Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

215. Letter from Gen. Taylor to Rusk, July 27¹

July 27, 1963

Dear Secretary Rusk:

In anticipation of Congressional hearings on the limited test ban treaty just negotiated in Moscow, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel the need of your counsel and that of the Department of State in order to reach a thorough understanding of the implications and consequences of the implementation of this treaty. We recognize that the military considerations falling within our primary field of competence are not the exclusive determinants of the merits of a test ban treaty. In addition, important weight must be given to less tangible factors such as the effect upon world tensions and international relations. Here we sense the need of your help and that of your colleagues in the Department of State.

To be specific, I am inclosing a list of questions the answers to which will have an important bearing on the position which the Chiefs will take in the hearings before the Senate. It would be deeply appreciated if you would provide us the response of the Department of State to these questions, preferably in writing, so that we can study the text in detail. Thereafter, we would hope to have the opportunity of conferring with you and possibly with other officials of the Department in order to reach a full comprehension of the non-military factors bearing on this treaty.

We are hoping to finalize our study of the treaty by August 14, 1963, a date chosen in relation to an estimate of the time of initiation of Congressional hearings.

Sincerely,

Maxwell D. Taylor

Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

POLITICAL QUESTIONS

1. What are the political advantages to the United States of the proposed treaty? In particular, to what extent will it reduce world tension, restrain the arms race, and accentuate the split in the Communist Bloc?

2. An atmospheric ban was proposed by President Eisenhower in 1959 and by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan in 1961. The limited treaty has been tabled since 27 August 1962 in Geneva. The Soviets have rejected all of these. Why do the Russians want this treaty now? Do you interpret the Soviet action in signing the treaty as indicative of a basic change either in Soviet goals or in the spectrum of means by which they are prepared to pursue their goals?

3. To what extent and in what ways is it considered that the proposed treaty will help stop proliferation? What pressures are the Soviets considered in a position to exert on Red China to keep her out of the nuclear club? In view of the stated attitude of the French that they will not participate in any test ban arrangement, what inducements or pressures, if any, would we consider to gain French participation? Is it conceivable that the US and the USSR might unite to enforce nonproliferation using whatever means necessary?

4. Is it considered that there are advantages of a military or security nature which the United States will derive from this treaty, or must it be justified on other grounds?

5. What would be the international political implications if the US at this stage were to reject the treaty?

6. The draft treaty provides that a party may withdraw if it decides that “extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country”. What does the State Department visualize as extraordinary events within the intent of this treaty?

7. If Soviet cheating is detected, will it be possible for the US to convince the world of their guilt without declassifying US detection system or intelligence? Is there ground to fear that world doubts or disbelief might prevent our action to abrogate?

1. Requests Department of State assistance in preparation for Congressional hearings on test ban treaty. Attached is a list of political questions JCS would like to have answered. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban, Congressional Relations I, 5/63–7/63.