Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

208. Telegram 271 from Moscow, July 22¹

Moscow, July 22, 1963, noon

Today’s session began 3 pm with same US group as last meeting.

Fisher began by reporting proceedings drafting committee this morning.

After some discussion various points in Article 1 tentative agreement reached on following:

(1) Sovs accepted inclusion of qte to prevent unqte following qte to prohibit unqte in para 1; (2) US/UK accepted language para 1.a subject to minor editorial changes; (3) in para 1.b, add after qte conducted unqte qte it is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the parties have stated in the preamble to this treaty, they seek to achieve. Unqte; (4) Sovs agreed make language para 2 conform to language para 1.

Re (1) above, there was no discussion.

Re (2) above, Gromyko expressed concern US language did not cover underwater explosions in inland waters. Harriman and Hailsham said neither US nor UK intended conduct such explosions; assumed Sovs had no such intentions either and accepted Sov language.

Re (3) above, there was lengthy discussion in course of which Gromyko’s main point was that since para 1.b in effect created a special category of explosions it should be made clear that such explosions would be covered by any future comprehensive treaty. Harriman and Hailsham said intention was have all types nuclear explosions, including those referred to in para 1.b, covered by any future comprehensive treaty. Harriman pointed out, however, that Washington’s preference was to reflect this intention in preamble rather than body of text, saying para 3 preamble could be appropriately modified for that purpose. Gromyko countered preamble already agreed and such solution would only complicate matters. Suggested brief recess so that principals could consult advisers. During recess US/UK developed language which Sovs accepted with minor drafting changes. Harriman stressed language subject to Washington’s approval.

Re (4) above, there was no discussion.

Gromyko then proposed turn to Article 4 (“withdrawal” clause). Asked if any comments on Sov proposal.

Harriman said thought matter could be handled without changing Russian text simply by agreeing to difference English translation Russian terms, i.e., substitution qte subject matter unqte instead of qte contents unqte and qte extraordinary events unqte instead qte extraordinary circumstances unqte. It was agreed these new translations would be English text with Russian text remaining unchanged.

Harriman then raised problem of qte peaceful uses unqte. Said although this not rpt not now rpt now mentioned in treaty, he had discussed matter with Khrushchev yesterday. Khrushchev had spoken of great new Sov projects concerning canals and reversing flow of river. US had considered possibility of new canal across Isthmus Panama. Such projects might involve qte peaceful uses unqte. Under terms of article on amendment this might be possible by agreement all original parties. Harriman stated merely wanted make record clear that any one of the parties who wished in future use atomic energy for peaceful purposes might raise matter in this fashion. Gromyko agreed saying Sov position on peaceful uses had been stated in context treaty under negotiation, without prejudging issue for future. Harriman said would now be able say amendment could be requested and Sovs agreed consider it without prior commitment.

Concerning amendment, Gromyko inquired whether would be two-thirds or simple majority. Harriman said preferred simple majority which would make it easier for USSR, US and UK to accomplish what they wished. Gromyko said had no objection to simply majority. Harriman suggested, and Gromyko agreed, include in para 5, Art 5, reference to withdrawal notices.

Gromyko said next wished discuss situation which would be created if French refused adhere treaty and continued test. In this event Sov Govt would wish re-examine situation. This serious matter and he hoped US and UK efforts persuade France adhere would be crowned with success. Add Sov Govt reserved right issue formal statement concerning France at appropriate stage progress this treaty.

Gromyko said wished again point out Soviets proposing in all seriousness return to subject of NAP. Would like recall Khrushchev statement re importance this subject and his remarks re favorable consequences which would ensue from signing such pact. Trusted no one would deny that 3-environmental TB treaty does not constitute disarmament or even beginning of disarmament although of positive significance. But simultaneous conclusion both TB and NAP would certainly have definite positive effect and lead to international détente. Would also create more understanding among states and more favorable atmosphere for study other question, particularly German question and settlement situation West Berlin. Said did not know whether others ready this meeting say anything new re UK and US position re NAP, but in accord Soviet Government position must emphasize again importance attached NAP in combination with TB.

Harriman said wished postpone discussion France until three principals meet privately later. Gromyko agreed. Harriman stated we fully recognize seriousness which Soviet Government attaches NAP and yet at loss how deal with other than in communiqué saying we prepared take matter up and discuss with respective allies who of course would be affected.

Gromyko regretted Harriman had said little new. Said there was evidently still belief NAP would yield income or dividends to Soviets but this was not case and was not reason they pursuing it. NAP would be useful for everyone in easing international tension and benefitting cause of peace.

II

Hailsham stated UK delegation had no doubts re importance Soviet Government attaches this matter, was particularly anxious achieve détente. Problem was how far could go without exceeding instructions or causing NATO allies feel we had negotiated this subject behind their backs. Emphasized could neither go beyond instructions nor negotiate behind allies’ backs. Said had put down language which might be used in communiqué and which Harriman had seen. At this point Hailsham handed Soviets text contained Emb’s 248. Hailsham said felt this language would assist purposes Soviets had in mind and create favorable atmosphere in which further discussion could take place.

After looking at text Gromyko remarked that it not only showed no positive attitude toward NAP but on contrary even cast doubt on expediency its being discussed. Added was certain positive Soviet reaction to this language had not been expected. Every state was free to consult its allies. Soviets were proposing not consultation with our allies regarding expediency NAP discussion, but that understanding be reached on necessity of concluding NAP and in combination with TB.

Hailsham responded was difficult carry matter much further at this time in view instructions from President and Prime Minister. Would carry matter as far as possible and would seek instructions. President’s and Prime Minister’s instructions not based on lack of desire conclude agreement. Point is that allies would react strongly to any attempt on our part to prejudge outcome of discussion. Any such action on our part would be counterproductive and would reduce chances agreement eventually being achieved. Not a word of what Soviets had said would be overlooked. President’s and Prime Minister’s instructions had been based on desire avoid resentment of allies but within limits these instructions willing go far as possible.

Agreeing with Hailsham, Harriman emphasized that anything that appeared to our allies as if we were settling matters behind their backs would create difficulties. Necessary get agreement all NATO partners or nothing could be done. Anything having appearance pressure would be counterproductive. Promised go forward in good faith. Had studied and liked text UK just distributed. Felt “desirability” was asset rather than liability.

Harriman recalled President and Prime Minister had written Khrushchev early in June concerning TB discussion and this was basis for presence UK and US delegations in Moscow. Was only shortly prior delegations’ departure for Moscow that Khrushchev had made East Berlin speech re TB and NAP. Therefore US and UK delegations empowered negotiate TB but nothing else. Hoped could conclude TB and proceed in orderly manner to give fullest consideration to discussion nonaggression between our respective allies or between USSR, US, and UK again if authorized by allies negotiate for them. Was certain world would be very disappointed if at this stage after rather protracted negotiations announcement agreement on TB could not be made. Felt such announcement would create favorable atmosphere for further developments. Trust no thought TB would be held up.

Gromyko said had nothing to add to what had previously said on this subject. Suggested adjournment plenary with three principals continuing meeting in private.

On Hailsham’s suggestion, was agreed drafting committee would meet tomorrow 10 AM to prepare clean draft TB treaty as presently agreed.

After agreement on language today’s communiqué, was agreed plenary would meet again 3 PM tomorrow.

Kohler

1. Readout of July 22 meeting with Gromyko. Secret. 5 pp. Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18–3 USSR (MO).