I attach a memorandum for the President about which you and I spoke on
the telephone.
Attachment
August 4,
1961
SUBJECT
- Possible public announcement by United States that we would be
willing to forego any tests in the atmosphere without the right
of inspection or control if the Soviets would do likewise
As of the present time, it is planned that Ambassador Dean should return to the nuclear
test ban conference at Geneva on August 23, after first having
conference with the President who is announcing that he is asking
him to return.
The nuclear test ban item has been inscribed on the agenda of the
United Nations General Assembly at our request.
The various embassies are engaged in explaining to the governments to
which they are accredited, the provisions of the nuclear test ban
treaty as proposed by the United Kingdom and the United States at
Geneva on April 18, 1961.
[Typeset Page 104]
A public relations program has been undertaken to explain this treaty
and why it constitutes the best answer to the ending of further
nuclear testing.
Efforts will be undertaken to persuade the delegations from other
countries that the position of the United States with respect to the
nuclear test ban treaty is a sound and fair one and every effort
will be made to enlist their support on the basis of this
treaty.
While it is realized that a unilateral announcement by the United
States that it is willing to forego further [Facsimile Page 3] testing in the atmosphere if
the U.S.S.R. will also agree puts us in a favorable light as far as
our willingness to stop testing is concerned, from a practical
standpoint, it has at least three disadvantages.
These disadvantages are: Based on conversation between Mr. McCloy and Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Khrushchev will attempt to
downgrade the currency of our offer by stating not only will the
Soviet Union agree not to test in the atmosphere without effective
inspection or controls but that it will also agree not to test in
outer space, on or under the ocean, or below ground without
inspection or control. Somewhere in their reply they will probably
denounce us for wishing to include decoupling shots in our seismic
research program during the proposed three-year moratorium on
underground tests yielding below 4.75, and again repeat the charge
that in our proposal we are not in any way obligated to continue the
moratorium on such tests or to reduce the treaty threshold below
4.75 without regard to the actual outcome of the seismic research
program. It is believed that they already intend to carry on an
attack on our proposed treaty and on the proposed three-year
moratorium because so far we have not been willing to bind ourselves
by treaty language as to what we would do at the end of the
three-year period with respect to the treaty threshold.
Consequently, it is believed that an offer on our part not to test in
the atmosphere without inspection or controls may not only give the
Soviets an opportunity to denounce our present request for
inspection and controls as unnecessary from a scientific standpoint
and as constituting only espionage but it will also confuse our
friends and retard our campaign to get them to support us on the
treaty. Those who do not wish to antagonize the U.S.S.R. will
naturally not support us on the provisions of the treaty if we are
willing to compromise on much less by our announcement with respect
to atmospheric testing.
As you know, President Eisenhower proposed to Premier Khrushchev on April 13, 1959 that
we suspend nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere up to 50
kilometers while the other treaty provisions were being
resolved.
[Facsimile Page 4]
On April 23, 1959, Premier Khrushchev replied that such a proposal was a
“dishonest deal” and that they were “for the cessation of all [Typeset Page 105] types of
nuclear weapons tests—in the air, underground, under water, and at
high altitude.”
I am informed that on the present state of our knowledge, there is a
“good possibility” that we could pick up and detect nuclear
detonations in the atmosphere yielding from one to five
kilotons.
With respect to nuclear detonations on the ocean and occurring in the
Northern Hemisphere, I understand we have only a fair chance of
detecting them.
With respect to nuclear detonations under the ocean, I understand, as
of the present time, we have little or no capability of
detection.
With respect to nuclear detonations on the ocean south of the
equator, there is little possibility that we could detect them. The
status in underground testing is known to you.
All of the foregoing is, of course, based upon the present state of
our knowledge.
Some of the reporting telegrams from the embassies which have been
explaining the nuclear test ban conference to the governments to
which the Ambassadors are credited, have been reporting that some of
them find it difficult to understand why we attach such importance
to the possibility the Russians might violate the test ban agreement
and that they consider our emphasis on need for control and
inspection as exaggerated and that a more generous show of
confidence would give us greater protection than our current
attempts to achieve an elaborate system.
It is, of course, difficult to explain what the Soviets might achieve
by further undetected testing because of security reasons. It is
also difficult to explain the necessity for the large number of
control stations around the earth, the need for the number of annual
on-site inspections and the need for setting up the proper criteria
for inspection and the need for having objective inspection
teams.
[Facsimile Page 5]
Consequently, whatever public advantage might be gained by making the
offer not to test in the atmosphere would, I believe, be more than
offset by withdrawal of support for the treaty and might tend to
confirm what appears to be a latent belief that our present treaty
control system is too vast and too complex.
Therefore, I would urge that no announcement with respect to
suspension of tests in the atmosphere be made until after we have
completed our presentation before the United Nations General
Assembly and have taken the vote thereon.
Arthur H.
Dean
Chairman, U.S.
Delegation
Nuclear Test Ban Talks
