The President has asked me to pass the attached list of questions to you
for transmission to General Power.
He would like General Power to respond to these questions at their
meeting tomorrow, September 20th.
Attachment
September 19,
1961
1. Attached herewith are a number of questions bearing on the Single
Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP)
which you may wish to ask General Power at your meeting with him
tomorrow. The questions are designed to produce answers to some of
the alleged weaknesses of the SIOP
which include the following:
a. Without engendering dangerous
confusion, it is difficult if not impossible to vary the
schedule of planned strikes by excluding planned targets,
bringing in new ones or stopping the schedule.
b. As a result of the inflexibility noted
in a above, in an escalating situation
over Berlin, we could not execute a surprise first strike
exclusively against Soviet military targets if we so
desired.
c. If four weapons are scheduled for
delivery on a target and the target is destroyed or the enemy
capitulates after two have been delivered, it is not possible to
withhold the remaining two.
d. If the Alert Force is launched on a
false alarm and later must turn back, our strike capability will
be degraded for a significant period.
[Typeset Page 814]
2. In obtaining answers to the foregoing, it is important to separate
out what controls are available now and what are for the future.
This time factor was not clear in the briefing last Thursday. Also,
when the point is made that the injection of some forms of
flexibility will reduce military effectiveness, we should get some
feel whether the reduction is so serious as practically to eliminate
the option.
[Facsimile Page 3]
3. If the questions appear to cover the ground which you wish to
cover with General Power, I will have them transmitted to him at
once.
Attachment
STRATEGIC AIR PLANNING
Question #1. I understand the strategic attack
plan now contains 16 “options.” I gather the impression, however,
[text not declassified]. Is it now
possible to exclude [text not declassified]
from attack? If not, how soon could you develop a plan which
contains such options? Can whole areas, [text not
declassified] be eliminated from attack? If so, at what
risk?
[text not declassified]
[text not declassified]
[text not declassified]
[text not declassified]
[text not declassified]
[text not declassified]
[text not declassified]
Question #3. [text not
declassified] would leave a sizeable number of MRBMs facing
Europe.
a. Would the inclusion of these MRBMs
in the initial attack so enlarge the target list as to preclude
tactical surprise?
[Facsimile Page 5]
b. If so, is it possible to plan an
immediate follow-on attack which would strike these targets
before the first attack was completed? In particular, would our
European land and sea-based air forces be suitable for this
task?
Question #4. I am concerned over my ability to
control our military effort once a war begins. I assume I can stop
the strategic attack at any time, should I receive word the enemy
has capitulated. Is this correct?
Question #5. Although one nuclear weapon will
achieve the desired results, I understand that, to be assured of
success, more than one weapon is programmed for each target. If the
first weapon succeeds, can you prevent additional weapons from
inflicting redundant destruction? If not, how long would it take to
modify your plan to cover this possibility?
[Typeset Page 815]
Question #6. What happens to the planned
execution of our strategic attack if the Alert Force is launched and
several hours later it is discovered that it has been launched on a
false alarm? How vulnerable would we be, and how soon would the U.S.
be in a position to attack the USSR?
Question #7. After the Alert Force has been
launched, how do I know that our remaining forces are being used to
best advantage. Are these follow-on forces automatically committed
to predetermined targets, or do we have means of getting damage
assessments to direct their attacks?
Question #8. Given the European situation,
some of SACEUR’s tactical
fighters now scheduled for atomic attacks may be employed for
conventional support of ground forces instead. Can other forces take
over the responsibility of hitting SACEUR’s atomic targets without jeopardizing the
success of the plan materially?
