Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

236. Memorandum from Gen. Lemnitzer to McNamara, June 15¹

June 15, 1961

SUBJECT

• Policy Guidance on Plans for Central War (U)

1. With respect to your query of 5 May 1961, concerning introduction of multiple options into general war planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in agreement that the following objectives should be achieved:

a. Greater control of response for the purpose of enhancing military flexibility.

b. Minimizing the likelihood of destruction not directly associated with the objectives of our attacks.

c. Emergence from an initial nuclear exchange with sufficient residual power to impose our will upon the enemy.

d. Survival as a free nation capable of pursuing our national objectives.

e. Maintenance of adequate but not excessive forces.

2. While it is agreed that steps of both a short-range and long-range nature can be taken toward the foregoing objectives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have serious reservations concerning several aspects of the proposed Basic National Security Policy enclosed as background information in your memorandum of 5 May 1961. The desirable elements of this policy notwithstanding, it is considered that adoption of the policy in toto would have a deleterious effect upon our national security. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the adoption or declaration at this time of a policy of controlled response and negotiating pauses in general war to the extent indicated in your enclosure would undermine the credibility of our deterrent and increase the risk of defeat. Moreover, such a policy, in order to be effective, would require both our nuclear capable Allies and the enemy to develop capabilities which would permit them to adopt a policy similar to ours. Additional reservations, as are related to your specific questions, are:

a. The National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) were designed to fulfill requirements under conditions where our national survival is at stake. If the enemy were to launch an all-out nuclear attack against the United States, and its Allies during the current time period, the gross disruption of facilities, military capabilities, communications and control elements, and other national assets imposes an overriding requirement for simplicity of military response which severly limits the optional responses which may practically be planned, however desirable these individually may be under specific but unpredictable circumstances. The ability to defeat the enemy under these conditions must not be lost or equivocated by introduction into the SIOP at the present time or in the near future of a large number of options which would lower our assurance of success and contribute to confusion under the most adverse circumstances ever to confront our nation.

b. Assuming the USSR embarked upon all-out war, the capability of the United States to launch an effective retaliatory effort will depend upon the utmost exploitation of military initiative, adroit timing and effective targeting against the most rewarding targets. This requires intensive training in accordance with a well-conceived plan, which plan must not exceed the capacity of man for its execution. Little margin exists now to permit assessment of enemy intentions, objectives, or capabilities without our losing the military initiative. No procedures, based upon a conjectured intent or response by the enemy, should be accepted which would degrade our existing capability to cope with all-out general war. Nor may the degree or nature of force required to accomplish our objectives be dependent upon the prejudged intentions of the enemy.

c. While a primary objective in general war should be the destruction of the enemy’s military forces, it is recognized that a country’s war potential is gaged by economic, psychological and political as well as military elements. The possession by the enemy of long-range missile-delivered nuclear weapons system, the paucity of our intelligence regarding certain key military targets in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and the imposition of the second strike role upon our forces under enemy initiative combine to place us at a military disadvantage, especially in the context of the strategy suggested in the draft Basic National Security Policy. Until our forces are endowed with sufficient invulnerability to permit holding a portion in secure reserve, any limitations imposed upon striking all elements of the enemy’s war potential must be responsive to military necessity.

d. [text not declassified]

e. [text not declassified]

f. Our ability to attack essential enemy military strengths without significant effects against his non-military resources and population is hampered by two principal factors. These are the limitations upon the degree of selectivity feasible with existing thermonuclear forces, and the considerable collocation of enemy military strengths with enemy non-military resources and population.

g. Controlled response in the face of a nuclear hostile act which may or may not presage an all-out attack requires a strong passive defense posture. The development of civil defense and mobilization plans should be kept abreast of, and adequately responsive to, the requirements of a nuclear war emergency.

h. Significant forces, other than the long-range nuclear strike forces, are required to contribute to the general war deterrent in order to provide flexibility and to conduct essential operations both during and subsequent to an initial nuclear exchange. The draft policy fails to express the need for such forces and a policy for their use.

3. Regardless of the above listed reservations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that there are certain broad courses of action, available at the present time, which will meet a substantial portion of the objectives listed in paragraph 1 above. These courses of action are already in some state of preparation for implementation.

4. Destruction not directly associated with the objectives of our own attacks can be minimized and, in fact, operational plans currently provide for:

a. [text not declassified]

b. [text not declassified]

c. [text not declassified]

In addition to the foregoing, consideration could be given to the use of [text not declassified]. Additionally, the testing, development and production of the neutron flux or pure fusion weapon could greatly enhance our capabilities.

5. Specifically and regarding the first question on near term increase in the latitude of response options, the current variety of options is sizeable, and is larger than would be apparent solely from examination of “numbered” options in the current SIOP and command war plans. In addition, a limited number of carefully planned new options can be provided in the near future. For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will insure that in SIOP 63 and command war plans for the same time period all aspects of current flexibility and selectivity are more clearly and specifically identified in plans and provided for in pre-planned execution orders and messages. [text not declassified] It is emphasized that these elements of flexibility are currently available, although greater clarity in their designation and identification will be provided. In addition, new options will be studied and developed to provide alternative assignments to selected and limited elements of [text not declassified] which may be withheld from initial attacks for subsequent commitment. These options which will be developed to the extent militarily feasible, could be significantly affected by trends in the precision and completeness of our information on enemy strengths, and will include specific reference to the degree of calculated risk inherent in their selection for implementation in an emergency.

6. The retention of, or the capability to reconstitute quickly, a reserve is an indisputable requirement for all types of warfare and is particularly significant in general war. Within current and projected programs, this requirement can be fulfilled to a degree by:

a. [text not declassified]

b. Continued improvements in planning for use of surviving theatre forces in follow-on and “on-call” roles against targets as required.

c. Recognizing that substantial elements of forces committed to the initial attacks will survive and be available for subsequent strikes and as such can be considered as an integral element of the required reserve.

d. [text not declassified]

e. [text not declassified]

f. Using some of the most survivable weapons systems of our nuclear delivery forces as a reserve commensurate with the requirements for initial attack.

7. Measures along the lines indicated in paragraph 6 above can be implemented more effectively to the degree that measures are taken to increase survivability of all our nuclear strike forces. These measures are not limited to qualitative and quantitative improvements in specific weapons systems, but [text not declassified].

8. Detailed procedures for exercising more precise control of our nuclear strike forces will be pursued vigorously in response to the decisions of the President as Commander in Chief of our armed forces and in consonance with the development of approved command and control capabilities and procedures. Precautions should be taken to insure that no measures for control be developed which necessitate time-consuming international or intergovernmental political deliberations or decisions to the prejudice of our military posture. Because, under conditions of general war, the very existence of the nation is dependent upon military success, the exercise of the leadership of the President in his role of Commander in Chief, must override other considerations.

9. It is noted that decisions on questions raised in your memorandum of 5 May would have a considerable impact on future over-all programming actions. In view of budgetary considerations and in light of the fact that no clear cut distinction can be made between general and limited war forces, all facets of the requirements for national defense must be examined in order to ensure the proper application of priorities for meeting the entire spectrum of the threat.

10. A consideration of the above factors would seem to indicate that no definitive action should be taken on this matter until final governmental action is taken on the Basic National Security Policy. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterate their request to collaborate actively in the drafting of this policy. When the Basic National Security Policy is approved, the actions required to support the policy should be within the context of the normal planning, programming and budget actions. The earliest time for integration of feasible additional options as discussed above, in order to avoid disruption or reduction of current capabilities, will be in the promulgation of SIOP–63 and command war plans covering the same time period.

11. The submissions of the DSTP, CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, CINCPAC, CINCSAC, CINCONAD and CINCAL are attached as Appendices A–G hereto. It will be noted that the views of these commanders are generally in accord with those expressed above by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The commanders have made differing recommendations concerning means by which the long-range strike force can be made less vulnerable. However, all commanders have noted an urgent requirement for improvement of command and control, communications, and intelligence, particularly with respect to survivability. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that all programs designed to achieve these ends should receive continued attention. However, as noted above, they believe that acceleration of these programs should be undertaken only after full consideration of our total defense requirements.

12. Your attention is invited to the fact that the DSTP and certain of the responses of the unified commanders make cross reference to paragraphs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff message which transmitted the requirement to the designated agencies. Paragraph 1 of this message contained general instructions. Part I of this message was a direct quotation of your memorandum of 5 May, and was numbered paragraphs 2 through 6.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer

Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Policy guidance on plans for central war. Top Secret; Restricted Data. 7 pp. National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 218, JCS Records, JMF 3001, BNSP (5 May 1961), Sec. 2.