246. Memorandum from Maj. Smith to Gen. Taylor, October 21
SUBJECT
- Sec Def Recommended Long Range Nuclear Delivery Forces
1. In this appendix to an as-yet-unseen basic memorandum, the Sec Def provides the reasoning on long range nuclear delivery forces that leads him to recommend funds in the FY 63 Budget for 100 hard and dispersed Minutemen, 50 mobile Minutemen, 6 Polaris submarines, 92 air-to-surface Skybolt missiles, and 100 KC–135 tankers.2
2. Mr. McNamara states that his recommended forces are designed to avoid the extremes of a “minimum deterrence” posture on one hand, and a “full first strike capability” on the other.
a. He rejects “minimum deterrence” because deterrence may fail, and if it does, a capability to counterattack against high priority military targets can make a major contribution to our objectives of limiting damage and terminating the war on acceptable terms. In addition, a “minimum deterrence” posture would weaken our ability to deter Soviet attacks on our allies. (p. 4)
b. He rejects a “full first strike capability” because he considers it almost certainly infeasible; moreover, it would put the Soviets in a position which they would consider intolerable, thus risking an arms race; and finally, it would be too costly in terms of resources needed for other programs. (p. 5)
3. Mr. McNamara “tests” the capabilities of his forces on the assumption that war begins with a well-planned and well-executed Soviet attack (with limited warning) against our forces in a state of normal peacetime alert, and that we strike back after being attacked. He tabulates the percent expected kill of certain types of Soviet targets under such conditions. He then compares the percent expected kill in FY 65 and FY 67 of his forces with the capability provided by the highest unilateral Service proposals for the various strategic weapons. He concludes from this that the individual Service proposals run up against [Typeset Page 855] “strongly diminishing returns and yield very little in terms of extra target destruction”. His tables show that this is true for urban-industrial areas and population targets under optimistic, median, and pessimistic assumptions about the survival of our forces, but that this is somewhat less true for attacks on military targets under his median or pessimistic estimates. (p. 9–10) The constancy of percentages on urban-industrial and population targets most probably comes from holding back the Polaris submarines in the initial strikes, although this is not stated.
[Facsimile Page 2]4. The Sec Def draws all his comparisons—cost, force structure, effectiveness—on the basis of the initial positions of the individual Services. Yet, as his paper indicates (p. 3), on 11 September the JCS submitted to him their corporate agreed recommendations. (Presumably their recommendations covered all program packages). After listing these recommendations the Sec Def does not refer to, or use, them again. Possibly this was necessary because his paper had been largely developed before he received the JCS corporate views.
a. By considering only the individual Service views, the Sec Def leaves unanswered the question of how much better his forces would look than those recommended by the Chiefs. By analyzing the Service going-in positions—positions that, given Pentagon machinations, are optimistically stated for negotiating purposes—the Sec Def may have inadvertently or intentionally, set up a “straw man.” Admittedly the Chiefs negotiated to reach their position, (in this particular case General LeMay undoubtedly took the lead; he is known to have strong feelings about the necessity for the Chiefs to settle their own differences, and he has well known ideas on strategic forces), but military budgets must be negotiated ones. Force structure planning involves many matters of judgment; it is not a science, and there is room for persuassion, both within the individual Services, and among them, once the problem reaches the JCS. Especially is this true looking to the future today, when any error must be on the conservative side.
b. If the pattern of comparing the Sec Def views with the initial positions of the individual Services continues in the analyses of the other program packages, and if his case is made exhaustively as is the case in this paper, Mr. McNamara will be the uncontested father of the FY 63 military budget proposed by DOD.