active role is necessary despite the domestic political environment. (See following paragraph on Containment). The direction and pace of such a reorientation will depend upon Japan’s sense of participation in the “hard core” club of northern developed countries; the ability of its leadership to redirect important segments of public opinion; and, in significant part, on US policies designed to broaden the base of mutual security responsibilities in Asia.

Burden of Containment—Much of the above applies to that section of the paper which concerns a “network of increased mutual involvement and cooperation” in Asia (para. 34, page 104). We need, somehow, to shift earlier concepts of containment which placed the entire burden on the US for halting communist encroachments. Asians are still happily relying on this concept and even our European allies, who ought to know better, are satisfied to let us carry the ball alone.

Consultation—We agree that now is the time to prepare the ground for dealing with the effects in Southeast Asia of the coming Chicom nuclear capability (p. 140), but shouldn’t we broaden this approach to deal with many of our other problems in the area as well? Our friends in Asia have complained repeatedly of not being taken into our confidence. Nothing exists in Asia that approaches the exchange of views among the NATO group. What we need is something like a Pacific community intelligence estimates group to explain to them the shape of the future as we see it and broaden their present narrowly nationalist preoccupations.

Two Dilemmas We Face—In considering the “Reorientation of Regional Alliances” in Asia (p. 174–5), we are really dealing with two dilemmas: 1) our desire to engage the aid and support of our European allies in the area versus the existing views of Asian nations toward colonialism, neo-colonialism, and big power domination; and 2) the desire to have responsible regional allies firmly on our side versus the desire to make friends with the neutrals. Can we really hope, in the foreseeable future, to have it both ways? Or will the determination to pursue both facets simultaneously be mutually destructive? Take, for example, our dilemma in the West New Guinea dispute.

We suggest that further consideration be given to weighing the advantages and disadvantages of a clear-cut resolution of our twin dilemmas in Asia. How much help can we expect from France and the UK in the Far East and what would it cost in terms of disadvantages in the area itself? How much help can we count on from India, Cambodia, Burma, and Indonesia, and what would be their alternatives (in fact, not in fancy) should we lessen our support for them relative to that given Thailand, Pakistan, and our other allies?

Some Comments Concerning Policies Toward the Less Developed Nations

The Need to Stabilize Commodity Prices—In the section of the paper on North-South relationships there is no reference to the need for giving much greater attention to stabilizing the prices of basic commodities. Nearly all well-developed communities have recognized the need of producers of basic commodities, particularly agricultural commodities, to be protected against the vicissitudes of fluctuations in supply and demand. If we are to be successful in building a community of free nations we shall have increasingly to expand this approach to the entire free world. Where our own interests are immediately and significantly concerned, as in the case of wheat and sugar, we have already taken significant steps in this connection. There are also a number of other commodities relating to which we participate in price stabilization efforts. However, these efforts need to be broadened and intensified. In the kind of world in which we exist today we cannot again afford to permit such economic suffering as occurred in Brazil, for example, from the over-supply of coffee during the 1930s.

An Elaboration on the Setting for Policy—The setting (Section II B) in which we must approach the formulation of policy toward the less-developed areas includes a number of important factors which are not mentioned in this section. There is, for example, the breakdown in many of these areas of traditional societies. Equally significant in some areas is the legacy of state boundaries left by colonialism. These boundaries were fixed on principles which are now no longer rational. With the removal of colonial control a variety of intra-area disputes have arisen, such as the Pushtunistan dispute, the dispute between Iraq and Iran over the Shatt al-Arab, and the disputes arising out of the fragmentation of the Arabs. The dispute between Communist China and India over the northern border may in some degree be attributed to this factor.

Criteria for Military Aid—The paper (pages 67 f.) recognizes that economic aid may legitimately be extended for purely political and psychological reasons. Military aid, however, is to be extended solely on the basis of objective military criteria. While admitting that in the past military aid has not always been tailored closely enough to real needs, there will continue to be instances when we will need to extend some military aid for political and psychological reasons.

1. INR comments on the “Basic National Security Policy” paper. Secret. 9 pp. Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, BNSP, 1961–1962.