Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

247. Memorandum from Gen. Taylor to President Kennedy, November 13¹

November 13, 1961

SUBJECT

• FY 1963 Defense Budget Issues

Secretary McNamara’s tentative recommendations for the 1963 defense budget, summarized in his memorandum to you of October 6, have now been considered by Secretary Rusk, Mr. Bundy, General Taylor, Dr. Wiesner, and Mr. Sorensen, as well as by the Budget Bureau. It is our common judgment that there are four major policy issues which require your consideration at this stage. Stated in crude and over-simplified form, these are:

1. Is the Secretary’s program for general war forces (strategic missiles, bombers, etc.) too small—as the military services think—too big—as a number of your staff think—or about right?

2. Should we embark on the development of a new medium-range ballistic missile, which would have major usefulness in Europe—and if so, should the development be pointed toward a sea-based or a land-based missile or both?

3. Does it make sense to commit ourselves in the 1963 budget to the installation of Nike Zeus batteries around certain cities or should we continue to limit ourselves to a program of research and development in this field?

4. Is the Secretary’s program for conventional forces (represented for short-hand purposes by his proposal to maintain 14 combat-ready Army divisions in FY 1963) acceptable from (a) military and (b) political viewpoints, or would a 16-division program be preferable, as a number of your staff think?

5. In addition, there is a question of balance as between strategic and conventional forces. General Taylor, among others, thinks that the McNamara proposals are relatively generous on the strategic side and relatively tight on the conventional side, and considers that an improved force structure would result by shifting resources from one field to the other.

In addition to these major policy issues, we will place before you at a later date a number of less significant issues concerning the defense budget. Moreover, as you know, the Defense Department has not yet completed its 1963 program for civil defense, so we do not know what issues will arise in that field.

Comments on each of the issues identified above follow.

1. General War Offensive Forces

Secretary McNamara’s proposals are substantially below those proposed by the military departments—for example the Secretary proposes to make commitments in the 1963 budget for 100 Minutemen whereas the Air Force proposed 600 (both figures in addition to the 600 already on order). Moreover, the Secretary’s 1963 proposals represent a slackening, rather than an acceleration in the future production rates of Minuteman and Polaris, as compared with the provisions of the 1962 budget. The essential reason for this is the Secretary’s belief that we already have on order the main bulk of the strategic deterrent forces we will need in the time period before 1967, and while we need some additional forces of this kind, procurement can be at reduced rates for the next two or three years at least.

The Secretary’s proposals have been questioned from opposite points of view.

Are the proposed forces too small? The military departments (particularly the Air Force) and the Joint Chiefs proposed larger forces. The adequacy of the Secretary’s proposals, however, unlike those of the military departments, is supported by an impressively logical analysis of the relative capabilities of the Soviet and U.S. forces. This shows that his proposals will give us (even under pessimistic assumptions about survival, accuracy, etc.) a capability, after a Soviet attack, to destroy Soviet urban society and to strike heavily against Soviet military installations associated with long-range nuclear forces, thus reducing damage by Soviet follow-on forces. The Secretary’s analysis has convinced all of us who have reviewed his proposals that force levels higher than those proposed are not required.

Are the proposed forces too large? It seems to most of us that the proposed force levels exceed requirements that can be justified on purely military grounds. The analysis used by the Secretary to demonstrate that higher force levels are not necessary also suggests that lower force levels would suffice, particularly when the more recent intelligence estimates are taken into account. Beyond this, some of the assumptions of the analysis may be questioned; for example, does an adequate deterrent posture require 41 Polaris submarines threatening 200 Soviet cities as proposed, or would not the currently committed 29 submarines threatening about 150 cities suffice?

Will the proposed forces induce the U.S.S.R. to step up their armament plans? To some extent, Soviet decisions with respect to their force levels may be influenced by our own force objectives. This raises the question whether a build-up of our strategic offensive forces beyond those which clearly imply a capability to retaliate against urban areas, would have the effect of influencing the U.S.S.R. also to undertake a major increase in their long-range nuclear strike forces, which they otherwise might not do. This is, of course, a difficult question to analyze with any confidence. Insofar as it may appear significant, the presentation of the defense budget in January could be tailored to stress the slackening rate of the U.S. Build-up.

Will the proposed forces seem small to the U.S. public? The Secretary’s proposals, if accepted—or any lower Presidential proposals—may require a major effort on the part of the Administration to change what appears to be a fairly widespread national attitude that national security requires ever-increasing strategic missile forces and airpower. For the first time the position will be presented that we are approaching the force levels we need, and that “deceleration” rather than “acceleration” of missile programs is the proper course of action.

Note on mobile Minuteman. On the basis of the discussions that have been held, the merits of embarking on the currently planned mobile Minuteman program for 100 railway mounted missiles, at a total development and procurement cost of close to $1 billion, appear questionable. Substitution of a longer term development program for a more accurate, mobile ICBM, using some of the same guidance and other components of the proposed land-based MRBM system, is being considered. This change, if made, will result in a substantial reduction in the proposed NOA for 1963 for mobile Minuteman, shown at 270 million dollars in the Secretary’s October 6th memorandum.

Note on Skybolt. Dr. Wiesner raises the question whether the proposed commitment to produce the Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile, (or even to continue its development) is justified in view of the technical difficulties, late availability and debatable military requirement.

2. Medium-Range Ballistic Missile

The Secretary’s proposals include starting the development of a high-accuracy, quick reaction, medium range (1000–2000 miles) ballistic missile, capable of being launched from mobile land vehicles or from ships. This missile could meet requirements for a NATO nuclear deterrent force in the period after about 1966, as well as other future U.S. requirements. The Department of State feels that it is highly desirable that the proposed MRBM development explore possibilities for sea-based as well as land-based deployment, since in their view sea-based deployment will fit best with our proposal that NATO develop a common sea-based nuclear deterrent, rather than separate land-based nuclear forces. Secretary McNamara expects to make sure that the sea-based form is developed at least as rapidly as the land-based, and on this assumption I believe that there is general agreement on the desirability of developing the new MRBM. However, Dr. Wiesner, while agreeing with the objections to land-based deployment in Europe, also raises the questions whether a sea-based MRBM would provide a new capability beyond that available from Polaris missiles or is really necessary in view of the large number of Polaris missiles now planned.

3. Nike Zeus

The Secretary recommends a decision to proceed with the deployment of 12 Nike Zeus batteries for protecting 6 cities, at a total cost of about 3.6 billion dollars. This deployment would be completed by about the end of 1967, with an initial operating capability by 1965. Research and development would also proceed on possible improved systems.

The technical characteristics of the Zeus system are fairly well agreed, although the first field tests will not be conducted until next summer. It is estimated that the Nike Zeus system as now being developed would be:

effective against enemy ballistic missiles not equipped with penetration aids such as decoys;

marginal against missiles equipped with minimum (retrofit type) penetration aids such as the U.S. will have in inventory in 1963; and

ineffective against missiles with appreciable payload allocation to sophisticated penetration aids.

The U.S.S.R. could, therefore, negate the military effectiveness of Nike Zeus defenses, if they choose to do so, during the time period required to produce and deploy the proposed 12 batteries.

It may be technically possible to develop future systems which are more effective against missiles with penetration aids, although no such system is clearly in prospect at the present time. In any case it appears that such a system could not be developed and deployed prior to about 1970 and would be substantially a new system, not a retrofit modification of the present Zeus system.

The inescapable conclusion would seem to be that for the foreseeable future, attacking ICBM missiles will have inherent technological and economic advantages and tactical flexibility which will continue to make the achievement of an effective active ICBM defense at best a tremendously expensive venture of dubious effectiveness.

Secretary McNamara offers these reasons for proceeding with Nike Zeus:

—The Soviet Union may not in fact develop missiles with penetration aids; even if they do, the uncertainty of their decision-making will have been increased, and they will have to devote resources to this purpose;

—Even limited Zeus deployment could inhibit blackmail from secondary powers, and provide some protection from accidental attack;

—Zeus deployment would help counter future Soviet claims to a successful anti-missile system, which otherwise might have serious political effects both in the United States and abroad. The U.S.S.R. has an active anti-ICBM development program, and we cannot successfully refute any claims they may make.

To some of us, these arguments seem less impressive than the counter-vailing reasons against Zeus deployment:

—The Soviet Union must be assumed to have the technical knowledge and resources to develop penetration aids which will make the Zeus marginal or ineffective by the time it is deployed, especially since the limitations of the Zeus system cannot be kept secret in our society;

—The proposed six-city program is not a “stable” objective; presumably once a deployment decision is announced it would not be politically feasible to deny Zeus defenses to other major population centers, and we would be committed to proceed with at least a 29-city, 70-battery program as recommended by NORAD and the Army, at a cost of about 15 billion dollars;

—Zeus deployment at cities would not seem to improve significantly our basic deterrent power, which depends on the survivability of our strategic forces, not the protection of our cities; this also would seem to be the essential protection against any potential blackmail by secondary powers.

—So far as political and psychological effects are concerned, it would seem arguable that the best course is that of honest appraisal: claiming appropriate credit for research progress in what are expected to be successful tests at Kwajalein next summer, but not installing a system which is expected to be overcome before it is deployed—whose installation indeed might instill a false sense of security and result in a strong adverse public reaction as its limitations came to be understood.

The principal alternatives to the Secretary’s proposal would seem to be as follows:

It seems clear that in any case (i) the development and full-scale testing of the present Nike Zeus system should be carried to completion, and (ii) aggressive research and development efforts on possible improved systems should be pursued. Since achievement of an effective anti-ICBM defense by either side would have tremendous foreign policy implications in addition to its military significance, it is essential that every promising approach that might lead to a technological breakthrough be vigorously pursued as a matter of highest national security priority.

With respect to the deployment of the present Zeus system, the main alternatives appear to be:

a. Proceed with the 1963 actions proposed by the Secretary, which involve primarily long lead-time components, but with no decision or announcement as to the number of cities that might be involved or the ultimate scope of the program. The program would be presented as “buying a year’s time” if production is actually undertaken after consideration of the results of the Kwajalein tests next year. It would be difficult to turn back from deployment once this initial step were taken, since the Kwajalein tests are not likely to yield any unexpected results.

b. Proceed with a token deployment of perhaps one or two partial batteries, with equipment produced quickly on a hand-tooled basis. This has been suggested as meeting some of the psychological and other pressures for deployment of Zeus, and having the advantage of doing so sooner than the proposed production program. This alternative is now under active consideration by the Department of Defense. It is not clear what further action would logically follow such a token deployment.

c. Make a positive decision not to deploy the present Zeus system; explain to the public (U.S. and worldwide) its limitations as well as its capabilities; use the Kwajalein tests to demonstrate our technological progress; and place main emphasis on development of an improved system.

4. General Purpose (Conventional) Forces

The Secretary’s proposals contemplate that in 1963 the general purpose ground forces would consist of 14 combat-ready regular divisions with supporting units, 3 combat-ready Marine divisions, and reserve forces in a high state of readiness consisting of 8 Army National Guard divisions, of which 2 would be in first priority status, and 1 Marine reserve division. The overall total active duty strength of the Army associated with this proposal would be 929,000.

The proposed ground forces program represents an increase over the original 1962 plans of 3 combat-ready Army divisions and of about 60,000 men in the regular Army, as well as a higher degree of readiness in the priority reserve forces. However, the proposals represent a reduction below the Berlin build-up of active duty forces of (1) the 2 National Guard divisions now on active duty, which would be returned to reserve status, and (2) a total of 152,000 men—73,000 associated with the 2 National Guard divisions and 79,000 associated with other temporary increases in connection with the Berlin crisis.

Two major questions have been raised about the Secretary’s proposals.

First, some who have reviewed the proposals, notably including General Taylor and Mr. Bundy, question whether the proposed size of the conventional forces is large enough.

Second, some, notably including Secretary Rusk and Mr. Bundy, question whether it is desirable from a foreign policy standpoint to propose a reduction in January of the active duty Army forces that have just been built up.

Unfortunately, as Secretary McNamara points out, it has not yet been possible for him to provide for conventional forces the same type of rigorous logical rationale that he has worked out for strategic forces. Consequently the basis for judgment on these questions cannot be as firm and persuasive.

The Secretary’s view essentially is that a portion of the recent increases in Army strength should be regarded as temporary, and the ground forces he is proposing, in conjunction with the recommended increases in tactical air support and mobility of the forces, appear at this time to be adequate to meet our needs. In the 1963 budget, he feels that priority should be given to improving the capabilities of the existing 14 Army divisions by correcting known imbalances in equipment, tactical air support, and mobility. Following the Berlin crisis there appears to be no tactical or strategic requirement for more than 14 active divisions. He has pointed out that the long-term adequacy of the 14-division Army and all other aspects of the general purpose forces problem can be considered again in the 1964 budget if studies during the coming year clearly indicate that a different decision should be made.

The principal doubts that have been expressed concerning the proposed strength of the conventional forces are:

a. Adequacy of the forces for fighting in two or more separate local war situations simultaneously. This question involves an assessment of the needs of contingency plans in different areas of possible military action, and of the likelihood that two or more such situations in which we would actually wish to intervene might occur simultaneously.

b. Adequacy of the forces for deterring the Soviet bloc or others from provoking crises which might require our intervention and for supporting our foreign policy, including the question of whether a larger permanent force level is required to convince our allies to maintain adequate forces of their own.

c. Feasibility of relying on reserve forces to augment the projected regular forces in time of crisis. The principal questions are: (1) how frequently situations are likely to arise which will require a call-up of reserves; (2) whether the types of threats that are likely to arise can be expected to be unambiguous or dramatic enough to justify publicly the decision to call up reserves; (3) whether as a practical matter the strength and readiness of the reserves can be maintained through repeated call-ups and demobilizations.

As indicated above, unlike the situation with respect to strategic forces, there is at present no firm and clear rationale for conventional force levels and deployment, against which to judge these opposing points of view. Secretary McNamara has stated he is proceeding to prepare a proposed rationale for the force levels; it will take some time for him to do this—at the earliest it cannot be completed before sometime next spring. In the meantime, it is worth emphasizing that there can be no satisfactory resolution of the question of the desirable size of the conventional forces. The issue may be posed today in terms of 14 vs. 16 divisions, but when a better rationale is available it might indicate that some entirely different number would be preferable.

The principal doubts expressed with respect to the advisability of reducing the forces by the amount of reserves called to active duty are:

a. The effects on the Soviets and the rest of the Soviet bloc. Would the elimination of the reserve forces in the 1963 budget be interpreted as a sign that we are weakening in our will or capability to resist aggression in Europe, Southeast Asia, or elsewhere? Are there important gains to be obtained in deterring future Soviet moves by demonstrating that our response to crises they provoke is a permanent increase in force levels? If so, would the proposed additional 60,000 men have this effect, or would a larger increase be necessary?

b. The effects on our allies, especially with respect to our efforts to persuade the other NATO countries to increase their military forces. Would the reduction by the amount of the reserves called to active duty—even though the remaining force represents a 60,000 man increase in the basic 1962 Budget—be interpreted as a weakening in our offer to provide additional divisions to NATO for the Berlin crisis?

c. The effects on our domestic posture and sense of urgency regarding the Berlin and Southeast Asia situations. What events seem likely to occur that would provide the basis for a satisfactory public explanation for reducing our ground forces at this time?

If it were desired to provide for larger ground forces in the 1963 budget, Secretary McNamara would recommend planning for 16 active duty divisions, and for 30 to 35 thousand larger troop strength. This might cost in the neighborhood of 165 to 200 million dollars in FY 1963.

5. Balance between Strategic and Conventional Forces

General Taylor in particular has raised the question whether the proposed 1963 budget evidences further the intention of this Administration to expand conventional as against strategic forces. General Taylor will comment more extensively on this; however, two observations seem warranted in this regard:

First, the proposed budget provides for a sizeable increase in both strategic and conventional forces.

Second, the question whether the relative emphasis between them would be shifted requires a careful and subtle analysis which has not been made by anyone. However, in crude dollar magnitudes, there is a striking shift which would begin in the 1963 budget. It is shown in the following figures from Secretary McNamara’s memorandum:

	Anticipated NOA (billions of dollars)
Program	FY 1962	FY 1963	FY 1964	FY 1965	FY 1966	FY 1967
General war offensive (strategic)	9.3	8.9	8.0	5.6	4.7	4.1
General purpose (conventional)	17.2	18.8	18.9	19.9	19.4	20.0

These figures are far from reliable; for example, they do not take into account possible new technological developments or requirements in the strategic field. Moreover, they do not necessarily indicate a shift in the balance between strategic and conventional forces available at any one time: we buy missiles once and they are available until they become obsolete, whereas we have to pay troops each year. A downward trend in the purchase of missiles is quite consistent with a rising trend in our total strategic strength. (Strictly speaking, of course, it is inaccurate to equate general purpose with conventional forces, since the amounts related to tactical nuclear and dual-purpose weapons are also included.)

What these figures represent in military terms is the possibility of a strategic force rising in magnitude only slowly, and conventional forces built around 14 Army divisions whose costs would gradually rise with increasingly complex equipment.

Nevertheless these figures indicate the possibility of a very substantial change in the apparent budgetary significance of strategic as compared to conventional forces, and if in fact future budgets do look something like those projected here, the political impact might be large.

In closing this memorandum I think I speak for all of us in noting the enormous advances in concept, clarity, and logic which Secretary McNamara has brought to the military planning-budgeting process. The difference between the 1963 budget presentation now before us, and the 1962 budget we all had to work with last winter and spring, is literally revolutionary. There is much more to be done, as Secretary McNamara knows better than any of us, but the improvement in the degree of rationality which can be applied to military planning and budgeting is already tremendous.

1. “FY 1963 Defense Budget Issues.” Top Secret. 12 pp. National Defense University, Taylor Papers, 30, T–357–69.